Background on Structured Signal Models

had cause to comment at length on the relationships between board chairmen and chief executives of parastatals. Some of these commissions were (Administrative Staff College of Nigeria 1983):

i. Elias Commission of Inquiry (1960), which investigated the administrative, economic and industrial relations of the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC);

ii. Ani’s Working Party (1966), which examined the management of public sector enterprises;

iii. Bello Commission of Inquiry (June 1967), that probed the affairs of the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN, now NEPA);

iv. Beckley Commission of Inquiry (1967), which looked into the affairs of Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA);

v. Adefarasin Commission of Inquiry (1967) which, looked into the affairs of Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC)

vi. Adebo Commission (1970) among others, probed the cost of living in Nigeria;

vii. Udoji Commission (1972) which examined the management of the Nigeria Public Service including the parastatals;

viii. Onosode Commission (1981) which examined the organisation, structure and management of public enterprises (Administrative Staff College of Nigeria 1989).

Each of the key actors in PEs management has contributed to the friction between board members and the chief executive in one way or the other.

This section will discuss the problems with each key actor(s).

Board Chairmen and Members

The following are some of the problems relating to board chairman and members:

(i) that in the appointment of all chairman and members of board, it would appear that political considerations were the over-riding factors and the due regard was not given to professional expertise, experience, qualification, integrity, commitment and interest in the affairs of the organisation.

(ii) arising from (i) above, board members tend to be more interested in using their organisations in feathering their political nests, i.e.,

as instruments to recoup their political expenses, rather than real interest of the organisation. They generally do not see themselves as being accountable for the corporate success of the parastatal or state-owned company. The lack of fusion in the interest and objective of both the board and management has resulted in a lack of corporate focus which inevitably has culminated in incessant conflicts between board chairmen and executives.

(iii) the goal achievement of the goals of parastatals is impaired partly because the average new breed politician, probably due to Nigeria’s thirteen year of military interregnum, is largely inexperienced in government financial regulations and other rules and regulations of the public service. They were not given any orientation in the presidential system of government. The end result of this is that these political appointees, under the cloak of achieving results, flagrantly breach laid down government rules, regulations and procedures.

(iv) the board chairman and members are hardly content with determining policy but often hustle to be involved in the day- today management of the organisation. Some board chairmen have been known to give instructions directly to operational staff (officers) without reference to the chief executives, the meddlesomeness coupled with a violation of known administrative procedures, have been major sources of conflict when resisted by the chief executives.

(v) inspite of extant regulations, some board members persistently pressurise, and even worse still, sometimes blackmail chief executives, to provide them with amenities such as motors cars and permanent allocations of guest houses with complements of cooks and gardeners, and drivers. However, some chief executives are not lacking in courage of conviction and have been known to have resisted political pressures and blackmail, though at a price.

(vi) some Board members who lack integrity and perceive their board appointments as opportunities to make money, often ask chief executives to do “unethical” things. In this regard, a chief executive compared the politicians of today with his predecessor of the First Republic. While the latter always thought of the consequences thereafter, the present politician hardly consults on such matters and is, ironically, scared stiff of possible future probes. Who would want the chief executive to bear the brunt of the responsibility and this is a source of friction.

(vii) since the exclusion of public officials from membership of the Boards of parastatals, the chief executive have remained the only solitary voices in drawing attention to, and advocating compliance with, laid down government rules and regulations aimed at ensuring public accountability.

(viii) the problems of insensitivity to public accountability and normal administrative procedures, have been aggravated by the appointment of non-career technocrats who themselves may not be conversant with these procedures, as chief executives of parastatals.

(ix) contrary to expectation, the role of the chief executive has been made more harrowed by the posture and action of some ministers in relation to the management of some of the parastatals. In this regard, it has been alleged that where these has been conflict of values between the board and management, the minister invariable teamed up with the board against the chief executive at the expense of the organisation. We were informed of an instance where a minister was alleged to have not only incited board members against a chief executive, but arm-twisted the chief executive to obtain benefits such as cars and guest house to which he was not entitled.

(x) although it has been stipulated that the meetings of board should be few and far between, some chairmen have, due to lack of conceptual clarity of their roles converted their part-time appointments to permanent ones as demonstrated by the frequency and duration of their visits. Their presence has, among others, created the problem of the two-boss model whereby staffs see two authorities in the place of one. This may create a conflict between the chief executive and the management staff especially those of them who are sycophantic and intend to exploit the situation to pursue their vaulting ambition.

(xi) many of the board chairmen, under the pretext of serving the corporation, make use of the available facilities in running their own private interest or businesses. A management resentment of this act of impropriety may result in conflict.

(xii) there is a school of thought among board chairmen that believe they are the repository of corporate power and authority in the organisation and that whatever powers the chief executive possesses, is held for and on behalf of the board. The implication of this in practice is that the board chairman and/or his fellow board members could withdrew or exercise the powers of the Chief Executive with regard to the day-to-day administration of the organisation’s human and other resources(Administrative Staff College of Nigeria 1983)

Chief Executives of Parastatals

The chief executives have also been accused of acts that are detrimental to the health of their organisations.

Some of the chief executives use their power in the area of appointments, deployment, promotion and staff discipline arbitrarily in utter disregard of the dysfunctional effects of such personnel practices on the motivation and productivity of their staff. In an era where the functionality of participative management and attendant delegation is recognised, some chief executives alone:

i. deploy staff without consulting their key officials

ii. sign letters of offers of appointment to successful candidates iii. begrudge and sometimes deny staff their entitlements even when

such entitlements have received necessary approval

iv. exercise disciplinary powers without reference to existing regulations

v. display arbitrariness in respect of promotion

vi. sit on petitions addressed to the board by senior members of staff.

Financial Transactions and Contracts

The problems of insensitivity to public accountability and normal administrative procedures, have been aggravated by the appointment of non-career technocrats who themselves may not be conversant with the procedures, as chief executives of parastatals. Some chief executives, by flagrant acts of abuse of office and financial irresponsibility, ensure non- performance of their organisations. Such acts include diversion of public funds to private use, collusion with contractors after collecting mobilisation fees: commissioning feasibility studies for projects that the organisation could not prosecute; sponsorship or ownership of firms that seek contracts in organisations which they head. On top of these abuses and shortcomings are:

i. deliberate defiance of board’s directives and calculated manipulation of the chief executives private desires as against corporate interest

ii. unpreparedness or unwillingness to perform their statutory functions

iii. administrative/managerial immaturity or inexperience and ineptitude in spite of academic attainment resulting in inability to grapple with the major problems and issues confronting the organisation

iv. inability to interact and communicate effectively with staff, and some are rigid, aloof, withdrawn and inaccessible

v. lack of respect for officially sanctioned channels of communication and indulgence in inveterate habit of bypassing heads of departments to give assignment to officers under them, a practice which chief executives loathe and resent on the part of board chairmen in relation to the operational management.

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE

i. What are the differences between a policy board and an executive board?

ii. Describe the role of board members according to the Udoji Commission of 1975?

iii. Discuss the role of the secretary to the board of a parastatal.

3.5 Recommendations to Improve the Performance of