In document Human security assemblages. Transformations and governmental rationalities in Canada and Japan. (Page 111-182)


This chapter of the thesis examines the structural conditions of emergence which have enabled the articulation of CanHS programme. The country’s human security is approached as an example of a rhizomatic assemblage characterised by its horizontality and open-endedness. The chapter is divided into an empirical part and a theoretical part: the first half provides an empirical analysis of domestic structural conditions and foreign-and-security-policy structural conditions respectively. With regard to the set of conditions, government-initiated transformations of domestic economies of power regulating the relationship between Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector and the country’s government are studied in detail. As far as the second set of conditions is concerned, the related section focuses on procedural and substantive changes to CanFSP. It will be argued that the synergy produced by the interacting sets of conditions constituted the humanitarian terrain on which human security could subsequently emerge and be cultivated by NGOs. The second half of the chapter theorises the structural conditions and their effects. It will identify the key characteristics and mechanisms of power through which this assemblage has been regulated. With regard to the theorisation of domestic conditions of emergence, it will be shown how the government successfully created an advanced liberal funding regime to which it inserted the country’s non-profit and voluntary sector. Practical implications, namely the reconstitution of Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector into an efficient and effective performance machine of service delivery, are analysed in this section. As for the theorisation of foreign-and-security-

policy conditions of emergence, it will be argued that the country’s post-1993 foreign- and security-policy was a specimen of a governmental programme which marked a shift in Canadian security configuration. It will be shown that although the original motivation for the launch of human security was material (budgetary cuts), the development moved well beyond this motive and the country’s foreign- and security-policy contained an early radical, transformative potential.

Domestic Transformations as Conditions of Possibility

From a genealogical perspective, the linear location of the origins of the human security agenda in general, and of the landmine case in particular, in governmental attempts to engage the public misses the point. The same is true for interpreting the subsequent unfolding of events into a more narrow freedom-from-fear doctrine as a natural and logical development. It is crucial to dig deeper and search for structural conditions that allowed the human security agenda to emerge. As far as enabling structural conditions for Canadian human security (CanHS) and the landmine campaign as its most important case are concerned, this means going back as early as the 1960s. The most important enabling structural condition for the human security field were repeated, government-initiated, transformations of Canadian non-profit and voluntary sector in the late 1960/early 1970s (the first crisis of welfare liberalism) and the late 1980s/early 1990s (the second crisis of welfare liberalism). As will become clear, they resulted in both a quantitative increase in NGOs as well as in a qualitative trend of delegating more social responsibility to them. The analysis contained below suggests that repeated structural transformations of the non-profit

and voluntary sector (NVS) have been brought about by a mixture of specific and unique factors. This development will be identified as the key for the conceptualisation of structural conditions as parts of a rhizomatic, open-ended system.

To begin with, very little has been said about structural transformations of the NVS in Canada. This is baffling considering how much structural effect these transformations have had on the emergence of human security, including the landmine case and its subsequent development. The puzzlement is twofold: quantitative and qualitative. In respect of the qualitative issue, the fact that there have been no systematic analyses of the NVS in the context of the security domain is surprising, due to the volume of funding channelled to the NVS (which, importantly, includes international development NGOs) by the Canadian government. From a strictly economic perspective, the relative size of the Canadian NVS is enormous. It is the second largest in the world), receiving $110 billion a year from the government, which makes up around 51% of total NVS revenue (Canadian Council on Social Development 2006; Hall et al. 2005). With regard to the qualitative dimension, there have not been any studies that have tried to emphasise the importance of the domestic economic transformations of Canadian NVS for the field of human security. The link between the realm of economy and security has not been studied, and this fact has significantly hindered any systematic attempts to understand the deeper fabrics from which human security emerged and upon which it has unfolded.

