Continuing Difficulties and,Drafting^Opt ions

Although the proposals arrived at by the Sub-Committee contain several useful elements, there are other problems yet to be resolved in their later stages of development. Chief among these is the need to formulate agreement on the question of amending the c o n v e n t i o n ’s Annexes which would contain necessary information on the explosives and taggants covered in the main text. Inevitably, advances in technology will require a flexible means by which changes to the Annexes can be incorporated swiftly and completely, such that the document retains its currency and is sufficient to meet the threat posed by newly-produced plastic explosives. In discussions, three possible means of amendment were presented for consideration:

1. amendments would be prepared by the ETC and adopted by the ICAO Council, thus binding all parties;

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majority and requiring individual state ratification of decisions to protect s t a t e s ’ sovereignty;

3. the ETC would draft proposals for change which would be sent to states for their comments; in the absence of objections the proposals would become operative; otherwise a diplomatic conference would be called to consider the matter.**

There is no doubt that, taken equally at face value, option one would represent the most efficient and clear proposal, but would pose the most obvious threat to s t a t e s ’ closely guarded freedom of action. Option two is a politically realistic suggestion, but one which is cumbersome and unlikely to allow for swift implementation of reform. Only option three combines the elements of realism and potential " : ' V. nesg to produce a compromise which might still allow for moderately efficient reform. It is perhaps an indication of the difficulty entailed in balancing the factors involved that none of the three options (plus a more complex compromise presented by the United K i n g d o m ’s member) gained sufficient support to be adopted by the S u b ­ committee.** After referral to a Drafting Group composed of six states,** the question was addressed once more and it was decided along the lines of option three, above - that amendments proposed by the ETC and circulated to States Parties would enter force unless rejected by a number of States Parties (the number to be decided). Objectors would consult with the Commission and, if the disagreement remained, could maintain the objection and force the convening of a diplomatic conference.*? It was suggested by some Members of the S u b ­ committee that in the interests of "stability and uniformity" even one dissenting voice should be enough to call a diplomatic conference.*® Although the consequences of this could include a grievous o v e r ­ reliance upon resort to major problem-solving methods for minor disagreements, it is hard to deny that the maintenance of universal consensus on the issue calls for nothing less. Above all, a new regime on marking should aim to provide certainty and to prevent splintering of opinion on the questions of explosives and taggants. Whether such aims are too ambitious will be determined by the states themselves, first in the drafting conference and later in the operation of the convention.

On a related matter, the Sub-Commit tee was unable to reach agreement on the procedural code to be followed by the Commission and decided (by its only indicative vote - twelve to six) that the Draft Convention should contain no guidance on the E T C ’s Rules of Procedure, which it noted could be formulated after the agreement had come into for c e . * ’ In the absence of such a provision, it would be impossible

J9/j/90, pp. 9 - 10.

* * I b i d .

, p. 13.

*? Draft Convention, _{Article VI, in} LC/5C~MEX-REF0RT, 19/1/90, Ibid.

j9/j/9D, fbfd., p. 17. , p. 15.

to predict how the Commission might take its decisions and, in particular, what voting procedures it might adopt. This would not constitute a significant problem for a body empowered only to produce recommendations of no binding force, but it could lead to embarrassing disagreements and delay if the Commission were given the capacity to formulate more concrete, and thus more politically-divisive standards. For this reaon it would be wiser for the drafting conference to settle upon a firm set of Rules of Procedure in advance of the formation of the ETC.

Another issue still to be decided upon is the location in the convention of definitions of such key terms as "explosives", "marking of explosives" and "detection agent". One option presented by the Sub-Committee is to place definitions in the Annex section, thus allowing changes to be accommodated with ease, provided a streamlined mechanism could be arrived at for producing necessary changes when needed. Another is to include a definitions section in the first article of the document, so as to become a concretised and less easily amended piece of international legislation. A useful compromise, <Luigesl i'd in the 5 u b • ,i‘ ' be to include fun'i . n,. ? ' i 1 y important aspects of definitions in Article 1 but to leave the potentially changable details for the more pliable Annexes.*®

One worrying feature of the Sub-Committee's draft "Alternative A" which should not be permitted to be retained at the diplomatic conference is its reliance upon one means of security screening and a single mode of tagging. According to this wording, the marking of explosives would cover only the introduction of "an additional component which vaporizes, rendering the explosive detectable by gas analysis methods." By the same rationale, detection agents would constitute nothing more than "a substance having sufficient vapour pressure, which is introduced into an explosive as an additional component to render it detectable by gas analysis methods."**

It is unreasonable and unwise to place too much confidence in any one detection system - and particularly in gas analysis. At present, the use of the technique is hampered by the low success rates and/or the high false alarm rates of some models, plus the lengthy process of analysis and the high costs of others. Instead, the inclusion of a variety of taggants would make detection more predictable. If, for example, metal filings could be added. X-ray and metal detection systems (both of which are much more commonly used than gas analysis at airports) could be employed for the purpose. To overcome the problem the diplomatic conference could follow drafting “Alternative B" by leaving the convention silent on the details of explosives, taggants and detection possibilities, only to place them in detailed Annexes, which could be amended as required.

