Figure 5.4: Database structure
7. Conclusions and future work 1 Introduction
Transparency in agri‐food supply chains depends on communication and information ex‐ change (Schiefer and Deiters, 2013). In this context, much of the information required by producers, processors, intermediaries, consumers, and government is already available at some stages. However, up to and including the present, information has not flowed in a closed loop through all of the relevant chain actors (Branscheid, 2002). Data capture is often carried out in parallel to processes in the individual stages, so the collected data is only available horizontally for this stage (Branscheid, 2002). To improve this situation the collabo‐ ration and coordination of activities is required between supply chain entities to increase information sharing and accessibility. A method for improving supply chain efficiency and improved information flow is to perform inspections jointly with a greater number of supply chain stages, to enhance the mutual benefit to each stage.
With regard to the mutual inspections, an adaption of the control to match the actual quality situation is valuable if a product is bought for an extended time period in larger quantity (Pfeifer, 1993). In this case the intensity of inspection is greater or smaller than in normal inspections (Leonhard and Naumann, 2002). Adaption of the inspection can be oriented to‐ wards risks with greater or smaller likelihoods according to the risk of the product or batch. Risk orientation of specific inspections is anchored in European food legislation, for example regarding the official control of food producing companies according to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004. A combination of both, collaboration between supply chain stages regarding inspections and risk orientation of these inspections has been proposed with the AMOR model (Alliances for the Mutual Organisation of Risk oriented inspection strategies) (Petersen and O’Hagan, 2014; O’Hagan et. al., 2013; Lang and Petersen, 2012a, 2012b). The model describes the col‐ laboration in a dyadic relation between supplier and customer potentially complemented by a coordinating partner for the purpose of a mutual inspection strategy according to risk ori‐ ented viewpoints. The approach includes the formation of an alliance between the collabo‐ rating partners and the exchange of inspection results as well as product information within this alliance. 7.2 Answers to research questions The primary outcome of this thesis has been the development of the AMOR model (Alliances for the Mutual Organisation of Risk oriented inspection strategies). AMOR has been com‐ prehensively defined and a complete characterisation of the principles of the concept is pro‐ vided. Furthermore, practical applications of AMOR principles have been investigated and the extent of their implementation has been evaluated through case studies.
The thesis has made an additional contribution to the study of structures in an agri‐food supply chain to determine actors coordinating quality management strategies as well as their activities on supply chain level. Based on the insights obtained through this evaluation, a model of chain coordination has been established.
Another goal of the work has been to analyse risk management systems in agri‐food compa‐ nies to determine their connection with quality management systems and to evaluate the organisational structure of risk management systems. This analysis has established whether risk management systems are used for risk oriented inspections in industry and whether collaboration with other supply chain stages regarding risk management is an existing prac‐ tice. The aspects of risk orientation and collaboration are important aspects of the AMOR concept. The research presented in this thesis is based on empirical studies including qualitative and quantitative online, personal and telephone interviews as well as focus group meetings with industry professionals. The main findings of the research will be summarised in response to the questions formulated in the Introduction chapter. I. Do structures in the pork supply chain exist which facilitate the coordination and spread of quality management strategies in the supply chain? How can they be characterised? In empirical analysis of case studies, structures for the coordination of quality management strategies in the pork producing chain could be found. A chain coordination model has been proposed for the coordination of individual activities concerning quality management. Three levels have been defined – normative, strategic and operational – to allocate actors accord‐ ing to their roles and responsibilities. The actors on the three levels are the chain quality board on the normative level, network coordinator on the strategic level and quality broker on the operational level.
The chain quality board can be occupied by actors who have an outstanding position in the supply chain. These actors are in charge of setting requirements for the quality management strategies and for strategic quality objectives of the supply chain. The network coordinators strategically set up, implement and support mechanisms for coordination. Quality brokers perform the controls of a quality management strategy and promote the strategy amongst the members of the supply chain to assure functioning of the strategies. The brokers medi‐ ate between the supply chain members as they usually are companies that are naturally in an intermediary position with access to supply chain members.
Results have shown that the existence of the coordinating actors in the different supply chains varies. This variation can be related to for example the degree of integration in the chain. In fully integrated chains like in China, one actor occupies the positions on normative, strategic and operational level.
The research has shown that the proposed chain coordination model will strengthen the competitiveness of European pork chains by making them more compatible under various
market conditions and relationships in pork supply chains. Furthermore, it can help chains to structure coordinating actors and implement coordination mechanisms for quality manage‐ ment strategies.
II. Are risk management systems in the supply chain connected to quality management