ANNEX 3A – TARGETING IN SUPPORT OF ATTACK THE NETWORKS
3A1. Joint targeting58 is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives. In this case it will assist in determining which aspects of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) System to attack and how best to do this. Targeting relies upon identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritizing targets, and the synchronization of fires with other military capabilities (including cognitive activities) and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. It is both an operational level and component level command function.
3A2. Successful targeting requires:
a. Clear understanding of the desired effects and their consequences.
b. Prioritisation and sequencing to balance demands and resources.
c. Balancing short-term impact against longer term considerations.
d. Established and proven measures of effectiveness.
e. The management of unintended consequences.
3A3. Targeting Intelligence. Even when good intelligence is available, it normally requires further analytical work to be developed into high grade targeting intelligence. There are 2 interlinked functions that underpin this. The first involves collecting background information and the second function develops this into contact information. Refined, the 2 functions become:
a. Generation of an intelligence picture to underpin understanding.
b. Development of target intelligence.
3A4. Developing Target Intelligence. High quality targeting intelligence is required to direct physical or cognitive activities against specific groups or individuals, while reducing collateral risk. It is achieved by focused tasking and analysis designed to ‘zero-in’ on adversarial groups and the IED System.
This requires the explicit direction and involvement of the commander himself, not least as it is likely to require the commitment of resources. Forces should be deployed for the specific task of gaining information and refining intelligence.
58 Joint targeting is described in more detail in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.
3A5. Continual Refinement. Continual refinement should precede action. The process can be compared to a spiral known as a virtuous spiral. Refined understanding will lead to refined direction to gather more information leading to further refined understanding. This is explained in Figure 3A.1.
The Population
Figure 3A.1 – Targeting Refinement – the Virtuous Spiral 3A6. Two further aspects of targeting refinement should be considered:
a. Patience. Each time the commander draws his deductions he will need to weigh the benefits of immediate action, against the potentially greater benefits that may be gained from further refinement. Clearly a decision to gather further information risks missing fleeting opportunities. Yet premature exploitation action not only causes set-backs in the spiral, it may have far wider implications including the loss to understanding of the adversaries’ pattern of life (painstakingly built up) due to tightened security. Such actions can also damage the support of the wider population through unintended consequences.
Building a pattern of life in a foreign society is a long-term investment and understanding the IED system and its networks will take time. In the long run, time invested in growing intelligence capital will pay dividends. Once the intelligence picture has been sufficiently developed, the 2 intelligence functions – understanding and targeting – will have a synergistic effect.
b. Multiple Spirals. Throughout a campaign there are likely to be multiple spirals operating, both in and out of theatre. Each network or adversarial group could require its own analytical spiral. Gathering information to fuel these spirals relies on the prioritisation and co-ordination of collection assets, and the adoption of organisational structures and information sharing protocols. In stabilisation these factors will differ markedly from those employed in more conventional warfighting operations. Furthermore, for C-IED an additional factor will be the capacity and effectiveness of technical intelligence and the input from the C-IED exploitation system at all levels.
3A7. Principles of Targeting. The principles of joint targeting are:
a. Focused. The targeting process is focused on achieving the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) objectives efficiently and effectively within the parameters set by NATO and as limited by applicable ROE and relevant international law. It strives to minimize collateral damage and fratricide.
b. Effects. Targeting is concerned with supporting the creation of effects to achieve the JFC’s objectives.
c. Interdisciplinary. Targeting requires the integrated efforts of many functional experts/disciplines and capabilities.
d. Systematic. In supporting the JFC’s campaign objectives, the targeting process seeks to create effects in a systematic manner.
e. Timeliness. Targeting is often time critical. It is therefore, fundamental that the transfer of information from source to user be as direct and as fast as possible. The timely initial reporting assessment is also critical.
Time sensitive targeting is often a feature of C-IED and its process59 is described in detail in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting.
f. Control and Coordination. Due to its importance, complexity, and potential political sensitivity, targeting policy and direction is normally retained at the highest practical joint level while the authority for the execution of that policy is delegated to the lowest practicable level. In order to avoid duplication, fratricide and confusion from the inability to coordinate, it is important that a system of centralised control is maintained on the targeting process. Proper use of the command structure and the management and coordinating functions of the joint targeting coordination board and the joint coordination board should be
59 The time sensitive targeting process incorporates 6 steps: find, fix, track, target, engage, assess and is also known as the F2T2EA process.
used to ensure that the targeting process is fully coordinated both across, and up and down the command levels.
g. Exploitation and Objectivity. Time permitting, all available information sources should be used and exploited methodically to ensure that the complete picture is obtained and that vital information is not overlooked.
h. Accessibility and Security. All the information produced to support the targeting process should, wherever possible, be held on shared databases. However, sensitive information may need to be stored and disseminated on a need to know basis in order to preserve OPSEC.
The need for OPSEC must be balanced with the need for timely access.
i. Reliability and Responsiveness. It is important that the information produced is as accurate as possible. It must be factually correct and portray the situation as it actually is, and not how the analyst (or the commander) may like it to be. Assessment products must be tailored to answer the commander’s questions accurately and concisely.
3A8. Joint Targeting Cycle. The joint targeting cycle consists of 6 phases. The phases are built upon the principles of effective and efficient joint targeting.
The cycle focuses targeting options on the JFC’s objectives for operations, while diminishing the likelihood of undesirable consequences. These are shown in Figure 3A.2 and are subsequently described.
Commander’s
Figure 3A.2 – The Joint Targeting Cycle
j. Phase 1 – Joint Force Commander’s Objectives, Guidance and Intent. Guidance from political, strategic and operational levels provides constraints and restraints for targeting, but it is the analysis of the commander’s intent that will determine targets that will have the greatest impact on achieving, or denying, that intent.
k. Phase 2 – Target Development, Validation, Nomination and Prioritization. Targets may be proposed by members of the commander’s staff or by his component commanders. Target development will determine those targets that will significantly assist in achieving the commander’s intent; the critical areas of vulnerability;
compliance with higher intent and rules of engagement. This will lead to the approval of a prioritized target list.
l. Phase 3 – Capabilities Analysis. Capabilities analysis matches appropriate capabilities (physical/cognitive) to the selected targets in order to best create the desired effect.
m. Phase 4 – Force Planning and Assignment. Force planning and assignment integrates capabilities with operational considerations and resources, and assigns responsibility to the appropriate component for subsequent engagement.
n. Phase 5 – Mission Planning and Force Execution. Mission planning and force execution is undertaken by the assigned component commanders in concert with the joint operation.
o. Phase 6 – Assessment. Assessment takes place to analyse progress on the force mission, and looks at task accomplishment, combat assessment and measures of effectiveness.
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