It was agreed by the Sub-Committee that an important feature of the new regime of explosives standardisation should be a continued

* ® 7 b J c / . p p . 13 - 14; Draft Convention, Alternatives A and 8. Article 1, in LC/$C~NEX~REPORT, Ibid.

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reliance upon existing security apparatus in use at places of sensitivity, such as airports.*? This decision reflects a common

contemporary inability to predict future trends in security

technology. At a time when new generations of security apparatus are promised, it is difficult - if not impossible - to guage to effectiveness of these infant systems. It also signifies an awareness that different nations will always use different levels of security dependent upon factors such as wealth, threats faced and passenger throughput. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the Sub-Committee gave current technology such high priority without also stating the necessary accompanying fact that in future the detection of plastic explosives will require faster, more efficient equipment. This issue will be discussed below in the context of apparatus currently being refined and introduced into operation.

5.3. The Inadequacies of Traditional Security Screening 5,3,1, Manual Searching

It has already been noted above that the original techniques used in passenger screening prior to the development of technical means of security were those which depended upon labour-intensive and time- consuming physical examination of the baggage and persons of travellers. Even after the introduction of advanced systems, however, the physical approach continues to play a significant role in all security strategies, because it is regarded as the ultimate determinant of innocence with any suspicious object or person. Also, there is a deterrent effect in hand searching a proportion of baggage irrespective of prior screening indicators, as this can add a potential tier of possible security activity for a terrorist to consider when planning an attack.

Whenever technical devices have indicated that a danger may exist in the form of an unidentified object, it is the responsibility of security personnel to undertake a full inspection to ensure that the passenger in question cannot enter an aircraft with suspicious articles. For that reason it is crucial that staff be able to make a swift search in a dignified yet rigorous way and know what objects might be capable of concealing weapons and explosives. Unfortunately, not all terrorists use as their locus of concealment the more obvious hiding places, such as hollowed-out books and soft toys. Instead, the malleable properties of plastic explosives allow potent bombs to be constructed and placed, for example, behind the lining of a suitcase, with the compound rolled to minute thicknesses and attached to the walls of the case.

The security dilemma which is presented by this development is of special interest because it effectively renders unworkable as an operational absolute the use of baggage hand searching, traditionally viewed as the only foolproof method of back-up to fallable technical means. The piece of baggage which Nezar Hindawi packed with plastic explosives in an attempt to sabotage an El A 1 Boeing 747 on 17 April 1986 was passed by BAA security staff because the b a g ’s false bottom, which concealed a compartment containing approximately three pounds of

plastic explosive in sheet form, was not discovered. A pocket calculator which held a small quantity of plastic explosive, a timer and an initiating blasting cap, was adjusted in such a way as to make it fully functioning, were it to be investigated.*®

Plastic explosive devices concealed within electrical and electronic articles were uncovered by police in the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1988, during a raid on premises known to be used by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP- 6C). Some of the devices, including a Toshiba "Bombeat 4 5 3 “ radio- recorder, contained altitude switches, as used in more advanced aircraft bombs (although PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril insisted that

they were intended for attacks on road vehicles in mountainous

areas).** Within the Bombeat was hidden a piece of plastic explosive measuring 180 mm x 60 mm x 22 mm and weighing 300 grammes, yet this block was itself disguised by a paper covering bearing a realistic

Toshiba trade mark and the description, "SX 225 BW 3 - W e g - K o m p a k t - B o x ." Elsewhere in the electrical parts an electronic timing device was found, covered with another Toshiba label, making it appear to be a legitimate component.**

In the investigation of the bomb discovery, various electrical goods

were removed from the PFLP-GC base to police offices. While one of these, containing a bomb which had not been recognised, was being examined by a trained police officer it exploded, killing him and

injuring a colleague. Difficulties of recognition are not unique to police departments: it would have been completely understandable for comparatively poorly trained security staff working to a tight

screening schedule to have given the Bombeat or a similar explosive device security clearance.

Even allowing two major assumptions to be made, first that a terrorist

was to attempt to infiltrate such a device in hand baggage and second that time was to permit a security officer to dismantle it for a detailed physical inspection, it is unlikely that anyone without

reasonable proficiency in the electronic sciences would be in a position to identify the disguised bomb components. With a bomb

concealed in the dense circuitry of personal computers or even simply following the specifications of the Bombeat device and dispatched by

terrorists to the safety of hold baggage, it is also unlikely that it would be prevented from reaching one of an a i r c r a f t ’s baggage sections. Only trained eyes and informed minds would be likely to find the Bombeat features which Wilkinson has identified as being

suspicious:

"[Security personnel] might have been able to spot the clue that

when x-rayed the radio-cassette player bomb appeared to contain

more wiring than normal. But only careful manual inspection

* ®Vincent (1989), p . 7.

