The question of whether negotiations with iran should be overt or covert is related to another aspect of the Persuasion approach: what to play
typically takes place despite any number of mis- steps and offensive statements by people on both sides. The two countries inevitably overlook these slights because it is in their own best interests to do so. This is a critical point to keep in mind when considering the potential for a U.s.-iranian deal. countries do not make peace as a favor to one another; they do it out of a cold calculation that it serves their interests. any rapprochement that can be derailed by obnoxious rhetoric is not the genu- ine item. During the american reconciliation with china in the 1970s and 1980s, and with india in the 1990s and 2000s, reactionaries on both sides fired off outrageous verbal broadsides at the other country to try to derail the process. Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi all chose to continue to im- prove relations because of the benefits to each of them of doing so. Until iran decides that improved relations with the United states are in its interest, it does not matter what the United states says, there will be no rapprochement; and once the iranians make that decision, affronts to its dignity will lose much (if not all) of their sting.
Nevertheless, words do have impact, and they can certainly complicate a delicate rapprochement— even once both countries have crossed the crucial rubicon of seeing the rapprochement as in their interests. These complications rarely affect the ul- timate outcome, but they certainly can affect the timing of the rapprochement. Given that amer- ica’s problems with iran are closely tied to mat- ters of timing, Washington should try as hard as it can to not prolong this process by saying care- less things that would make it harder for tehran to cooperate. indeed, the smartest thing that an american administration pursuing the Persua- sion approach could do, would be to announce that it was pursuing a policy of pure engagement instead, playing up all of the positives and the de- sire for a cooperative relationship, and pushing the president’s outstretched hand, the United states
will adopt a different approach that will not be so friendly. second, iran is going to find out about the sanctions anyway—tehran has various sources who will report on the negotiations between the United states and other key members of the inter- national community over what sanctions to im- pose on iran for failing to comply or engage, trying to draw out negotiations, or taking actions clearly intended to advance a nuclear weapons program. eventually, those threats would need to be made public, but for the obama administration, there is still time for that. Third, because the regime will not agree to be seen as bowing to pressure, issuing constant public threats, as obama administration personnel have done in their first weeks in office, simply undermines the ability to get the iranians to the table (let alone agree to the compromises that would make a deal possible) and does not materi- ally advance any american interests.
on a related note, any american administration (including the current one) that intends to pur- sue the Persuasion approach should never utter the term “carrot and stick” in public. although it is simply a metaphor, even a cliché, that ameri- cans use to describe any diplomatic policy that employs both positive and negative incentives, be- cause the metaphor is derived from the way one handles a donkey, it is often offensive to the object of the policy. That is certainly the case for iran, which has repeatedly bridled at the term, includ- ing when President-elect obama employed it in a televised interview.20
This too must be kept in perspective. Ultimately, rapprochement between longtime adversaries only becomes possible when both sides have made the unilateral calculation that is in their own best in- terests to end the squabble. When both have done so, the rapprochement typically takes place, and it
to develop an enrichment capability and privately signaled their willingness to cooperate with the United states on iran in return for american con- cessions elsewhere—probably on issues of greater importance to Moscow, like missile defense, Geor- gia, chechnya, Belarus, Bosnia, Kosovo, and/or Ukraine. steven Pifer has suggested that an easy compromise the United states could make would be to slow down the installation of ballistic mis- sile defense systems in eastern europe in return for russian cooperation on iran.22 This might be
expanded to an explicit deal in which the speed of emplacement and ultimate extent of american missile defenses were directly related to the ra- pidity of iran’s nuclear development and whether tehran ultimately agreed to suspend or end it. This would then put the onus on the russians to find ways to convince the iranians to stop their program (which likely would mean joining in on tough international sanctions) if the former wanted to head off the deployment of the ameri- can missile defense systems. especially after the august 2008 russian moves in Georgia, it would be repugnant for the United states simply to ac- quiesce to the reassertion of russian dominance over the former countries of the soviet Union, but it may be necessary to cut some deals in order to secure Moscow’s support for a tougher iran poli- cy. if the current administration truly cares about preventing iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and is determined to pursue the Persua- sion approach to the greatest extent possible, it may find it necessary to make such hard decisions. similarly, the chinese have privately indicated that their greatest concern is secure energy sup- plies and that they, too, would be willing to go along with harsher sanctions on a recalcitrant iran if the United states were willing to find ways the sanctions and all of the threats well into the
background until it becomes clear that the irani- ans are interested in a deal.21