Who Is Accountable to Whom?

The concept of accountability in a post-conflict framework entails several different meanings and sometimes appears extremely complex and elusive. It may be useful to consider, in the first place, legal accountability.

The existence of legal mechanisms to ascertain the truth and to prosecute persons accused of criminal behaviors both during the conflict and in its immediate aftermath is a crucial component of post-conflict reconciliation. International conventions, when applicable to the concerned country, cover the most serious crimes (crimes against humanity, war crimes, etc); a peace agreement may or may not include clauses on transitional justice, truth and conciliation committees, special tribunals, amnesty laws, and such. International actors, however, are to a large extent immune from this kind of jurisdiction. This appears particularly significant in situations where the UN or other external entities enjoy very broad powers, such as in the transitional administration of territories (as in the recent cases of Kosovo and East Timor), where they exert, de jure or de facto, legislative, judicial and administrative power. In similar circumstances, the risks of abusing their powers and violating the rights of the population are very high; nonetheless, no effective accountability mechanism has been put in place to address potential abuses. In some instances, an ombudsperson institution has been established (for example, in Kosovo and East Timor), but it lacks effective powers other than the ability to make recommendations to the UN mission, even regarding abuses committed by the same. Their reports have been at times extremely critical of the UN missions’ lack of respect for human rights and, more generally, of the missions’ legal and democratic principles.84

83_Ibid.

84 _{The Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, in its second annual report 2001–2002 stated that} “UNMIK [UN Mission in Kosovo] is not structured according to democratic principles, does not function in accordance with the rule of law, and does not respect important international human rights norms. The people of Kosovo are therefore deprived of protection of their basic rights and freedoms three years after the end of the conflict by the very entity set up to guarantee them.”

The proposal85 made by the UN Secretary-General to create an

ombudsperson in all peacekeeping missions to deal with complaints from civilians about the behavior of peacekeepers has not been implemented so far, and repeated abuses (especially sexual exploitation) are now considered almost inevitable in all peacekeeping missions. Even when evidence is gathered against members of UN peace missions, the decision to prosecute them rests with the authorities of their own country, while the UN can only issue administrative sanctions.

Given the more limited scope of authority of an ordinary UN peace mission (compared to a transitional administration), the absence of accountability mechanisms for illegal or criminal behavior on the part of its members may seem to be a relatively minor drawback. However, the simple prospect of impunity for abuses committed by the very persons deployed to assist countries emerging from conflict has a very disturbing moral impact.

The second aspect is that of political accountability of UN peace operations. Since they normally derive their legal authority from Security Council’s resolutions, UN peace missions are accountable to the Council, through the Secretary-General, who is usually required to present reports on each mission at regular intervals (typically every three months). In substance, the debate within the Security Council takes place almost exclusively on the basis of the reports of the Secretary-General, which are “generally taken at face value.”86

As for the activities of individual UN and other development agencies operating in a post-conflict country, they are normally reported to agencies’ headquarters and subsequently to their governing bodies. Also, the only reports discussed are usually those made by the same staff on the ground, with little if any possibility for members of the board to independently assess their activity.

In practice, while external actors stress the importance of upholding the principles of transparency and accountability on the part of authorities of beneficiary countries as a crucial component of good governance, they appear reluctant to adopt substantial measures to enhance their own accountability.

Another element sometimes raised is that of making external actors accountable to the beneficiaries of their activity, although at present “there are no dedicated mechanisms for promoting the transparency of external actors vis-à-vis elected representatives in the post-conflict countries they assist.”87

The feasibility and desirability of such mechanisms is still a matter of debate, and it is difficult to establish their legal basis. However, as noted by

85 _{Se the Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts, UN} Doc S/1999/957, recommendation 31.

86 _{Chesterman, You, the People.}

Simon Chesterman (in reference to situations of transitional administrations, though the point applies more generally to all peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations):

“Creating mechanisms by which the international presence may be held accountable can both encourage the emergence of an indigenous human rights and rule of law culture as well as improve the day-to-day governance of the territory. The failure to do so…will lead to frustration and suspicion on the part of local actors.”88