THE CITY OF MANILA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs.
JACINTO DEL ROSARIO,DEFENDANT-APPLELLANT.
G.R. No. 1284. November 10, 1905
FACTS:
The City of Manila filed an action to recover the possession of the two lots described in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by the defendant.
At the trial, after the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. The question thus raised puts in issue the trial court’s finding that the City of Manila was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question.
The City of Manila introduced both documentary and oral evidence. It consisted of the testimony of John R. Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney.
The first witness testified that he did not know of his own knowledge if the land in question belonged to the city.
The next witness testified that the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona was formerly part of Plaza Divisoria, which belonged to the Central Government (not the city), and that he did not know to whom it now belongs. It must be borne in mind that this witness referred to the land included in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, and not to the lots described in the complaint. These lots abut upon the streets referred to, but do not form a part of either. According to the complaint, they are building lots.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of the precediing witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega’s testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land.
The fourth witness (Sotera Roco) testified that Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the land from Cipriano Roco and sold it to his brother Jacinto del Rosario. Assuming that the hearsay testimony of Sotera Roco is admissible, we do not see how it can be inferred from her testimony that the plaintiff is the real owner of the property. The witness Modesto Reyes and Lorenzo del Rosario said nothing as to the ownership of the land. They simply testified as to the authenticity of some of the documentary evidence introduced by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. The reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The only witness examined with regard to it was the city attorney. He was unable to say who made it or who caused it to be made, or when it was made. He said only that he believed the map had been drawn in the month of July, 1880, or prior to May, 1893. Neither this nor his statement that the map was found among the archives of the city of Manila is of itself sufficient to show that the map is authentic. No one appears to certify as to its correctness. The map identified by the witness John R. Wilson was introduced by the plaintiff for the sole purpose of showing the location of the land in question. It has, therefore, no value in establishing the right of possession claimed by the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies presented are considered common reputation.
RULING:
Such testimony does not constitute the "common reputation". "Common reputation," is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property.
From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff does not prove its claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by the plaintiff nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the City of Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint. Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of the defendant rather than those of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the plaintiff itself admits in the complaint that the defendant’s possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that the defendant had been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.
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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.
ALLYSON BELAGAN, respondent.
132 SCRA 164 OCTOBER 19, 2004
FACTS:
Magdalena Gapuz filed an application with DEC’s office in Baguio City for permit to operate a preschool. One of the requisites for the issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DEC’S Division Office.
Respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of inspection, while both descending the stairs, respondent suddenly placed his arms around complainant’s shoulders and kissed her cheek. She then wrote a letter complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DEC’s Secretary Gloria. Respondent was then placed under suspension. Meanwhile Ligaya Annawi alleged in her complaint accusing respondent of several sexual harassment acts and imputation of dereliction of duty.
DEC’s conducted joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya, of which respondent was found guilty and was ordered dismissed from service.
Respondent filed MR contending that he has never been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service, and by contrast, Magdalena was charged with several offenses of Defamation, Light Physical Injuries, Grave Threats, Malicious Mischief, Unjust vexation, Light Threats, and Grave Oral Threats on separate occasions. Thus, the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her character, integrity and credibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the derogatory record of Magdalena undermines the verity of her charge.
RULING:
NO. Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. In this case, no evidence bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her. Regarding Magdalena’s credibility as a witness, the charges and complaints against her happened way back in the70s and 80s while the act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation. Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement
of the suit. “It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.” The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.
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R es Gestae
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs.
CEFERINO LUNGAYAN, accused.
G.R. No. L-64556 June 10, 1988
FACTS:
Rape is a serious offense against chastity. Its essential element is involuntariness. More often than not, the credibility of the offended party is vital. Failing in this, the prosecution cannot make out a case.
Ceferino Lungayan was charged for the crime of rape of Agripina Juan Vda. de Garzota, then 52 years old and a widow. She was allegedly asleep in her room and with her were her two married daughters Silveria and Leticia, the latter's husband Berting Garcia and the children of said daughters. At about 10:00 o'clock of that evening, Silveria heard someone knock at their door and when she opened it she saw the accused who was then the barangay captain of Barangay Oscariz. He asked Silveria if her mother was in. She answered in the affirmative and added that her mother was asleep. Nevertheless, the accused entered the room where complainant was sleeping and woke up the complainant. He invited her to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the market stall identified as Linda's canteen in violation of the barangay ordinance prohibiting the same after 10:00 o'clock in the evening.
When she reached home about 12:00 midnight, Silveria asked her what happened and she revealed that the accused abused her. When Silveria pressed for details, the complainant replied that she will tell her the following morning.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim’s revelation form part of res gestae.
RULING:
No. The incident happened at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening. She went home only at about 12:00 o'clock that evening. Apparently, she still moved around or spent some time alone for about one hour. She must have contemplated what to do with her clothes all muddy. When she reached home she was confronted by her daughter as to what happened. She had no choice but to tell her that she was abused by appellant but she was not prepared to reveal everything. She promised to tell all the details to her daughter the following day. She thought about her predicament the whole night. She had no choice.
