PLATAMON: 14 16 APRIL
ANALYSIS OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
Operational Setting
The overall German strategy for Greece was based on the need for a quick decision, which was in keeping with their ‘preference for short, decisive campaigns.’72 This necessitated the employment of the blitzkrieg tactics which had served the Germans well in previous campaigns.73 Paddy Griffiths has written that the success of blitzkrieg lay in ‘moving a mechanised force through an enemy’s front line before he had time to consolidate it, and then playing havoc in his rear areas...’74 21 Battalion’s defence prevented penetration and the creation of “havoc” for 21 Battalion, and more so for the remainder of Lustreforce which was still north of Larisa. The terrain, as the Allies would find with Italy, was good for defence and at odds with the German imperative for a quick
71 Report by 3 Pz Regt (2 Pz Div), Reports from Various Formations of 12th Army (Greece). WAII 1, DA
438/21/4, NA.
72 J.P. Harris, ‘The Myth of Blitzkrieg’, War in History, Volume 2, Number 3, 1995, p. 344. Harris argues
that the idea that the Germans espoused a “blitzkrieg” doctrine in World War II is spurious and that it has only become known by that title after the fact. See also Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 311.
73 War Diary of HQ 1 Australian Corps 6 Mar- 24 Apr 41, Appendix F to 1 Aust Corps Op Intn No. 4, para
3. Freyberg Papers: War Diary ANZAC Corps 1940- 41. WAII 8/9, NA. Also, Peter Ewer, p. 142. See note in margin ‘Blitzkrieg in the Greek mountains’ within Herman Balck, ‘Translation of taped conversation with General Hermann Balck 13 April 1979’, unpublished, Battelle Columbus Laboratory Tactical Technology Center, Ohio, July 1979, p. 11.
result, where flat or rolling terrain was better suited.75 The topography in Greece, with its constricted routes, as 21 Battalion’s defence at Platamon demonstrated, was not ideal for a blitzkrieg war of speed and manoeuvre.
Larisa was the German objective at the operational level.76 The capture of Larisa by striking through Platamon provided them with an opportunity to encircle the Allies.77 The Germans and the senior Allied commanders both considered the coastal route to Larisa through Platamon and the Pinios Gorge, but each drew different conclusions about its utility for tanks, and assigned forces on that basis. A realistic understanding on enemy capabilities and terrain effects is therefore an essential tool for intelligence staff and commanders. The coastal route was the shortest route to Larisa, a point which appears to have been overlooked by Allied planners.78 The coastal route also allowed for a
simultaneous and supporting advance across country by mountain troops which would not be restricted to roads like the panzer or mechanised forces, and which could ultimately appear behind any locations that blocked the tanks.
The British and Allied forces appreciated the combat power of the German forces, but they underestimated the willingness of German commanders, at the operational and tactical levels, to negotiate difficult terrain which the Allies would at this stage of the war consider impassable.79 Clearly they did not appreciate the mind set of German
commanders, their willingness to utilise almost any and every route, or the mobility of their panzers, for they had not faced them previously. This provided the Germans with an edge.
75 Charles Cruickshank, Greece 1940- 1941, Newark: University of Delaware Press, First American
Edition, 1979, p. 142.
76 Balck, Ordnung im Chaos, p. 321.
77 Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, Detelf Vogel, Germany and the Second World War Volume III:
The Mediterranean, South- East Europe, and North Africa 1939- 1941, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 509.
78 Narrator’s Note to Para 16, Wards, Campaign Narrative- Campaign in Greece -Part III and Appendices,
p. 257.
79 Connor, Finding Ways to Survive, p. 41. This has similarities to British reluctance to use the jungle in
This battle showed that the site directed by New Zealand Division headquarters for 21 Battalion to fight from was a sound choice. However, their analysis of the threat and therefore the allocation of sufficient and appropriate resources for to 21 Battalion to achieve its mission, was flawed. This led to 21 Battalion becoming combat ineffective. The mission assigned to 21 Battalion was not within their capacity to undertake given the strength and composition of Battlegroup 2.
