Chapter Three: Conclusion

The ultimate conclusion to be gleaned from the case study of the Baltic region is a simple one, combining well with the lessons we have learned from studying the Ukrainian crisis. Despite Russia’s bluster and strongly worded statements, and its attempts to mask its true intentions in order to threaten and intimidate both its neighbors and Western powers, ultimately it only intervenes in areas which are strategically valuable and where there are low barriers to do so. The conclusion of this essay will further explore the implications of Russia’s approaches to both regions, with particular concern for the lessons that can be learned and applied by other states in Russia’s “near abroad.”

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Through the case studies of Ukraine and the Baltics, we can make several conclusions about the nature of Post-Soviet Eastern European geopolitics. To start this conversation, let us reflect on our three variables: the first, Russian strategic interest in a location (not, as many have argued, the presence of Russian-identified people in the region), allows for the very threat of intervention in the first place, thereby being the most fundamental variable of the lot. While at first the inclusion of this variable may seem unnecessarily simple, it is important to note that this means not all land bordering Russia is in particular danger of incursion (for example, remote Mongolian borderlands). Second is an intensifying variable contingent on the first: the identity and circumstance of Russian minorities in those areas of interest, the presence or lack of an exploitable minority. If these minorities are discontented and willing to openly defy their government, Russia will be more

willing to intervene as they provide both a pretext and a cover for intervention. This means that Russia may intervene more rapidly in areas it already considered interesting if unrest spikes and/or it may intervene in areas it considered interesting, but below the normal threshold for intervention, before the spike. Thirdly, an institutional barrier to Russian military interference exists in NATO and other organizations in some cases; the threats that organizations can pose are obviously variable, but in the case study of the Baltics, they are fairly universally considered a credible and strong deterrent effect. However, these institutions only work if states in Russia’s “near abroad” have membership in them; as much as NATO and the EU dislike Russian aggression in Ukraine, they were unwilling to come to Ukraine’s aid directly as it was not a member state. No border state, apart from the Baltics, is a member of one of these major, deterrent institutions. Given this

structure, Ukraine can be considered a perfect storm for Russian intervention, as all variables in early 2014 favored it, Estonia presents a case study in which the first variable was present but the other two were anti-intervention, and Latvia a case in which the first variable is pro-intervention, the second intermediate to low, and the third anti-intervention.

The value in this framework is not in understanding the case studies better (or at least not primarily so); these case studies are deeply complicated and heavily studied as it is. Rather, the lessons from them, filtered through this variable approach, can be applied to find future points of potential Russian aggression and ascertain what Russia’s strategy might be if they choose to

intervene. It comes as no surprise that the “institutional override” of Variable Three has played, and continues to play, an enormous role in Russian strategy in the Baltics. Due to the overriding nature of this variable, it is true both that nations in which both Variables One and Two are present should seek strong military alliances and that the potential outcomes are much more varied in its absence;

in essence, if Variable Three is present, it puts the power in the hands of the border state, whereas in its absence the power lies with Russia to tailor its plans for potential intervention specifically for that region.

Let us take some examples to illustrate these points: for instance, suppose that minerals of great value were found under eastern Latvia, and the Russian-identifying populations there

happened to be greatly upset at their government at the time and desired to join Russia. Even in this scenario, one which would surely cause many Western pundits (likely even the more sensible ones like Shlapentokh, given that many fundamental assumptions about the stable nature of Baltic

Russians would have proven incorrect), seizure of that land would be unlikely as it would effectively constitute a declaration of war against many nuclear powers bound to protect Latvia due to their alliances. In essence, even in a worrying situation like this, the threat of NATO and like institutions would almost certainly preclude invasion, and probably even a Ukraine-style quasi-invasion.

The more interesting question is how these variables apply to nations without strong military alliances, ones without the overriding presence of variable three. If the above situation occurred on the border of Kazakhstan, a nation without alliances with significantly lower institutional and alliance backing, Russia would likely rapidly intervene (indeed, they might intervene on an even more sparsely-fabricated excuse absent an exploitable minority, given sufficiently high interest). Russia would decide whether to intervene or not by weighing the strength of its interest against its ability to “get away with it”, so to speak, including the clearly significant pretext and justification provided by a disgruntled Russian minority. The example of Crimea and the Donbas would prove crucial to predicting the specifics of such a case, depending on its circumstance. In the above scenario, given a Crimea-like combination of Variables One and Two

being present and three being absent in a border territory in Kazakhstan (or in any of several nations in Central Asia or the Caucasus), immediate seizure of territory and rapid attempts at justifying this invasion through sham secession referendums would be a likely strategy, as it appears to have largely worked in Ukraine. If only variable one were present, this might still occur, as mentioned above; though in Crimea both were present, and thus separating the contribution of each is an inherently difficult proposition, the reason for invasion was surely a very strong Russian interest, and the second variable merely informed the timing and method of invasion.

