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In this final section the Netherlands interventions on the four issues are assessed on the basis of the four evaluation criteria. The overall conclusion, including the assessment on whether certain outcomes were justified given the impediments, is presented in chapter 9.

Compliance

The Dutch interventions in the period 1995/1996-2001 with respect to the issue of compliance were partially connected to the national policy objectives. The Netherlands aimed at a compliance mechanism that would include a verification system and fact- finding missions. This objective only materialised in the Dutch support for the EU and South African proposals. As such, the policy objectives were more ambitious than the interventions. The Dutch interventions were partially responsive to the international policy objectives. Rather than labouring to achieve consensus, the Netherlands opted to lend support the position of the Western Group, which preferred a strong

verification regime. Despite this coalition and as a result of the resistance from the group of States Parties that preferred to include confidence- building measures only, the compliance mechanism for Amended Protocol II adopted during the First Review Conference did not include a verification system or fact-finding missions. The Dutch interventions were timely; in preparation for the First Review Conference the Netherlands actively supported proposals of other States Parties on verification and compliance. However, the intervention instrument the Netherlands used in this period (supporting proposals) was of a moderate scope: although the action radius of supporting proposals is large, it is an indirect instrument for communicating a position.

Moreover, from the perspective of the actor using it, it is an active instrument rather than a proactive instrument.

The Dutch interventions were also partially connected to the national policy objectives in the phase of consultations on the issue of compliance (2001-2006). That is, in this period too, the interventions were not as ambitious as the policy objectives would suggest. The Dutch government aimed to actively promote the establishment of a compliance mechanism, but it did so mainly by acting within the framework of the EU. As such, the Dutch interventions were partially responsive to the international decision- making process, because they supported only the policy objectives of the EU in particular and the Western Group more in general. Only in 2005 did a Dutch intervention aim at creating consensus beyond the Western Group. The Dutch

interventions were timely; the Netherlands supported the EU approach from the outset. By and large, the Dutch interventions in this period were of a moderate scope. Initially, the interventions did not go further than giving support to the EU papers. During the Dutch EU Presidency (second half of 2004) the Netherlands drafted an EU position paper on the issue. By doing so, the Netherlands took on an active level of involvement, but the directness and action radius of the instrument in question

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remained the same. The same applies to the joint initiative of the Netherlands and the UK to work on a compromise proposal in 2005.

Universalisation

As far as the universalisation of the CCW and its protocols was concerned, the Dutch interventions were connected to national policy objectives. The Dutch government aimed at promoting the universality of the convention. It did so by sponsoring the resolutions in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which called on states to become members to the CCW and its Protocols. Further, it initiated a proposal for EU démarches. Since the universalisation of the CCW was a general objective of all States Parties, the Dutch interventions were responsive to the international decision-making process. The Dutch interventions were timely: they were put in annually immediately after the CCW had been established. The Dutch interventions on universalisation were of a moderate scope, since they did not go beyond supporting UN General Assembly resolutions and one (unanswered) initiative in the context of the EU.

AVMs

The Dutch interventions regarding AVMs in the first phase of agenda-setting (1995/1996-2001) were partially connected to the national policy objectives. The Netherlands aimed at a ban on the use of non-detectable AVMs and in 1998 the government promised Parliament that it would push hard for a total ban on non- detectable AVMs and AVMs without neutralising and self-detecting mechanisms. Although the interventions were indeed in line with the policy objectives, they were not as ambitious as the policy objectives. The interventions were responsive to the international decision-making process, because they took into account the existence of a clear group of proponents of further restrictions as well as a group of opposing States Parties. As such, the interventions were aimed at creating consensus within the CCW as a whole. The interventions were timely: as early as April 1995, in the early stages of the deliberations, the Netherlands pleaded for self-destruction and detectability devices for AVMs. The Dutch interventions on AVMs in this period were of a moderate

scope. Together with like-minded actors it argued for measures on AVMs during the First

Review Conference. Only during the First Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW in 1999 did the Netherlands labour for further restrictions by organising an informal meeting on AVMs. Subsequently, it supported several proposals put forward by the US and Denmark in 2000 and 2001, and eventually the 12-nation proposal on AVMs in 2001.

In the second phase of consultations on AVMs (2001-2006), the Netherlands held to its original position on AVMs. In this phase too, the Dutch interventions were in line with the national policy objectives, though not as ambitious as these. The interventions were limited to supporting the proposals of other states and concerted EU action, and the Netherlands even opted not to co-sponsor the 18-nation and 30-nation proposals. As such, the interventions were partially connected. At the same time, the interventions were partially responsive to the international decision-making process. Instead of making

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