RE: APPLICATION FOR RETIREMENT OF RETIRED JUDGE MOSLEMEN T

MACARAMBON UNDER R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 9946 A.M. No. 14061, 19 June 2012, J. Brion

Resignation under RA 910 must be by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.

Facts:

Judge Moslemen Macarambon was an RTC Judge who was appointed as Comelec Commissioner before reaching the optional retirement age of 60.

He requested that he be allowed to retire under Sec. 1 of RA 910. The Judge asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of the RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. Citing the case of Re: Associate Justice Britanico, he posits that his appointment as Comelec Commissioner incapacitated him to discharge his duties as an RTC judge on account of his submission to the will of the political authority and appointing power. As an alternative, he appeals that he be allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1 considering that he has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and a total of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while he was short of the minimum age requirement of 60, he believes that the Court’s ruling in Re: Pineda is applicable to his case where the Court brushed aside such requirement and considered the retirees career which was marked with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned from his judicial office before reaching the optional retirement age to receive retirement benefits under RA 910.

Ruling:

No. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with certain age and service requirements specified by law and jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of law. Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception.

On the other hand, resignation under RA 910, as amended must be by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. Resignation contemplated under the law must have the element of involuntariness on the part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors

beyond his/her control. In either of the two instances, Judge Macarambon’s case does not render him eligible to retire under RA 910.

RE: LETTER OF COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICE VICENTE S.E. VELOSO FOR ENTITLEMENT TO LONGEVITY PAY FOR HIS SERVICES AS COMMISSION MEMBER III OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION

A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, BRION, J.

Longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then he returned to the judiciary.

Facts:

This case involves the letter-requests of CA Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan and CA Associate Justice Vicente Veloso for their claim of longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package. They anchored their claim under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 and the Court's ruling in In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo. In such case, Justice Pardo was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any interruption in his service. Accordingly, the court considered Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the judiciary as part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining his longevity pay.

Issue:

Whether or not they are entitled to longevity pay for their services rendered outside the judiciary.

Ruling:

No. Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that longevity pay should be given to the Justices and Judges of courts for each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary. However, the service outside of the judiciary is considered continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the judiciary, if a judge or justice left the judiciary to served in a single non-judicial governmental post and then he returned to the judiciary.

Hence, in this case, Associate Justice Salazar-Fernando was an incumbent MTC Judge, then she served as Chairman of LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC, then she was appointed as Commissioner of COMELEC, then as a consultant of COMELEC, and only then that she was appointed as Associate Justice of CA.

Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened which did not comply

with the requirement of service in a single non-judicial position. On the other hand, Associate Justices Gacutan and Veloso served as Commissioners of NLRC before they were appointed in the CA. However, NLRC is an agency attached to the DOLE, an Executive Department, and hence such is not considered as continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary for the purpose of longevity pay.