Assembly Elections 2001

While (at least concerning the Kosova-Albanian population) the election process went basically without problems, the aftermath gave a clear indication of the problems that Kosova had to confront. The LDK under Ibrahim Rugova was able to gain almost 46% of the votes and scored a clear (relative) victory. Nevertheless, compared with the 58% that the party scored in the Municipal elections only a year before, the result was a virtual slap in the face. The PDK, with nearly 26%, was the second strongest party, but still with a significant distance to Rugova. With close to 8% Haradinaj´s AAK was the third strongest party in the Albanian sector; all other contestants reached negligible results. On the Serbian side, the KP (Koalicija Povratak, or in

170 Some accounts of this behaviour and about intimidation before the Municipal elections can be found in the ICG Report “Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?” p. 8 cont.

171 A detailed analysis can be found in the ICG Balkans Report No.120: “Kosovo: Landmark Election”, published on 21 November 2001.

English, Coalition Return) was able to get about 11%, bringing it to the third place in the overall count. Apart from the above-mentioned political groups, ten other entities gained a seat, making it difficult to find a stable majority. The participation rate was 64% and generally considered a success, although the two mainly Serbian municipalities in the North, Zubin Potok (less then 30%) and Zvecan (less than 19%) had a significantly low turnout.

Among the Kosova-Albanian parties, soon a conflict erupted. Ibrahim Rugova was not able to get enough support to be elected president and therefore it was also not possible to form a government¹⁷². Especially the PDK was disappointed with the result and took measures to slow down the procedures after the constituting session of the Assembly in December. During the first round of voting, in December 2001, 50 out of 120 Assembly members did not vote, and in subsequent rounds Rugova continued to fail to obtain a sufficient majority. This stalemate, which lasted for several months, was only broken with UNMIK support, but at the expense of the Constitutional Framework. Brand¹⁷³ describes:

“Eventually the deadlock was broken by breaking the constitutional rules. (…).

After months of haggling, the newly arrived SRSG Steiner was able to strike a power sharing agreement among the three major Kosovo Albanian parties, the LDK, the PDK and the AAK. The ‘Agreement on the President and the Government of Kosovo’ of 28 February 2002 contained a package deal, according to which Bajram Rexhepi of the PDK would become Prime Minister, and the PDK in turn would support Rugova’s election for President. It also included an eight point list of priorities for the new government and a coalition formula (LDK – four ministers, PDK and AAK – two ministers each). On 4 March, the Kosovo Assembly voted in the President and the Government, which had just been presented, in a single, open ballot. Nine ministers were appointed. In order to accommodate the political aspirations of all coalition partners (two ministries were reserved for minorities) the originally foreseen Ministry of Health, Spatial Planning and the Environment was divided in two separate ministries. The candidate for the post of Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development, which was reserved for a Serb of the Coalition Return, was not confirmed. Finally, on 15 March 2002, the new government under Bajram Rexhepi had its first ordinary meeting.”

Bajram Rexhepi, the new Prime Minister was a medical doctor from Mitrovica who did not play a prominent role before being elected. His nomination was considered to be

172 See above. According to the Constitutional Framework, the President has to choose a Prime Minister, who was responsible to form a government. Therefore, without a President it was technically not possible to form a government.

173 Brand: p 37/38

a compromise, because although being a member of the UCK, he had no specific record from this time. PDK leader Hashim Thaci, who was generally considered to be the main contender for the function of Prime Minister, had to curb his ambitions.

Although it never was officially mentioned, it seems that firstly his bad personal relationship with president Rugova and secondly his alleged involvement in criminal activities contributed to this outcome.

Although eventually a government was formed, it was clear that the local politicians were not able to find a solution without UNMIK intervention. Instead of electing the President and Government step by step, as it was foreseen in the Constitutional Framework, a “package solution” was found. While such a pragmatic approach was successful at last, this practice remains questionable, since UNMIK itself gave an example that the rules can be bent. The situation became even more problematic, since Ibrahim Rugova continued to be the LDK President, although it was explicitly stated in the Constitutional Framework¹⁷⁴, that the President of Kosovo shall “hold no other office”. By tolerating this practice for years, UNMIK did not give a good example.

On a domestic level, Rugova´s insistence on maintaining his position as “President of Kosova”, now officially legitimized, led to frictions as well. It was widely perceived that not only the PDK´s frustration of having “lost” the elections, but also Rugova´s unwillingness to make concessions contributed to the political deadlock. In their perception, LDK was the undisputed winner of the elections, and the party saw little reason to share power, although they needed a partner to have the President elected. Within his own party, Rugova caused frustration, because it was perceived that he sacrificed the victory in the elections only to satisfy his personal ambition of becoming President. Interestingly, this problem still haunts the LDK today. Meanwhile the party has lost about half of their support, but now Fatmir Sejdiu, Rugova´s successor in both functions (LDK´s and Kosova´s president) seems to follow this questionable example.

Finally, it seems worth to note that as a representative of the Kosovo-Serbs, Goran Bogdanovic, became Minister for Agriculture and Forestry and Rural Development.

174 Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, Chapter 9.2.7

Practically he never really took over office, so that his ethnic Albanian Deputy was holding this office.

In 2008 Bogdanovic again gained a ministerial post, but this time in Belgrade. After being elected to the Serbian Parliament as a representative of the Democratic Party in 2007, he was appointed to be Minster for Kosovo and Metohija in July 2008.

Another prominent Kosovo-Serb, Oliver Ivanovic became the State secretary in Bogdanovic’s ministry.