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ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

In document Political Law Cases (Page 158-162)

EVALYN I. FETALINO and AMADO M. CALDERON, MANUEL A

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORMER DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS ARTURO C. MOJICA

G.R. No. 146486, March 4, 2005, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

When Sec. 2, Article XI of the Constitution includes Ombudsman as one of the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office.

Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.

Facts:

A complaint was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation for allegations of extortion, sexual harassment and oppression against Deputy Ombudsman Arturo Mojica. Consequently, the Office of Ombudsman ordered that a separate criminal and administrative case be filed against Mojica. Aggrieved, Mojica filed a petition before the CA. The CA dismissed the complaints against Mojica, holding that Deputy Ombudsman is a public officer whose membership in the Philippine Bar is a qualification for the office held by him and removable only by impeachment, therefore he cannot be charged with disbarment during his incumbency. Instead, he should be impeached first before he may be held answerable to disbarment proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not a Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.

Ruling:

No. As enumerated in Sec. 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. When it includes Ombudsman as one of the impeachable officers, it refers to the rank or title and not the office.

Therefore, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, et. al

G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011, CARPIO MORALES, J.

The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice.

Facts:

Two impeachment complaints were filed against Ombudsman Gutierrez, both were based betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. The House Plenary referred the two complaints to the House of Representative Committee on Justice. After hearing, the House of Representative Committee on Justice issued a Resolution finding both complaints sufficient in form and substance. Consequently, Ombudsman Gutierrez contended that the issued the Resolution violated the one-year bar provision under Article XI, Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it issued the Resolution

Ruling:

No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case, the HR Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted the second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed.

Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the complaints sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment

Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution, and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.

EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al.

G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.

Facts:

This case involves two consolidated petitions filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. The petition of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales involves the Decision of the Office of the President finding him guilty of inexcusable negligence and gross violation of rules of procedure by allowing PSI Rolando Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification. He was then dismissed from his office. On the other hand, the petition of Special Prosecutor Sulit involves the order of the Office of the President initiating a Preliminary Investigation and requiring him to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave.

Consequently, they filed their separate petitions assailing the act of the President of removing them from their office. They both claim that the President has no disciplinary jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

Issue:

Whether or not the Office of the President has the power to remove and disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor.

Ruling:

Yes. Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

The manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions, Section 8(2) and Section 21, was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and employees.

Moreover, following the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise. Therefore, in giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.

EMILIO A. GONZALES III v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, et. al.

G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, BRION, J.

Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Facts:

This is a motion for reconsideration for the decision of the Supreme Court in the consolidated case of Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit. In such case, Gonzales and Barreras Sulit assailed the power to remove and disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the President. In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 which grants President disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is constitutional.

Ruling:

No. In this case, the Supreme Court reversed its prior pronouncement and votes to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. However, this conclusion does not apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Constitution.

Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.

Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office.

However, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN

In document Political Law Cases (Page 158-162)