The Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States

Closely connected to the presence of a functioning government, this criterion requires that an entity express its independence to freely determine its international relations and to interact with other states. The Declaration of Sovereignty and the 1991 Constitution both explicitly mentioned international relations, stipulating that:

The Transdniestrian MSSR exercises its international links and relations independently as well as through the existing bodies of the Union of SSR. In its relations with the republics of the Union of SSR, the exclusive right to represent the TMSSR belongs to the Supreme Council of the republic and its designated bodies.¹⁴

Additionally, the Declaration of Independence provided that:

The relations of the Transdniestrian MSSR with other states are built on the basis of treaties signed on the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs of other states.¹⁵

The 1995 Constitution echoed this provision by grounding its foreign policy in the principles of the sovereign equality of states, use of force, peaceful dispute resolution, and non-interference in other states’ internal affairs.¹⁶ It stated that:

The universal principles and norms of international law, as well as the international treaties of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, are the basis for relations with other states and the constituent part of its legal system.¹⁷

To summarize, the Transdniestrian constitutional acts have included provisions relating to all the traditional criteria for statehood. By employing fundamental constitutional documents such as the Declaration of Independence and two Constitutions to assert these key elements of its statehood, Transdniestria has demonstrated its commitment to seek sovereignty and independence internally and externally. Internally, the population of Transdniestria witnessed the realization of popular will through the provisions of these fundamental constitutional documents

14 Declaration of the TMR’s Sovereignty, 1990; Article 29, the TMR’s Constitution, 1991.

15 Declaration of the TMR’s Independence, 1991.

16 Article 10 (1), the TMR’s Constitution, 1995.

17 Article 10 (2), Ibid.

after having expressed wide support for sovereignty in referenda.¹⁸ Externally, Transdniestria has made clear its commitment to independence so that the external actors could see its intention and consider it while negotiating over TMR’s status.

Notwithstanding Transdniestria’s substantial efforts to advance its statehood and to assert the traditional criteria for recognition through constitutional acts, the external actors have made no mention of either these constitutional documents or the provisions they entail in their official public discourse. Instead, the external actors largely frame their public discourse around issues related to the negotiation and settlement processes. Major sections in the official statements of all of the external actors – Moldova, the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the US – concern the need for conflict resolution and the importance of discussions and cooperation among all parties involved to achieve that goal. The external actors have emphasized Moldovan territorial integrity and their commitment to the conflict settlement process¹⁹ and discussed the need for a viable resolution that includes a guaranteed status for the TMR.²⁰ With the goal of settling the dispute in sharp relief, the external actors also have paid considerable attention to the issues of international and regional stability and security. They have debated the peacekeeping mission, the withdrawal of Russian troops,²¹ and the ways in which a solution to the conflict will

18 Details on the referenda held between 1990 and 1991 may be found in Chapter 2, while the 1995 Constitution is discussed in Chapter 4.

19 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Annual Reports,” (1994-2012); Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Testimony of Asif J. Chaudhry,” (2008); U.S. White House, “Joe Biden’s Speech at Opera House Square, Chisinau, Moldova,” News Release, March 11, 2011; U.S. Department of State, Interview by Virginia Dumitras, December 12, 2011; European Union Council. Council Conclusions on Moldova, 2004 and 2008;

Pravitel’stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Sovmestnaya press-konferentsia s Federal'nym kanslerom Germanii Angeloi Merkel po itogam rossiisko-germanskih peregovorov” News Release, June 5, 2010; Sovet Federatsii Federal'nogo Sobrania Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Sergei Mironov: Rossia gotova sodeistvovat’ resheniu Pridenstrovskoi problemy,”

News Release, May 18, 2008.

20 Ministerstvo Inostrannyh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, “Intervieu Sergheya Lavrova,” News Release, November 10, 2005; OSCE Annual Reports, 1994-2012; OSCE Report #13, 1993; “Interv’u Erwan Fouere,” Novyi Region, September 24, 2012; “Interv’u William Moser,” Novyi Region, October 8, 2012.

