Title II. LEGAL SEPARATION (Articles 55-67)
Article 61 (Administration issues pendente lite) See also, and compare with, Article 124
Facts:
Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a diplomat was assigned in different countries and left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15years. After his retirement he returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children.
After 4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their property in San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership and would use the proceeds of the sale for his hospital and medical treatments.
Respondent (wife) opposed the authorization and filed an action for legal separation. Respondent alleges that that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and their children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband never returned to them being the legitimate family and lived in a separate house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng and their children.
Judge Umali found that petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Curameng. Court granted the decree of legal separation and the petitioner is not entitled to share in the conjugal properties and he is not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
30 Decision of lower court was appealed and was granted the writ of
preliminary injunction filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from interfering in the administration of their properties. Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against the other because no right will be violated.
Issue:
WON article124 is applicable as regards to joint administration of conjugal properties
Held:
Grant for preliminary injunction is valid; it is necessary to protect the interest of the respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Injunction has not permanently installed the respondent as the administrator of the whole conjugal assets
Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction:
o Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal estate
o There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner may result to the irresponsible disposition of assets that would cause injury to his wife and children
Primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit.
Twin requirements of valid injunction:
o Existence of a right
o Actual or threatened violation
Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple would appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd person to act as the administrator.
Ong v. Ong
GR# 153206 / OCT. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76
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SSS v. Aguas
GR# 165546 / FEB. 27, 2006 483 SCRA 383
Facts:
Pablo Aguas died on December 8, 1996. Pablo‘s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits.
Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly pension was settled.
In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablo‘s sister, contesting Rosanna‘s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man, and that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.
The SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn‘s monthly pension. In an investigation, it was reported that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna and that Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn.
31 Rosanna was advised to refund to the SSS the amount representing
the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn. Rosanna and Jeylnn file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC). Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant.
SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund the SSS. On Appeal, the CA rendered a decision in favor of Rosanna.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are entitled to the pension benefit.
Held:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Jeylnn‘s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn‘s status as a legitimate child can no longer be contested.
The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis. Respondents submitted a photocopy of Janet‘s alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn‘s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register.
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimant-spouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is
the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.
Rosanna presented a copy of their marriage certificate verified with the civil register. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone.
The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely
"adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it;
hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470 / OCT. 08, 1985 139 SCRA 13
Facts:
Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen and Richard Upton, an American citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they resided in the Philippines and begot two children. In 1982, the parties
32 were divorced in Nevada, United States. Alice has re-married in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice with the RTC stating that her business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties. He asks that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss.
Hence, this petition.
In her petition, Alice contends that Richard is estopped from claiming on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; hence, barred by prior judgment.
Richard avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not Richard still has the right over the alleged conjugal properties.
Ruling:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on Richard as an American citizen. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as her husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain that, under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
GR# 80116 / JUNE 30, 1989 174 SCRA 652
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Private Respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on
33 the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property.
On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. However, on June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Issue:
Whether or not the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.
Held:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Thus, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Limbona v. Comelec
GR# 181097 / JUNE 25, 2008 555 SCRA 391
Facts:
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik
"Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte for May 2007 National and Local Elections. Malik filed a petition for disqualification against Mohammed on the ground that it failed to comply with the one-year residence rule. COMELEC disqualified Mohammad. Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad.
Issue: WON Norlaine is disqualified for running as mayor on the ground of failure to comply with one-year residence.
Ruling:
We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth;
and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner's husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
34 Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case
of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioner's disqualification would not result in Malik's proclamation who came in second during the special election.
Ilusorio v. Bildner
GR# 139789 / 139808 / MAY 12, 200 332 SCRA 169
Facts:
Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium.
On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with
another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I.
Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her.
On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7
What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8
On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties.
Issue(s):
The Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit:
(a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio;
(b) Whether the same is relevant; and
(c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9 Held:
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus:
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio
35 Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she
would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15
The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16 Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments.
Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.