This section analyses transformations of the non-profit and voluntary sector (NVS) since the late 1960s. As will be shown, the 1960s can be considered as the starting point for the open-ended development which has led to the current

infrastructure of CanHS. The empirical part of this section looking into these transformations has been informed by the critically-oriented new public management literature (Miller and Fox 2006; Wood, Roper and Dibben 2004; Osborne 2001; Lynn 2006; Osborne and Gaebler 1993). Studied transformations in Canadian NVS and their impact on the field of human security have contributed to the constitution of the so-called managerial state, in which crucial characteristics of advanced liberalism can be seen. In the words of Saint-Martin, new managerialism

is not simply a matter of minor transformations in management style. This is a political change of governance itself and to the relationship between state and citizenry, as the state tries to become more responsive by opening up its functions to competition in order to make it easier for citizens, redefined as “clients”, to express their preferences and make choices in a market-like fashion … Its essence lies in the belief that there is something called “management” which is generic, a purely instrumental activity, embodying a set of principles that can be applied to both the public and private sectors … The main guiding principles are the pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness, and value for money (Saint-Martin 2000: 1; also, cf. Farnham and Horton 1996; Hughes 1994; Enteman 1993).

It is argued that in remaking the NVS, the government has, apart from initiating substantive and procedural changes in Canadian foreign and security policy which are tackled in the next section, played the decisive role in preparing the structural terrain upon which advocates of the ban concerning antipersonnel landmines later

crucial for the nature of CanHS field more generally (especially after 1997), which has experienced a robust connection to new managerial ideas and an advanced liberal economic model. The argument of this section is straightforward: had it not been for the government re-examining and re-imagining its role in the maintenance of the socio-political order, or more specifically, in the provision of public goods in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it is hardly conceivable that the number of NGOs would have grown as it did, including the dramatic expansion of their role in society.

The most profound reason behind these transformations lies in the worn-out Keynesian welfare liberalism which came to an impasse during the 1970s. This period – which can be termed the first crisis of welfare liberalism in Canada – led to the transformation of the NVS. It should be pointed out that, unlike Canada’s second crisis of welfare liberalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many of the symptoms of the first crisis were not confined to Canada but were shared by many Western industrialised states, most notably the US, the UK, and the Netherlands (Gidron, Krammer and Salamon 1992; Putnam 1996). The notion of the state as a universal caretaker of the population and its needs was increasingly under fire from two sides. First, there was growing disillusionment with the government in economic matters, especially its ability to generate and distribute wealth. Second, economic difficulties were coupled with an increase in citizen activism, mainly rights-based movements largely funded by the government which had an interest in collaboration with them (Brock and Banting 2003; Brock 2001; Jenson and Phillips 1996: 118-119).

From the late 1960s, policy-makers began to recognise and fully appreciate the potential of the NVS. One of the first examples of governmental attempts to formally engage the NVS can be found in the 1967 amended version of the Income

Tax Act, making the registration of charitable organisations compulsory. As a part of this change, these organisations had to report annually on their activities (Monahan 2000: 11). Specifically in regard to international development NGOs, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) established the non-governmental division within its Partnership Branch in 1968. As Katherine Scott explains, ‘[d]uring these early days of CIDA involvement, funding for NGOs was provided on a “responsive basis”’ (Scott 2003: 58 fn. 3). An even more systematic method to examine the ways of improving the relationship between the Canadian government and NVS was adopted through the creation of the National Advisory Council on Voluntary Action by the Secretary of State in 1974. The Council’s recommendations were presented in the form of a report in 1977 (Andreychuck et al. 1977). Governmental efforts to reframe the role of the NVS and the government’s reliance on NVS in a number of social areas are testified to by the exponential growth of funding for the NVS (Gidron, Krammer and Salamon 1992). What made the Canadian government unique from a comparative perspective was the extent of funding channelled to highly political advocacy organisations (Scott 2003: 14), i.e. the development that allowed for emergence of NGOs campaigning in favour of antipersonnel landmines ban.

