maximizing expected practical utility, some of them at moral goals, maybe a few at aesthetic goals. In the absence of any characteristic epistemic aim associated with them, though, there is little reason to think that these actions will be governed by an epistemic norm.
Consider, in contrast, asserting, perceiving, reporting, judging, learning, reading, applying to the university etc. These actions are all characteristically aimed at delivering epistemic goods. As such, it makes sense for them to be governed by epistemic norms.
Thus, having an epistemic norm for action makes perfect sense when it comes to actions characteristically associated with epistemic goals, like assertion. It makes sense to ask what property exactly one’s assertion must enjoy for it to be epistemically proper; that is, properly equipped to reach its epistemic goal. However, just as in the case of producing antibiotics, there is no reason to think that my buying chocolate will be governed by an epistemic norm, due to the fact that it is not characteristically aimed at delivering epistemic goods. Assertion is not governed by an epistemic norm in virtue of its being a type of action, but due to its characteristic epistemic function.
In the light of these results, it looks as if the question concerning what one’s epistemic relation to p has to be in order to render acting on p permissible should be framed as concerning a type of normativity that plausibly governs all types of action. Uncontroversially, I guess, the most obvious candidate is prudential normativity. Thus, what we are asking is what one’s epistemic relation to p has to be in order to render acting on p prudentially permissible.58
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter put forth a function-‐first classical invariantist knowledge account of assertion. According to the view defended here, assertions are epistemically permissible if and only if knowledgeable in virtue of: (1) the fact that the main epistemic function of assertion is to generate knowledge in hearers and (2) knowledge on the part of the asserter being both necessary and sufficient for fulfilling this function.
I have also hinted towards what the functionalist framework has to say about the relationship between assertion and its normative neighbours, belief and action. According to the view defended here, the
58 Crucially, nothing here excludes there being an epistemic norm for practical
reasoning. After all, practical reasoning does serve (at least) the epistemic function of generating knowledge of the conclusion. For more on this, see (Simion, Under Review).
normative commonality assumption for the three is false: knowledge governs assertion, the norm of belief is a weaker, reliabilist norm, and there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action.
Last but not least, I put forth a functionalist, light constitutivity claim, which stays clear of the difficulties encountered by its Williamsonian counterpart.
In what follows, I defend both the necessity and the sufficiency direction of the norm proposed against the putative counterexamples in the literature.
Chapter IV.
The Necessity Claim
In recent literature, the necessity claim involved in KNA (henceforth, KNA-‐Nec) is taken by many to be too strong a requirement. The most prominent competing account on the market59 imposes a weaker norm on assertion, and has been most notably defended, among others, by Igor Douven (2006) and Jennifer Lackey (2008). Roughly, the thought is that one should only assert p if p is rationally credible to one (henceforth, RCNA), where the epistemic status at stake is taken to be equivalent to knowledge-‐level justification – that is, whatever turns un-‐ Gettiered true belief into knowledge.
Defenders of RCNA argue for their preferred view from different directions; thus, I will discuss them in turn. Douven (2006, 2009) argues that theoretical considerations, such as a priori simplicity, speak in favour of RCNA; furthermore, he thinks the weaker norm will also do just as fine in accommodating the linguistic data generally taken to support KNA-‐Nec. According to Jennifer Lackey, KNA-‐Nec, as opposed to RCNA, has a hard time explaining cases in which assertions on some lesser epistemic standings do not seem to render the speakers subject to criticism. All in all, RCNA is taken to score better.
This chapter’s main ambition is to tip the balance back in favour of KNA-‐Nec. To this effect, I will first argue that Douven’s argument for the a priori simplicity of RCNA does not go through. Furthermore, I will show that KNA scores better on the second front – that is, accommodating linguistic data. Finally, I will provide a unified defence of KNA-‐Nec against Lackey’s cases, sourced in the normativity of action in general, so as to avoid charges with ad hoc-‐ness.
4.1 A Priori Simplicity
According to Douven, while both KNA-‐Nec and RCNA do an equally good job in explaining the empirical data, RCNA is to be preferred due to considerations pertaining to a priori simplicity (2006, 451). That is,
59 The truth norm of assertion, according to which one’s assertion is epistemically
permissible only if true, is the other main competitor on the market. I do not engage with this account, mainly because I am convinced by the extant case against it in the literature. See (Williamson 2000) for reasons to thing truth is not the norm and Weiner (2005) for a rejoinder on behalf of the truth account. Furthermore, some of the arguments in support of the necessity claim involved in KNA presented in this chapter will work equally well to mount a defense against a truth norm, or any weaker norm, for that matter. (But see the previous chapter (section #3.2.2) for reasons to believe a truth norm cannot be associated with the epistemic function of assertion.)