Force Strength
The nominal strength of any unit engaged in fighting must be adjusted from its authorised strength to account for casualties sustained previously through combat or from illness, for personnel left out of battle, and those whose employment, especially in a headquarters or administrative capacity, did not contribute directly to combat.80 Any elements (personnel or key weapons) detached or positioned where they did not influence the action must also be subtracted in order to determine true relative strengths. Similarly, the numbers of tanks, mortars and guns are counted, but not their crews.
The records show that 618 members of 21 Battalion deployed to Greece, although this was not the actual number engaged in combat at Platamon.81 Of the 618, nine officers and men were left behind in Athens when the battalion departed for Platamon.82 A further 95 personnel did not participate in the fighting, simply because of their role. These included the battalion’s second in command and the battalion’s administrative and transport personnel of two officers and 92 men. It is assessed, therefore, that the “fighting” or “bayonet strength” of the battalion at Platamon was actually 514 men.83 From this total, the complete strength of D Company, approximately 104 men, must also be subtracted as
80 This same logic was applied by N.C. Phillips with respect to German strength states in New Zealand’s
official history of the Italian campaign. See fn 1 to N.C. Phillips, Italy Volume I: The Sangro to Cassino, Wellington: War History Branch, 1957, p. 99. It will be applied throughout the remaining battle analysis chapters.
81 Chapter 6 -To Greece, p. 2. 21 Bn War History. Shaw T.R., 21 Battalion Unit History: Chapter 7 Greece-
Preliminary Draft and Chapter 6- move to Greece .WAII 1 DA 54/15/3, NA. The total was made up of 37 officers and 581 men.
82 John M. Stevenson to J.F. Cody, letter, 13th February, 1951. Correspondence concerning 21 Battalion’s
part in the Greek Campaign. WAII 1 DA 54/10/20, NA.
83 Sailing strength, less the Battalion 2IC, the battalion’s administrative and support personnel and the nine
the company was sited on the rear slope of Castle Ridge and therefore could not, and did not, contribute at all to the fighting on the forward slope of Castle ridge or in C
Company’s location. Thus the bayonet strength of the battalion at Platamon is assessed as 410 men. This total includes battalion headquarters, Mortar Platoon and three rifle
companies only. Bayonet Strength (Infantry) Medium Mortars Artillery Tanks
21 Battalion (3 companies only) 410 2
A Troop 4
Battlegroup 2:84
2 MC Battalion Attack 15 Apr (three
companies only)85
561 6 16
Regimental Attack
15 Apr (four companies 2 MC Battalion)
748 6 16 3486
Regimental Attack
16 Apr (eight companies- 2 MC and II/304 Battalions)
1496 12 16 34
Table 3.2: Relative strengths at Platamon
Battlegroup 2 was significantly stronger than 21 Battalion. Its nominal strength has also been reduced to reflect only those elements involved in each encounter so that the
numbers are consistent with 21 Battalion. Attacking strengths of Battlegroup 2 comprised mainly the forward motorcycle, infantry and panzer elements, and their supporting
84 Strengths are based on Wards, “Panzer Attack in Greece”, p. 5. Panzer regiment tank strength was stated
as 100, the reinforced MC battalion 1050 men, infantry battalion (I/ 304 Infantry Regiment)1026 men and the artillery (I/ 74 Artillery Regiment) twelve 105 mm and four 150 mm guns. A second source recorded that the attack on 16 April was made by 100 tanks, two infantry battalions, twelve 105 mm guns and four 150mm guns ‘as well as other artillery and technical units.’ Donald S. Detwiler (ed.), World War II German Military Studies Volume 13 Part VI. The Mediterranean Theater, New York: Garland Publishing, 1979, p. 98. These figures are considered (much like the New Zealand upper end figures) to include all the non-combatant elements as well. Infantry bayonet strengths have therefore been based on the basis of rifle companies.
85 This is based on three full strength rifle companies at 4 officers and 183 men each, a total of 187 men per
company.
86The official number of tanks involved was 100 as indicated in footnote 84. The official number was
based on the total numbers of tanks within I/3 Panzer Regiment. However, it is assessed that the actual number able to participate, due to frontage and terrain, was no more than two tank companies, the maximum number committed by Balck in the regimental attack on 16 April. Tank companies each contained five light tanks and 12 mediums tanks (4 in each of the three tank platoons). The maximum number committed to each attack would therefore have been 34. Tank strengths of panzer companies are based on Charles C. Sharp, German Panzer Tactics in World War II, np: George Nafziger, c.1998, pp. 26- 27 and 32.
artillery and mortars. The strength varied in each of the attacks as shown in Table 3.2. It has not been possible to adjust the figures within Battlegroup 2 for casualties sustained in each attack. Casualties prior to Platamon are assumed to have been minimal.
