There is a vigorous debate over the existence of material objects like tables and trees. Nihilists claim that their existence would lead to various troublesome metaphysical con- sequences, such as causal overdetermination, collocated entities, and metaphysical vague- ness, while realists have offered counter-arguments to each of these objections.3
But deflationary theorists like Thomasson (2007) and Hirsch (2011) have argued that there is something misguided about appealing to these types of “metaphysical” arguments to settle whether tables exist. It seems that, in ordinary language, the sentence ‘The table exists’ has the status of a trivial truth (on the assumption that there are particles arranged table-wise). So deflationists claim that the composition debate can be trivially resolved in favor of realism simply by reflecting on how we use ordinary English. Deflationists have
2On the usage of this chapter, an ontological question isnon-substantiveif, as deflationists suppose, it can
be decided merely by reflecting on the ordinary use of our linguistic expressions (in the sense discussed in the next section). In contrast, an ontological question issubstantiveif it instead should be decided by evaluating “metaphysical” arguments like the ones typically offered by ontologists (see section 3.3.2). So, for example, to say that the question over the existence* of tables is non-substantive is to say that this question is not to be decided by, e.g., arguments concerning metaphysical vagueness or causal overdetermination. Note that, on this usage, a question can be non-substantive without its answer beingobvious; to say that a question is non-substantive is just to say that it should not be decided in the way that ontologists typically suppose.
3See van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001, ch. 3) for examples of arguments for nihilism. See Elder
made similar claims about other areas of ontology as well.4
Earlier in the literature, many ontologists resisted the deflationist’s claim that asser- tions like ‘The table exists’ are often trivially true in ordinary language.5 But more recently,
some ontologists have claimed that there can still be substantive debates in ontologyeven if deflationists are correct about ordinary language.6 The claim is that, even if it is trivially
true in ordinary English that tables exist, there is still a substantive debate over whether tablesreally exist.
What is “real existence”? Here, ontologists appeal to the idea that the world has a “privileged ontological structure”: it is naturally carved into a certain set of objects. The goal for ontologists is to figure out how the world is carved. This question has to do with theworld; it doesn’t depend on the use of language.
If the quantifiers in ordinary English do not express real existence, how can we talk about the world’s privileged structure? Here, it has been suggested that we think of ontolo- gists as speaking a special language called “Ontologese”. Ontologese is much like ordinary English except that the ordinary existential quantifier is replaced with a special “existence* quantifier” that is stipulated to correspond to the world’s most natural carving. Whether or not ‘The table exists*’ is true does not depend on how speakers use this expression; it de- pends only on whether the table is a member of the world’s privileged domain. Following Sider (2014), we can call the proposed shift to Ontologese theOntologese gambit.
Some deflationists have worried that the notion of an existence* quantifier is unintel- ligible.7 But in this chapter, I will raise an independent objection. I will argue that, even if
we grant thatsomeexistence* questions are substantive, there are no substantive questions to ask about the existence* of things like ordinary objects, numbers, and properties – things
4For example, Schiffer (2003, 2.3) argues that we can trivially establish the existence of properties by
looking to the ordinary use of property terms.
5See Sider (2001, xix-xxiv) for this type of response. 6See, e.g., Cameron (2010).
whoseordinary existence is given a deflationary treatment. More precisely, I will defend the following thesis:
Thesis: If the deflationist offers the correct explanation of the triviality8 of a
givenordinaryexistence statement, then there is no substantive question to ask about the truth of the corresponding existence* statement
For example: if we give the existence of ordinary objects a deflationary treatment, then there is likewise no substantive question about the existence* of ordinary objects. Simi- larly, if we give the existence of properties a deflationary treatment, then there is likewise no substantive question about the existence* of properties. (In contrast, the thesis does not challenge the substantivity of debates about the existence* of superstrings, since the existence of superstrings is not trivial in ordinary language.)
To defend this thesis, I will first explain a difference in how ontologists and defla- tionists typically think about language (section 3.3.3). This discussion will help clarify the dispute between ontologists and deflationists and will serve as the foundation for the later arguments. In section 3.3.4, I will defend the main thesis. In section 3.3.5, I will consider a response on behalf of the ontologist.