Croatia has a long and rigid public administration tradition. It is mainly rooted in the Continental (Austrian) model, with influences from other socio-political orders, most predominantly the public administration (and jurisprudence) culture of the first (1918-1941) and second (1945-1991) Yugoslav states (cf. Medvedović, 2003; Koprić, 2006a;
Omejec, 2008).
5.2.1. First Yugoslavia (1918-1941)
In the period up to 1918, the status of Croatian civil service was principally determined by the developments of the Austrian-Hungarian civil service system, meaning that the country
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did not develop an indigenous civil service blueprint. Most of the basic characteristics of this system became the basis of public administration in the Kingdom of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia (SHS- from 1921 – Yugoslavia) (Sević and Rabrenović, 1999: 52-53). In the first two years of the common state, the administrative organisation of the SHS was quite diverse with the „newly liberated lands‟ Croatia and Slovenia being allowed to maintain their „autonomous‟ Austrian-based local civil service regimes. However, in the early 1920s significant changes were brought about as emphasis shifted at „unity and centralisation‟
aiming at integrating a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse state; thus, a standard and unified system was applied throughout the country (ibid: 52). The basic organisation of the civil service was set out by the Constitution of 1921, which was largely inspired by Austrian legal traditions. Recruitment was based on a career-track system and the completion of a traineeship. After a probationary period lasting up to three years, appointment to a post was for life (ibid). Following the proclamation of the „royal dictatorship‟ and change in the name of the kingdom by King Alexander I in 1929, Yugoslavia‟s civil service gained in importance and professionalism as new laws introduced in the early 1930s stressed the independence of the civil service from politicians and strengthened its loyalty to the state. It was then that Yugoslavian civil service became highly unionised, aiming at maximising its welfare through professional associations, such as the Yugoslav Association for Public Administration established in 1930 (ibid: 73).
5.2.2. Second Yugoslavia (1945-1991)
The codification and professionalisation of the Yugoslavian/Croatian public administration system was influenced by the infamous „split‟ between Tito and Stalin in 1948 and the subsequent quasi-liberal „self-managed‟ course of Yugoslavian communism. However, the civil service in Yugoslavia has a very long tradition that even the forty-five years of communist rule could not wipe out. Undoubtedly, pre-war legislation was an important source of continuity, as evidenced by the important distinction between civil servants and ordinary workers in the country‟s legal system (Sević and Rabrenović, 1999). That said, the service maintained, to a high degree, its impartiality and an acceptable level of professionalism.
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These positive trends notwithstanding, Yugoslavia‟s (and by extension Croatia‟s) civil service system was marred by the emerging authoritarian regime of Marshal Tito. Indeed, the leftist authoritarian nature of the second Yugoslav state meant the effective re-modelling of the civil service on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles and requirements, such as the „unity of power‟ (as opposed to the separation of powers doctrine) from mid-1970s onwards14. Eugune Pusić (1985), one of Yugoslavia‟s leading academic in administrative science, argues that, in recruitment policy, the nomenclature system, or the
„cadre‟ policy in the Yugoslav case (Sekulić and Sporer, 2002: 97), ensured partisanship and political reliability amongst members of the state administration. But, this statement should also be moderated, as the Titoist „self-management‟ concept ensured that „there was a clear distinction between party administrative staff and civil servants‟ (ibid: 99).
Notwithstanding their differing approaches, most analysts seem to converge on the fact that politicisation was more evident in the highest levels of state power, where administrative and political authority was merged. Such strong entanglement bore significant consequences for the development of a particular bureaucratic practice and ethos that privileged the concept of the „unity of authority‟, meaning obedience, loyalty and unquestioning servitude (Pusić, 1985). Again, what is hardly undisputable is that under an authoritarian regime the mentality of an obedient executing state administration was largely reproduced and therefore habitualised in the course of time through a socialisation process as citizens (including civil servants and legal experts) accepted their subordinate status vis-a-vis the state as obligatory for all society members (Omejec, 2008: 10).
Because Yugoslav authoritarianism required constant and all-pervasive control, it produced a heavily over-administered state in which „armfuls of pieces of paper‟ were needed for everything from internal travel to renting a flat. This culture of over-regulation (itself partly influenced by the Austrian blueprints) implied a formalistic and „cynical‟ adherence to the „letter of law‟ which, in turn, forged an ineffective, over-bureaucratised and
14 The 1978 Law on the Basics of the System of the Public Administration, Federal Executive Council and Federal Administrative Organs transformed civil servants from a public servant to a „worker in public administration‟. As Sević and Rabrenović (1999: 56) note, this fulfilled the ideological premise that all those employed should be fully equal regardless of the organisation in which they worked. But, in reality the new law changed little. The public service tradition was very strong, and the public perception of professional „public servants‟ remained unchanged (ibid).
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scholastic attitude toward administrative practice (including jurisprudence). In fact, a powerful tradition of „bureaucratic control‟, secrecy and closed ranks defined executive-administrative authority leading to „patron-client‟ relationships rather than service in state administration. This bureaucratic unresponsiveness, in turn, exacerbated citizens‟
collective need to find „connections‟ for various situations they encountered, such as the courts, enrolling their children in school, or making a doctors appointment (ibid).
Corruption was thus an endemic and systemic by-product of Yugoslavia‟s leftist authoritarianism.