Barriers to the Adoption of Public GAP Certification Programmes

The literature has highlighted that governments face a number of barriers in relation to the implementation of public GAP programmes. Banzon et al. (2013a) identified the barriers that affect the adoption of a generic GAPprogramme for the Cavendish banana plantations. It also follows that these barriers hindered the adoption of the PhilGAP certification programme. These barriers were classified as: (1) knowledge, (2) costs, (3) processes, (4) rewards or incentives, (5) scale of farm operations, and (6) trade issues in the banana industry. Thus, this section provides a review of barriers to the adoption of public GAP programmes in the literature.

3.4.1 Knowledge Barriers

Banzon et al. (2013a) identified the lack of awareness as a major barrier to the adoption of PhilGAP

certification programme (see Section 3.3.1).

3.4.2 Cost Barriers

The second type of barrier to adoption identified by Banzon et al. (2013a) was the compliance costs associated with the participation in the programme. There were two kinds of costs, namely: (1) compliance costs, and (2) certification costs. The former includes installation of new facilities, additional training of farm workers on safety and record-keeping, acquisition of more appropriate personal protective equipment, and safety instructions among other things. The latter includes the administrative cost of certification such as travel expenses incurred during inspection and the cost of microbial and chemical residue analysis. The Philippine government waived the latter cost similar to

Thailand’s QGAP and, as such, certification cost is not a barrier to the adoption of the programme (Banzon et al., 2013a; Nabeshima et al., 2015; Sarsud, 2007). However, Banzon et al. (2013a) reported that the Cardava banana farmers did not immediately participate in the certification programme as they needed financial resources to comply with the requirements. This compliance cost barrier was overcome through the provision of subsidies for infrastructure such as toilets and netting of packing facilities that were provided by an NGO, and the subsidisation of medical expenses for the growers by the LGUs.

3.4.3 Process Barriers

The third type of barrier to adoption identified by Banzon et al. (2013a) was the certification process associated with participation in the programme. In this process, banana farmers needed to acquire new skills in managing and planning their operational activities, such as record-keeping of pesticide use and the incidence of pests. This was also reported by Banzon et al. (2013a) among mango growers.

Chapter 3: Literature Review

38 However, there are other audit process problems identified in the literature (Sarsud, 2007; Schreinemachers et al., 2012; Wongprawmas et al., 2015). Thus, the process barriers include: (1) a lack of coordination among government agencies, (2) a perceived lack of credibility in the audit process, and (3) a perceived lack of enforcement. These are discussed in the following sections.

LLack of coordination among government regulators

Banzon et al. (2013a) reported that the mango growers complained about the lack of coordination among government agencies pushing for PhilGAP adoption leading to bureaucratic delays. This lack of coordination has also been reported in Vietnam’s VietGAP and Thailand’s QGAP public GAP programmes (Nicetic, Fliert, Chien, Mai, & Cuong, 2010; Sarsud, 2007). The different government agencies that manage the VietGAP certification programme failed to coordinate and harmonise policiesat the national level and this discredits the independent roles of each agency (Tam, Loan, Hien, & Thuy, 2007). In addition, the Thailand government set an over-ambitious objective of certifying a large number of producers, yet there was a lack of coordination between government institutions and knowledge institutions such as universities and research agencies (Sarsud, 2007; Wongprawmas et al., 2015).

Perceived lack of credibility

Another important process barrier for the adoption of public GAP programmes is the perceived lack of credibility in the certification process by growers and traders (Sarsud, 2007). For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC) and its underlying departments in Thailand carried out the overall operations of QGAP including the setting of standards, training, auditing, inspection and certification (Sarsud, 2007). A study was conducted to explore the perceived barriers that hindered the adoption of QGAPin Thailand’s fresh fruit and vegetable industry (Wongprawmas et al., 2015). The results showed that the audit system was poorly adopted because of the growers’ distrust of government agencies based on their experience working with them within the food safety area over the years (Wongprawmas et al., 2015). This was supported by the growers’ doubt over political manipulations (Sarsud, 2007).