It was not until the 1990s that the federal government restored dialogue with the NVS, this time in the context of the second crisis of welfare liberalism. As will become clear, this process was important for the later reconstitution of the role of Canada-based international development/human security NGOs. The main aim was to upset the status quo, and more precisely to engage the NVS more, for less money, as the federal budget was in deficit and severe funding cutbacks were imposed (Hall and Reed 1998: 1-20). The 14% of the government budget then spent on supporting

registered charities was too easy a target not to be slashed (Juillet et al. 2001: 24). It was therefore not a great surprise that the Department of Finance under Paul Martin reviewed the system of funding for the NVS in 1994, cutting funds by $300 million within a year (Miller 1999: 76). What followed was the principal review of the NVS, with input from both the NVS and governmental sides. The former, represented by the thirteen national umbrella organisations, established the Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR) in 1995; its Panel on Accountability and Governance for the Voluntary Sector (PAGVS) produced a report in 1999 (PAGVS 1999). The relationship has been portrayed as follows:

The Canadian federal government faced a difficult policy problem. It wanted to make greater use of voluntary sector organizations to deliver government programs … A first question for government was whom in the voluntary sector to engage … In 1995, a dozen leaders of national voluntary sector organizations had come together informally to set up a Voluntary Sector Roundtable. Although these leaders did not have a clearly defined accountability relationship to the organizations and citizens they purported to represent, the government decided to deal with this group because it was the only single organization that contained the leaders of the sector. With that, the stage was set for the government and the voluntary sector to embark upon a process of consultation and collaboration to address the problems they faced (Good 2003: 122).

NVS-government relationship within its newly-established Voluntary Sector Task Force supervised by the Privy Council Office (Brock and Banting 2003: 8). These interactions also resulted in the issuing of a Joint Tables Report (Government of Canada/Voluntary Sector Initiative 1999). The comparison and contrast of the two reports’ foci and priorities is summarised in Table 2:

Table 2. NVS and the Government’s Priorities: Comparing and Contrasting the Two Reports

PAGVS Report of 1999 (NVS) Joint Tables Report of 1999

(The government in dialogue with NVS) democracy promotion the establishment of a working plan building social trust and social capital a road map to restructure the relationship the government needs to recognise the

sector’s diversity

strengthening NVS capacity-building

the government needs to respect the sector’s desire for autonomy

improvement of the regulatory framework

the government needs to provide NVS a voice within the Cabinet

better administrative relationships and training opportunities

different reporting standards for smaller and larger organisations

clearer guidelines regarding financial matters and funding and accountability enhancement

more flexible requirements for advocacy the improvement of skills and technology management in NVS

In the wake of the two reports, the government and NVS jointly launched the five- year, $94.6 million Government of Canada/Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI) in 2000. The aim was to translate the recommendations of the two reports into legislation. By 2009, An Accord between the Government and the Voluntary Sector (2001) and two codes of good practice (Joint Accord Table of the Voluntary Sector Initiative 2002a,b), focusing respectively on policy dialogue and funding, had been approved. When the mandate of the VSI expired in 2005, the government set up the Task Force on Community Investment, which issued a report in 2006 clearly embracing and further elaborating the agenda and language of the previous Joint Tables Report of 1999. The recommendations in the PAGVS report have been marginalised and this demonstrates how the government was able to impose the agenda onto the NVS, thus being in charge of structuring practices of NGOs.

Available governmental documents which deal with CIDA’s relationship with international development NGOs show how quickly and without reservations general governmental priorities have been introduced into the field of human security/development:

In June 2007, CIDA launched its Transformation for Results Initiative that seeks to place CIDA among the world’s most effective and accountable bilateral development agencies. In a major step towards implementing the Government’s aid effectiveness agenda and delivering better development results, CIDA is modifying its management structure. This new structure will ensure that CIDA uses the world’s best development knowledge and innovative thinking; improves the efficiency and coherence of its programming with more consistent processes, better coordination across

all delivery channels, and increased opportunities to develop thematic programming across countries and continents; integrates rigorous strategic planning, state-of-the-art evaluations and independent assessments, and enhanced public communication of development results; and enhances opportunities for employees to develop their skills and to demonstrate their leadership potential (OECD 2008: 17).