**For a detailed description of the bomb see S. Emerson and B. Duffy The Fail of Pan Am Î03 _{(London: Futura, 1990),} pp. 193 - 194. **Bundesk.riminalamt, Getarnte Sprengvorrichtung, eingebaut in einem

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would have been able to detect the more obvious clues notified by the West Germans: the aerial jack plug was taped to the side of the radio and there was no wire attached to the jack plug; additional batteries and explosive material were not secured

inside the radio-cassette player, and these loose items rattled inside the set if it was rotated. There is only one airline in the world operating the rigorous search methods that would have been likely to spot such a device without any prior warning and briefing as to what to look for and that is El A 1. The rest of the w o r l d ’s civil aviation security systems simply do not have the technology or the human skills and knowledge to prevent another Lockerbie from happening tomorrow."**

Perhaps of even greater concern is the fact that radio equipment had been used to house lethal bombs on more than one previous occasion. On 21 February 1970, the casing of a radio was used to conceal a bomb which destroyed an Austrian Airlines Caravelle.*? Fifteen years later, an Air India Boeing 747 broke up in flight after a radio bomb detonated in one of its baggage holds.*® Because little progress appears to have been made in detecting concealed explosive devices, analysis must now be made of the problems encountered by technical security apparatus in locating threatening plastic items.

5.3,2. Metal Detection

It is axiomatic to note that any means of detection which is based

specifically on identifying metallic compounds will find no

application in the search for suspicious non-metal lie substances. Metal detection was introduced instead as an entirely safe and uncontroversial method of verifying that passengers are not concealing undesirable objects about their persons prior to boarding an aircraft. In the early 1970s. when technologically-based screening was first being introduced systematically, the length of time required to frisk **Wilkinson (1989) IV, pp. 5 - 6 . W i l k i n s o n ’s suspicions were

confirmed when Mr Alan Feraday, a leading British explosives expert, testified to the Fatal Accident Inquiry concerning the Lockerbie incident that standard physical inspection and X-ray screening of the device used could have been expected to have found no indication of the presence of an improvised explosive device.

The Glasgow Herald, Tuesday 23 October 1990. p. 7. Note also that in June 1990, a British Airways security staff member cleared the baggage of Or Jim Swire despite it containing a device modelled on the widely publicised bomb design believed to have been used in the Pan Am flight 103 atrocity. At the time of the infiltr a t i o n ’s disclosure, the carrier claimed that the employee responsible had taken pity on Dr Swire (whose daughter had been killed in the Lockerbie blast) and hence had not initiated a full scale search of his belongings. Whether this was the case, or else security systems simply failed to detect the replica, the example served as an indictment of the search philosophy utilised. The Sunday

Telegraph, Sunday 1 July 1990, p. 1. *?Dudley (1976 - 77), p. 69.

and Inspect each individual was deemed to be too great for the flow of passengers which was then developing.

For this reason, "walk through" archway metal detectors (AMDs) were introduced which used a magnetic field to detect metals. Brian Prosser, General Manager of the UK based security technology firm

Aviation Engineering International Aeradio, has described the very basic technology involved in this first generation of devices:

"The early metal detection gateways utilized continuous-wave techniques in which the amount of metal passing through them was

detected by the size of the disturbance induced in the field, set UP between transmitting and receiving colls. This method demanded some skill from the operator in the setting up and

interpretation of the readings, and also tended to respond more to ferrous metals than non-ferrous objects."*’

If the field were to be disturbed by the passage through it of ferrous compounds, a detector would notify security operatives with a sound- based and/or a visual alarm signal, indicating that the passenger

should be given closer inspection. In time, this first generation of device was superseded by more advanced technology which Identified

many more types of metallic compound present around and within the bodies of passengers, rather than merely those which contained magnetic iron compounds. Also, much smaller amounts of metal were

able to be found (sometimes less than 10 grammes) by the more advanced systems.?* Pulse techniques came to be recognised as a useful means by which metal detection could be achieved because of their active

determination of metal types and sizes through monitoring the response

of the matter being screened to the electro-magnetic pulse field c r e a t e d .? ^

A difficulty with AMD techniques is the danger of "blind spots" and

sensitivity variations within the field of the device. Recent reports of security agents being able to pass undetected through AMDs with handguns affixed to their ankles illustrates the need for magnetic

fields to operate from floor level to well above average head

height.?? The thoroughness with which passengers are screened using

hand held detectors is equally vital to ensure, by educating and

monitoring security personnel in their utilisation. Although a portable device must be of a high sensitivity to be able to locate

small amounts of metal quickly in a secondary search - an ability to