21 “Iulian Chifu: V Buchareste schitaiut, chto naznachenie Rogozina zablokirovalo pryamoi dialog mejdu Kishinevom i Tiraspolem,” Novyi Region, January 29, 2013; (on the need to transition from Russian peace-keeping troops to an international force, and to push Russia to comply with Istanbul obligations on troops withdrawing);

contribute both to regional stability²² and to the protection and furtherance of the basic security interests of all parties in the region.²³ Furthermore, individually, the external actors have discussed particular issues of relevance to their own external policies. For example, along with settling the conflict, the EU often mentions its goal of further developing its neighborhood policy,²⁴ while Ukraine, Russia, and the US concentrate on social and economic issues.²⁵

The resulting context in which Transdniestrian status is debated rules out the possibility of recognition altogether, thus hinting that the issue has an important geopolitical component.

Official public discourse merges the issue of Transdniestria into a larger discussion of how to create a comprehensive system for security and stability in the region and cares little about the internal dynamics of the de facto state itself or its constitutional structure.

Thus, the approach the external actors have adopted in their official public discourse frames the Transdniestrian issue in terms of conflict resolution (based on the territorial integrity of Moldova) and geopolitics. Their approach has not suggested that the Transdniestrian constitution and its provisions asserting traditional criteria for recognition have been particularly decisive for the prospects of Transdniestria’s status.

Moldova US Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Office of Inspector General Report of Inspection. Embassy Chisinau. “Report Number ISP-I-05-12A,” (2005), 5.

22 During his visit to the TMR, the head of EU delegation on the external relations, Rene Nyberg, stated, “The aim of our visit is to underscore the importance of stability in this region of Europe. We support all efforts on final conflict resolution.” “‘Troika’ Evrosoyza v Pridnestrov’e,” Dnestrovskaya Pravda, #121, October 21, 1999.

23 Hill, 2008.

24 EU Council Conclusions on Moldova, 2004.

25 “Leonid Kozhara: Seichas vremea prinimat' vernyie reshenia,” Kommersant, January 20, 2013; Louis O'Neill.

“Moldova’s Recent Elections: Prospects for Change in Europe’s Poorest Country,” (Commission on Security &

Cooperation in Europe: U.S. Helsinki Commission), 2009.

2.1. The Presence of the TMR’s Constitutional Provisions Asserting the Traditional Criteria for Recognition in Official Transdniestrian Public Discourse, and the Approach of the External Actors towards Transdniestrian Claims

In arguing for the recognition of its statehood, the TMR rarely refers to the traditional criteria or to the constitutional provisions that ground these criteria in its official public discourse. Instead, the TMR bases its claim to recognition on the restoration of its statehood and its right to self-determination. This suggests that the TMR largely views the issue of its recognition within the context of international law and consigns constitutional law to the domestic sphere.²⁶ For the external actors, however, the framing of Transdniestrian claims in terms of the restoration of its lost statehood and right to self-determination are not important. In their official public discourse, the external actors reject the TMR’s claims²⁷ and largely ignore discussions of this topic in favor of upholding the international legal principle of territorial integrity.

Thus, along with defining the visible elements of Transdniestrian and foreign official public discourse, the view of and reactions to Transdniestrian claims to its statehood contextualize the grounds for the TMR’s search of recognition, as well as the external actors’

refusal to recognize the entity. In addition, review of Transdniestria’s claims to recognition strengthens the idea that the TMR’s constitutional documents have not played a direct role in the recognition process and have not affected the prospects for a change in the entity’s status.

26 The approach is supported by personal communications of the representatives of Transdniestrian authorities.

August 2013.

27 Scholars analyzing the compliance of the TMR’s claims to statehood and self-determination with the traditional criteria for recognition under the framework of international law widely share this position. See the discussion below.