The full implications and unintended consequences of the transformation of Canadian NVS generally, and of NGOs active in the field of human security/international development in particular, are examined in Chapter 5. Attention will be directed at the globalisation of Canadian advanced liberal managerial model.

Foreign- and Security-Policy Conditions of Possibility

In order to find out what kinds of mechanisms were at play between the government and Canada-based NGOs within the field of human security and international development, one needs to shift the analysis from the global level to micropractices and narratives produced around them. The advantage of a practice-oriented investigation is that it allows one to cut through a thick and impenetrable layer of celebratory discourses that have significantly hindered the process of shedding new light on the issue at hand. Following Deleuze and Guattari, one can say that the powerful discursive series of (i) middle power, (ii) (global) civil society vs. states

(Canada), and (iii) more ambitious human security (which was critically investigated in Chapter 2) can be conceived as an example of a powerful assemblage of enunciation. Importantly, although an assemblage of enunciation does not usually match an assemblage of effectuation, i.e. something the authors call a non-parallel formalisation (one never does what one says and vice versa), it has still become an established truth. In fact, a wide gap has appeared between what has been said about transformations in CanFSP and what can be said about it, both empirically and theoretically.

The following analyses the second key transformation that significantly contributed to the creation of a fecund substratum for CanHS and allowed the landmine case to emerge, namely procedural and substantive changes in Canadian Foreign and Security Policy (CanFSP). The key opening of the previously rigid substance and procedure of CanFSP came between 1992 and 1995 and was closely linked to the return of the Liberal Party (LP) to government in 1993, after spending nine consecutive years in opposition. However, it will also be shown that the initial stage of CanFSP transformations began as early as the mid-1980s during the Progressive Conservative government, and that the initial ideational shift was subsequently catalysed by material factors, specifically by the budgetary cuts of the early 1990s.

The first wave of governmental attempts to incorporate new actors dates back to the mid-1980s and was associated with Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government. Back in the 1980s, the Peace Movement was a vociferous and heterogeneous predecessor of future specialised NGOs, a conglomerate of anti- Reagan, left-wing pacifists, environmentalists and religious leaders who were all trying to “democratise” CanFSP. Its appeal was based on a simple and ideologically-

imbued message which was often extreme in its demand and thus politically unfeasible (Bland and Maloney 2004: 108). The effort of Mulroney’s government to internalise the voices of such “counter-experts” preoccupied with rights enhancement was identified with the rise of populism in CanFSP (cf. Page 1994). While the Foreign Ministry under Joe Clark tried to co-opt – some would even argue silence – the Peace Movement by consulting them, funding their “research” and making them members of various governmental committees, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the DND-funded Conference of Defence Associations initially ignored them and later made a successful effort to discredit them by repeated challenges in public meetings and in the media (Bland and Maloney 2004: 108-109). One of the effects of the above development was governmental pressure on the Peace Movement to professionalise. As a result of this trend, a number of specialised NGOs, such as Project Ploughshares, which later played an important role in the landmine case, were founded.

By the time of the 1993 general election, around which the second wave of governmental attempts to engage new actors took place, the Peace Movement had to a large extent already been dispersed and had begun to be replaced by NGOs connected to – and financially dependent upon – formal channels. Earlier efforts by the Progressive Conservatives to tame NGOs by bringing them closer to government were further intensified in the Liberals’ electoral campaign, founded on the notion of radical change in CanFSP. The clear mandate obtained by the Liberals after its landslide victory in the elections marked the key and perhaps permanent change in the procedure and substance of CanFSP. The Liberals’ vision was detailed in their election programme, Creating Opportunities (also known as the “Red Book”). The Liberals promised a shift in CanFSP, both in terms of procedure and substance, by

stating that ‘Canadians are asking for a commitment from government to listen to their views, and to respect their needs by ensuring that no false distinction is made between domestic and foreign policy’ (Liberal Party of Canada 1993a: 104-6).

In document Human security assemblages. Transformations and governmental rationalities in Canada and Japan. (Page 111-182)