She must have to tell everything the following day.
The trial court considered the revelation of the complainant to her daughter Silveria of what happened to her when she returned home as part of the res gestae. It is important to stress that her statement must not only be spontaneous. It must also be made at a time when there was no opportunity for her to concoct or develop her own story. As the Court observed, the complainant did not immediately go home after the sexual encounter. She took a walk. She spent some time thinking of what to do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their passionate interlude. She had enough time to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GUILLERMO PUTIAN, alias GUIRMO accused-appellant.
74 SCRA 133 1976
FACTS:
A case for murder was filed against Putian. The witnesses presented for the prosecution were the doctor who treated the victim and the policeman who arrested the suspect. The victim (Panimdim) revealed an ante mortem statement identifying Putian as the perpetrator.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Panimdim’s testimony may be admitted as part of dying declaration o res gestae.
RULING:
The court held that the declaration is not of a dying declaration because it was not made under expectation of an impending death.
However, although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarant's mind, it is admissible as a part of the res gestae.
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People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs.
Manolito Tolentino alias “Bong-bong”, Carlito Tala alias “Boy”, Rodolfo Matawaran and John Doe, accused-appellants
G.R. No.87085 February 2, 1993
FACTS:
Adelaida Lingad left her niece Grace Paule and her three children at home to attend the wake of her uncle. The children were the only ones left at home. In the afternoon, accused Tala, Matawaran and an unknown person whose face was covered entered the house of lingad by forcibly breaking the window grill of the comfort room and demanded to know from the children where their mother hid her money.
After Tolentino took the P4,000 he stabbed Grace Paule with a scythe while the three accused held the three other children who were then stabbed one after the other by Tolentino. During the stabbing incident, Grace Paule lost consciousness but was able to regain it after five minutes and shouted for help.
Her mother and grandmother who lived nearby heard her and immediately proceeded to said house but the four accused had already left. Adelaida upon reaching Geraldine who was lying at the porch she asked her the identities of the person responsible for stabbing them with the latter answering “Bong-bong” and also mentioning the names of Tala and Matawaran.
Grace Paule was the only surviving victim. She positively identified the three accused because accused Manolito Tolentino is her uncle as well as her barrio mate and accused-appellant Carlito Tala is a relative of her mother while accused Rodolfo Matawaran is the “barkada” of accused Tala.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in admitting the statement of Geraldine.
RULING:
No. The court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine named as one of the perpetrators in the commission of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs
PABLO CUDAL, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 167502 October 31, 2006
FACTS:
About 2:00 o’clock in the morning, accused, while intoxicated, went home to ask money for his father. When the latter told the accused he has no money, it resulted to an altercation. Camillo, cousin of the accused heard the altercation and proceeded to the house. When he entered, he saw the father of the accused near the bed and his head full of blood. He inquired what happened and the latter told him that his son (Pablo) hit him with a rock.
Camillo brought the victim to the house of his brother Segundo. Segundo also inquired what happened and the latter told him that his son hit him with a rock.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of Camillo and Pablo be admitted as evidence.
RULING:
YES. Although they were not eyewitnesses to the incident, it does not render their testimonies inadmissible, for they may be considered part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule.
According to the rules, for a statement to be made part of the res gestae, the following must concur:
(1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false statement, and the statement was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Since the declaration of the victim was made immediately after a startling occurrence, having no time to fabricate or make a false statement, it is correct to properly take the declaration of the victim as part of the res gestae. Thus the testimony of the witnesses is admissible.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs
ROMY FALLONES y LABANA, Appellant,
G.R. No. 190341 March 16, 2011
FACTS:
In the morning of June 29, 2004 Amalia was told by her mother to look for her sister Alice. Alice was an 18 years old girl with the mind of a 5 year old. Amalia looked for Alice all over the neighborhood until she neared the house of Romy Fallones. As she approached the house of Fallones, she heard a familiar cry: “Tama na! Tama na!”
It was Alice’s voice. Immediately, she ran up to Fallones’ door and knocked repeatedly until Fallones opened the door. Behind Fallones she saw Alice. Alice said: “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.”
Alice grabbed her sister who had a bloodied shorts. They went to the barangay office where Alice was able to positively identify Fallones as the person who sexually abused her. A rape case was filed against Fallones. During trial, Alice died. Amalia testified on what she heard during the incident.
Eventually, Fallones was convicted of rape. On appeal, Fallones argued that the testimony of Amalia on what she heard was hearsay for she only heard the cry of Alice but did not see the act of rape.
ISSUE:
WON the testimony of Amalia is admissible despite being hearsay.
RULING:
Yes. It is exempted from the hearsay rule under the principle of Res Gestae.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.
An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur:
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, the utterances of Alice “Tama na! Tama na!” were made during a startling event (when Fallones was penetrating her). When Fallones opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.”
In this case, the utterances of Alice “Tama na! Tama na!” were made during a startling event (when Fallones was penetrating her). When Fallones opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering “Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.”