Although its assault was focused on A Company, 2 Motorcycle Battalion attacked with just one company forward, with a strength of no more than 187 men. As the leading company emerged from the scrub, as many as 200 defenders (A and B Companies combined) engaged them with small arms fire. The effect was devastating on the attackers. The ratio of fire, approximately 1:1 was significantly altered in favour of the defence- hence it being quoted as the superior form- because of the relative superiority of being protected in trenches when the attacker is in the open. 21 Battalion’s defensive
posture was superior to that of the attackers, who were above ground, exposed. The difficult axis of assault prevented the Germans bringing forward direct fire support weapons, and there was no ground which overlooked the objective (other than higher up the ridge towards Pandeleimon), where a fire support position could have been
established and thus claw back some of the numerical disadvantage, by suppressing those infantry (primarily of B Company) who were not being attacked directly, but were contributing to the defensive small arms fire unmolested. The Germans did not make effective use of their artillery for neutralisation or destruction either. In fact, Balck stated that his ‘artillery was doomed to be useless.’87 For the size of the objective (and 21 Battalion would experience this at Bir Ghirba- Chapter 5), there was too little artillery to suppress the area effectively. The use of panzers in the second attack was an attempt to overcome this limitation, in conjunction with turning the New Zealand flank.
By the time of the regimental attack at dawn on 16 April, the Germans had a 3:1
attacking ratio (based on rifle companies alone) and they employed supporting weapons (finally) and tanks as well. The odds were now much more favourable for the attacker.
The analysis of this battle has shown that posture- whether one is attacking or in defence- was a significant combat effectiveness factor. Initially, 21 Battalion was able to hold off
the significantly larger Battlegroup 2 because being in defence improved its strength relative to the attackers. However, once Battlegroup 2 got more troops into the fight, by the use of envelopment and simultaneously employing the panzers, they were able to overcome 21 Battalion’s defences. 21 Battalion’s small arms fire was devastating against
2 Motorcycle Battalion. Bayonet strength, due to the siting of D Company in depth behind the ridge where it was unable to contribute to the battle, was a detractor from 21 Battalion’s combat effectiveness in this battle.
Battlefield Effects
Castle Ridge was an ideal location from which to delay a German advance east of Mount Olympus, as it was a natural choke point and because it was dominating ground that lay astride the enemy’s main approach. With the slopes of Mount Olympus on its left and the sea to its right, the site appeared to be safe from envelopment. The ridge’s steep forward slope and thick vegetation made it difficult to mount a massed infantry attack on a broad front from the north. The battlefield effects on the combat effectiveness of New Zealand and German forces at Platamon, derived using the OCOKA template, are summarised in Table 3.3 below.
Observation and Fields of Fire
Castle Ridge overlooked the plain along which the Germans approached. Observation was good enough for artillery fire to be called on German movement, and gun positions were
observed as far as 11,000 yards forward of the battalion.88 21 Battalion was unable to press
home this advantage due to its small number of mortars (two) and field guns (four). A Company, on the right, had excellent fields of fire, although only at short range. When German infantry emerged from the vegetation forward of the defenders, they did so into open ground just short of the fighting pits allowing the New Zealanders to sweep the area with aimed small arms fire to deadly effect. As a result the Germans were unable to break into any of the A or B Company positions. Yeoman stated that the infantry never got closer than 50- 100 yards from the New Zealand positions for:
once they had to leave the scrub for the open top of the knoll they came under fire. The section posts of A Company had excellent fields of fire. But enemy tanks
88 Report of “A” Troop 27 Bty, 5 Fd Regt, NZ by Lt L.G. Williams. Report attached to L.G. Williams to
J.F. Cody, letter, dated 11th July 1950, Correspondence concerning 21 Battalion’s part in Greek Campaign.
