Bringing both paradigms together

Both the ‘levels’ and ‘loop’ paradigms are useful lenses for understanding different aspects of AWS. But both lack the focus of the other and struggle to deal with real world systems. For example, the Brimstone air-launched fire-and-forget missile is fired at a target by a pilot, but the missile itself

156 _{Crootof (n.119) 1864-1865 (note that Crootof suggests her levels as inert, automated, semi-autonomous,}

and autonomous. ‘automated’ has been changed to ‘automatic’ for consistency in this thesis).

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performs the final actions of the attack autonomously (‘endgame engagement’).158 _{Prior to release,}

the missile is inert and the pilot is ‘in-the-loop’. At the point of release, the missile is semi-autonomous with the pilot ‘on-the-loop’. During the attack, it is autonomous and the pilot is ‘out-of-the-loop’. As such, classification of actual weapons is difficult for these paradigms. Thus, whilst it can be illuminating to consider the technological capability of a system under the ‘levels’ paradigm and the distance between the weapon and human under the ‘loop’ paradigm, neither are satisfactory.

So, as Scharre suggests,159 _{both paradigms should be considered simultaneously, whilst also}

considering what the weapon is doing. He proposes looking at autonomy in three dimensions: the task(s) a machine performs; the relationship between the human and the machine when the task(s) is performed; the sophistication of the machine when performing the task(s). These dimensions are independent and increasing any of these parameters can make a system ‘more autonomous’.160

Due to the independence of each dimension, and lack of clear thresholds, this paradigm cannot specifically define an AWS. But, it can be used to better understand differences in each definition offered by states.

With an AWS as defined by this thesis and others (a system that selects and engages targets without human intervention), the tasks performed by the system can be characterised as critical, in keeping with the ICRC understanding,161 _{the human-machine relationship as distant but potentially}

contactable, and sophistication as high. The potentially contactable nature of this system would mean that an operator could be in, on, or out-of-the-loop, with the system being autonomous or semi- autonomous in accordance with the acts which the human is performing. Consequently, this can be used as a baseline to compare other definitions.

158 _{Handy (n.14) 87.} 159 _{Scharre (n.89) 27-28.} 160 _{Scharre (n.89) 27-28.} 161 _{ICRC (n.57) 7.}

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In terms of tasks, very wide definitions could include systems performing highly-complex or simple tasks,162 _{and so the amount of autonomy displayed by such an AWS would vary depending}

upon how it is employed. Those definitions requiring lethality163 _{would be focussed upon critical}

targeting functions and so be at a similar level of autonomy along this dimension as the AWS definition adopted by this thesis.

Regarding the human-machine relationship, those definitions requiring an absence of human supervision164 _{would always require an operator to be out-of-the-loop. Such systems would always}

present the greatest distance and autonomy possible in the definition of AWS used in this thesis. Beyond this are those definitions which require an impossibility of recalling or controlling the system.165 _{Whilst they may be functionally as distant as simply having no operator oversight, the total}

absence of possible communications means that they are conceptually even more distant. As such, systems where communication is impossible present the greatest distance, and therefore most autonomy in terms of the human-machine relationship.

Turning finally to sophistication, the definitions which allow for remote-control or human oversight can also vary in terms of their sophistication as the level of autonomy present in this dimension is dependent upon what humans actually delegate to the AWS. These concepts are, therefore, two-sides of the same coin. Consequently, depending upon how it is used, an AWS could be inert, automatic, semi-autonomous, or fully-autonomous. However, one would expect AWS defined by their highly-technical functioning to display a greater level of sophistication and autonomy along this dimension.166

162 _{Cuban UNOG Delegation (n.64); Russian UNOG Delegation (n.62) para.2; French UNOG Delegation (n.63);}

UK Approach (n.62) para.205.

163 _{China UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.3; Belgian UNOG Delegation (n.65) para 8(c); French UNOG Delegation}

(n.63).

164 _{Cuban UNOG Delegation (n.64); Swiss UNOG Delegation (n.64) para.29; French UNOG Delegation (n.63).} 165 _{Netherlands UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.5; China UNOG Delegation (n.63) para.3; Belgian UNOG}

Delegation (n.65) para 8(c).

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By looking across these different characteristics for conceptualising AWS, we can see that there are vastly different understandings of what an AWS is. Further, whilst human-machine relationships and the sophistication of a machine are, essentially, two-sides of the same coin, it is the tasks that the AWS is performing that provide context for the other two dimensions. This not only underlines the superiority of Scharre’s approach, but also that it is key to consider how autonomous a system is at the time of its usage.

Thus, in terms of their use, this thesis is focussed on the ‘critical functions’167 _{of selecting and}

engaging targets by AWS. Indeed, it is the performance of these tasks in the context of distance and sophistication that determines their compliance with legal rules and the attendant need for regulation. Consequently, the precise definition of an autonomous system is largely immaterial. in the following chapters, this thesis focuses on the ability of international law to regulate critical functions in particular.