If the hypothetical case were shifted in the other direction, and only Variable Two was present, Donbassian logic could be applied: after all, Russia clearly involved itself in that conflict not due to any advantage it could gain from holding that territory (or else it would have seized it

directly, like it did in Crimea roughly contemporaneously), but rather to antagonize Ukraine and to signal to the West its aspirations at regional hegemony. This situation may be less likely to occur in areas outside of Eastern Europe; though some concern was expressed over the invasion of Georgia in 2008, it seems unlikely that any significant utility in this regard could come from invading, or aiding rebels in, a Caucasian or certainly a Central Asian state. Ultimately, Western nations will be much more concerned with what is near themselves and their allies; Ukraine and the Baltics certainly qualify as such, the Caucasus region somewhat less so, and Central and East Asia will thus be areas of low relative concern to the powers which would likely challenge Russian aggression (though, as China grows in its power and influence, Russia’s far eastern border regions could become an area of concern in the future). Thus, in a Donbas-like situation, featuring an exploitable minority but in an area too far from and insignificant to Western powers, there is limited signalling

potential, and as that is the only use for intervention in such areas, post-Soviet states outside Eastern Europe should be less worried about a Donbassian situation than a Crimean one.

Of course, in any real-world situation in Russia’s “near abroad,” these variables are hardly ever fully one way or the other. Crimea and the Baltics largely present clear and distinct cases and overwhelming interests, for example the overwhelming Russian interest in Crimea, or the overwhelming threat posed by NATO, precluding any semblance of Russian intervention.

However, the truly useful aspects of the case studies in terms of discerning future behavior are likely in the areas in between, in areas of potential conflict, rather than in areas in which it is likely or near. The conflict in the Donbas, for example, is in effect Russia simply utilizing the available Russian-identified minority to intimidate and signal its regional power to other nations, and

Latvia’s moderate level of Russian-minority discontent could be a meaningful and complex factor in Russia’s calculus if that context were present in a different and less protected nation, say in the Caucasus or in Central Asia. These considerations are well outside the scope of this thesis, both in terms of the myriad conceivable outcomes of intermediate cases and the application of the evidence from the case studies to specific areas, which each have their own peculiarities which could

significantly increase or decrease Russian desire and/or ability to interfere.

However, while acknowledging the uncertainty and limitations of using case studies to predict future behavior, some conclusions are difficult to avoid given the evidence provided by them. Firstly, and rather obviously, all post-Soviet states should attempt to make strong alliances or institutional ties, particularly with nuclear powers, and analyze the value of their land, not to themselves or to a hypothetical ethno-nationalist Russia, but to a strategic and regionally ambitious Russia which seeks to gain power (real or perceived) for itself at almost any cost. Secondly, border

states, if they possess any significant Russian minority population (especially near the border), should formulate policies towards them aimed at keeping them politically content with access to sufficient economic opportunity and, if possible, strengthening their claim on those border regions.

To provide an example of a potential successful deterrence of intervention, we can look to Kazakhstan in 1993. In that year, some Russian nationalists, notably the parliamentarian Vladimir Zhirinovsky, called for Russia to seize the predominantly ethnic-Russian northernmost region of the country (Barnard). While Kazakhstan’s leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, downplayed the significance of this rhetoric at the time, later that year he announced that Kazakhstan’s capital would be moving from Almaty, a large city in the ethnically Kazakh south, to a new planned city in the north of the country, what is now Astana, in order to solidify Kazakhstan’s claim on the region despite its ethnic makeup (Barnard). While such drastic moves cannot and should not be applied in every case, this flexible and bold approach to assuring a strong claim over territory should be looked to as a model by other states facing similar demographic and strategic concerns in Russia’s “near abroad”. Myriad options exist to counter Russian expansionism and aggression, from this sort of bold nation-building to economic programs to initiatives incentivizing minority migration further into the nation in question, and while it is important to realize that Russian minorities are only rarely dangerous in and of themselves, they are in effect quite dangerous if Russia has any strategic interest in their region. Ultimately, the closer a post-Soviet state finds itself resembling Ukraine in 2013, the more rapidly and commitedly it should utilize some or all of the aforementioned tools to ensure its continued sovereignty, lest it fall prey to Russia and its ongoing struggle for regional hegemony.

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