Perceived lack of enforcement

Another process barrier is the retailers’ perceived lack of enforcement by government agencies, thus a public GAP certificate is not required by the retailers from the producers (Schreinemachers et al., 2012). A study was conducted with fruit and vegetable growers in Thailand in 2011 to test whether fruit and vegetable farmers who were compliant with QGAP used less toxic pesticides and had a lower frequency of application than non-compliant farmers, and to understand whether public GAPs can or cannot reduce agricultural pesticide use (Schreinemachers et al., 2012). The study found that spray diaries and residue test results were not properly inspected and audited. Although the programme required three inspection visits per year without prior notification to farmers, in reality farmers were notified prior to the inspection and audit. This gave them time to prepare for the

Chapter 3: Literature Review

39 compliance assessment. Only one audit was undertaken per year, and young and inexperienced auditors spent as little as five minutes at each farm during the inspection process. Additionally, the age gap between the auditors and farmers, and cultural aspects, prevented the auditor from criticising the farmers about their pesticide practices. As a result of these contextual factors, farmers were unlikely to fail to gain QGAP certification irrespective of their farm practices. The high number of participating farmers in the QGAP certification programme in Thailand had compromised the quality of the programme and, in particular, the auditing process. There were only 120 government auditors who were required to audit 140,000 registered farmers. Technical assistance from the Department of Agricultural Extension (DoAE) was insufficient to cover the number of participating farmers. As such, the farmers did not understand the rationale behind the control points specified in the standards, which led to poor motivation in keeping to them. Thus, Schreinemachers et al. (2012) argued that

QGAP was not a viable alternative to the more stringent private standards used in Thailand to guarantee food safety.

A study of the VietGAP citrus programme in Vietnam by Nicetic et al. (2010) found that the training of extension personnel was also a barrier to the enforcement of the public GAP programme. Under GAP principles, registered pesticides are specific to crop and pest combinations and this was understood by some farmers. However, a few extension agents thought that pesticides could be applied to any crop as long as its use was not banned. This then created confusion in the implementation of the VietGAP certification programme because there can be no established withholding period if it is not specifically registered for citrus. Thus, the public GAP programme was criticised for the lack of enforcement because of insufficient trained personnel to effectively implement the programme (Nicetic et al., 2010; Schreinemachers et al., 2012).

In banana plantations that were not following private standards in the Philippines, Lockie et al. (2014) found that the public regulations were not fully enforced despite the presence of codified laws. For instance, the buffer zones were not properly observed, and minimum wages were audited through document inspection only rather than interviewing workers or undertaking investigative activities. Thus, Lockie et al. (2014) argued that encouraging plantations to comply with national standards is effectively pointless when the government monitoring and enforcement processes are inadequate, inefficient and weak.

3.4.4 Reward or Incentive Barriers

The fourth barrier to the adoption of the PhilGAP certification programme identified by Banzon et al. (2013a) is the lack of demand and a premium price for PhilGAP-certified products. They argued that

the government’s efforts are focused on the adoption of the certification programme and, to a lesser

Chapter 3: Literature Review

40 in Thailand put much more resources into promoting organic and fair trade production of agricultural produce than they did for QGAP. As such, there was no economic incentive for QGAP-certified growers such as price premiums or floor prices as compared to fair trade or organic producers. In addition, Srisopaporn et al. (2015) found that the lack of incentives hindered the adoption of the

QGAP programme among farmers renting land for agricultural production because they might not recover the cost of investments in the land that they did not own.

3.4.5 Scale of Farm Operations

The fifth barrier to the adoption of the PhilGAP certification programme identified by Banzon et al. (2013a) was the scale of the operation for small banana growers. One of the certification criteria requires a 50-metre buffer zone around a water source. Banzon et al. (2013a) reported that this could be a problem for small farmers where the average farm size was 1.73 hectares because of the reduction in the production area. Such farmers also lacked of economies of scale for investment in the facilities required by the certification programme. The PhilGAP programme comprises a cluster of technologies that require investment in infrastructure and facilities to meet the demands of export markets. Large-scale technologies are often supported by a large, prosperous and rapidly-growing

population with “striking homogeneity of tastes” (Abramovitz, 1986, p. 397). However, Marine et al. (2016) argued that practices that are related to food safety and environmental protection do not depend on the size of the operation.

3.4.6 Trade Issues in the Industry

The sixth barrier to the adoption of the public GAP programmes are the trade issues in the industry such as the pole-vaulting operations identified by Banzon et al. (2013a). In this process, a contract growing arrangement occurs when a grower enters into a supply agreement with the institutional buyers at a predetermined price for the production and supply of agricultural products for a certain period of years (Digal, 2007). Growers are expected to have the facilities needed to produce the bananas, but the institutional buyers are expected to provide technical assistance to the growers to meet certain quality requirements. Because of price competition in the international markets, some banana growers do not honour their contractual obligation to their exporters or institutional buyers, an unethical practice in the industry (Banzon et al., 2013a). Such a practice affects the traceability of bananas, which is a key component of public GAP programmes (Amekawa, 2009; Nicetic et al., 2010; Robert & Menon, 2007). The following section reviews the literature on the drivers of adoption of public GAP programmes.