WAII 1 DA 54/10/20, NA. See also Chapter 7 Greece, p. 8 (p. 15 in left margin). 21 Bn War History. Shaw T.R., 21 Battalion Unit History: Chapter 7 Greece-Preliminary Draft and Chapter 6- move to Greece. WAII 1 DA 54/15/3, NA where it records that ‘The arty did some wonderful shooting… Lt Wilson with his mortars was just in his element.’
forcing their way through the foothills to the N[orth] and crashing through the
scrub were able to keep hull down and come within 2 – 300 yards of A Coy.89
Cover and concealment
Cover, or protection from bullets and shrapnel, was gained through trenches dug by the battalion. As a result, the battalion’s casualties were light despite the heavy artillery, mortar
and tank fire sustained.90 Even though the ground was hard, adequate cover was able to be
developed because the battalion had digging tools (shovels and picks) and they had engineers with explosives to help prepare fighting trenches. In addition, they had had sufficient time to complete these preparations before the enemy arrived.
Obstacles The ground itself was the major obstacle to the attackers. It impeded dismounted infantry
movement, frustrated their attempts to attack in a coordinated and overwhelming mass and prevented tank attacks from breaking into and beyond the platoon positions. Tanks were forced to keep to the track until very close to the platoons, however they were still unable to penetrate the New Zealand position. Other than the single tank casualty caused by an antitank mine, all other tank “casualties” were caused by the terrain.
Only a limited quantity of man made obstacles were possible as the battalion was allocated very little in the way of barbed wire or mines. The engineer obstacle tasks completed at Platamon were the demolition of the railway tunnel, placement of a small antitank minefield and crater on the forward slope of the ridge near the crest, and another small
crater on the track on the reverse slope of the hill.91
Key Terrain The Vital ground was Castle Ridge. Had the Germans captured this then the battalion
position would have been lost. Key Terrain included the high ground near Pandeleimon (as it offered the enemy a means to bypass the battalion), the tunnel, Castle Hill and Hill 226. The tunnel was significant because if captured it would have allowed the Germans to penetrate beneath 21 Battalion and to attack it from the rear, and ultimately it would have provided a suitable passage for the heavy elements of Battlegroup 2. Although Castle Hill and Hill 226 were threatened, often, they were retained until the entire position was abandoned by the defence.
The loss of the Key Terrain near Pandeleimon afforded the Germans the advantage of being able to attack down towards the Vital Ground, although they were unable to exploit this straight away as the men were exhausted from their night approach march and the stiff fighting. It was the loss of this Key Terrain that highlights the failure of 21 Battalion to designate a force, probably D Company in depth, to ‘counter-attack should either [key Terrain] be captured’ as stated in the battalion’s orders.
Avenues of approach
Macky correctly identified the most likely German approaches and disposed itself to cover them. The battalion’s dispositions meant that it could defend against attacks from both approaches simultaneously. Denial of the centre approach to tank and infantry threats was effective, even if terrain was the cause of the tanks failure to break into the position, rather than defensive fire. The left approach was not able to be denied effectively, as this really required greater numbers of infantry and more firepower. As it was, 2 Motor Cycle Battalion and I/ 304 Regiment had to be employed simultaneously in order to capture C Company’s position on the left.
Table 3.3: OCOKA terrain analysis for Platamon
89 Yeoman A.A., Activities of 21 NZ Bn during Greek Campaign, Apr 1941. WA II 1 DA 54/10/2, NA.
90 Report on Operations 21 Battalion in Greece by Lt-Col N.L. Macky (Prepared after return to New
Zealand and circulated privately), p.18. WAI 1 DA 54/10/19, NA. Macky stated the casualties were ’very light in view of the artillery fire to which we were subjected.’
91 T.W.O. Jones to J.F. Cody, letter, 4th December 1950, Correspondence concerning 21 Bn in the
Overall, the terrain favoured the defence. 21 Battalion had occupied suitable terrain from which to undertake its mission, and it was successful initially. The location provided long range observation to defenders. Further, and as can be seen in Figure 3.2, the steep and broken nature of the slope leading up from the plain disrupted attacks by panzers and by massed infantry. Although these effects prevented penetration of the defence from the front, the open flank meant envelopment in the area of Pandeleimon was inevitable given the overall numerical superiority of the Germans. This battle has shown that terrain can be a significant barrier, raising the level of combat effectiveness of any force protected by