From the strong cosmopolitan perspective, there can be no general restrictions on the right to naturalise, since abiding in a state simply equals membership of that state (Carens 1989: 46).58 The right to naturalisation is thus analogous to the way in which federal citizenship carries with it a right to acquire local citizenship within a federation. Thus naturalisation only has the administrative function of recognising that a person can exercise her right to local
57 That said, states have, the ab ove w ithstanding, the right to restrict im m igration if it threatens to underm ine the b asic social and eco n o m ic structures o f a state. A state can also put in p lace certain lim ited residence requirem ents sin ce social rights in general are provided w here an individual abodes. (S e e the Naturalisation R ealm for a further d iscu ssio n .) F inally, it is com p atib le w ith the im partiality criterion to m ake social rights d ependent on the w illin g n e ss to contribute to the sy stem , i f and on ly i f ev ery o n e is provided w ith a the opportunity to contribute to the system . T his fo llo w s from that in d ivid u als h a v e a right not to be arbitrarily exclu d ed and to be g iv en the sam e concern but not the right to free ride on others.
58 T his also m eans that d ouble m em bership is not an obstacle to naturalisation from a cosm op olitan p erspective. A person w h o has a strong con n ection to tw o p la ces ought to en joy m em bership in both places. T his reflects the cosm op olitan id ea that citizen sh ip ought to be n either e x clu siv e nor unitary. T his is a lso w h y cosm op olitan s argue that local m em bership m ust be com p lem en ted w ith regional and a universal citizen sh ip (H eld 1995).
membership; i.e. it is recognition of the fact that the individual resides in the state, and hence qualifies for all rights that require her being a local resident. The relevance of local membership or citizenship does not stem from the intrinsic importance of such membership, but from the necessity of a functional division between jurisdictions. States divide the right to levy some taxes and the responsibility for providing certain public goods and social rights, for example.
This prima facie right to exercise local membership is, however, conditioned upon the willingness of an individual to become a functional member of a given society, and this includes learning the language. Thus a basic language requirement for naturalisation is compatible with the impartiality criterion. This follows from that acquiring a basic command of one of the dominant languages in a state is necessary in order to be a functioning member of a given state, and the requirement to be a functioning member is not an arbitrary condition as it affects all individuals’ ability to exercise autonomy. An immigrant cannot be expected to possess this knowledge when admitted, but it can be expected that she acquires it once a reasonable amount of time has passed; if this turns out not to be the case, it would be reasonable to withhold the right to naturalisation until this requirement is fulfilled.
It should be pointed out in this context that natural bom citizens, in most states, are under an obligation to learn an official language as a key component of their compulsory education. This said, citizens are not excluded from membership if they fail to do so. A straight comparison between citizens and non-citizens cannot, however, be made in this context. To fail to learn to communicate in the language of instruction in one’s native land is not seen as a choice, but a failure that is caused by social and/or cognitive problems, for which the individual is not held responsible. This might also be the case for certain groups of non citizens who are elderly or have learning disabilities, but non-citizens who choose not to learn an official language can be denied citizenship. This follows from the fact that they have chosen not to become functioning members of the community, and willingness to be a functional member is not an arbitrary condition; to deny membership on this ground is hence compatible with the impartiality criterion.
It is often simply assumed, even by strong cosmopolitans, that a prior criminal record would disqualify an individual from naturalisation (See for example Habermas 1993: 146). Nevertheless, it would appear that the impartiality criterion only allows for this under specific
circumstances. Individuals who have committed crimes and have been punished for them generally regain their basic individual rights upon their release from the penal system. It follows from the impartiality criterion that this must hold for citizens and non-citizens alike. Thus, non-citizens cannot be deprived of their right to acquire membership in the community where they abide simply in virtue of having a criminal record - at least not if other (citizen) ex-criminals are not deprived of comparable rights permanently.59
A state has the right to take measures to uphold liberal institutions, as these are essential to all individuals’ ability to exercise autonomy. This means that it is valid, from a cosmopolitan perspective, to deny non-citizens who are hostile to basic cosmopolitan values the right to naturalise (Habermas 1993: 147). This right to denial is, however, limited in two ways. One, no individual can be denied the right to naturalise simply by virtue of their descending from an illiberal culture. Cosmopolitanism is based on the notion that people, as autonomous beings, have a right to be treated individually, and hence they cannot be denied rights solely due to membership in different collectives. The universal foundation of cosmopolitanism also means that the presupposition is that all can become functioning members of a cosmopolitan society. Two, mere indifference or scepticism towards basic liberal values cannot disqualify a person from the right to naturalisation, as citizens only are barred from engaging in behaviour that constitutes direct hostility towards liberal values.60
The right to naturalisation is not a universal right according to the weak cosmopolitan perspective. This follows from the fact that the right to naturalise is not a pre-condition for
59 C itizens are perpetually punished for their crim es in certain states, b y a perm anent lo s s o f their right to v o te for exam p le, and the treatment o f e x -fe lo n s can alw ays be d iscussed but n o n -c itiz e n s cannot be sin gled out for additional punishm ent sim p ly b y virtue o f lack in g m em bership in a particular nation (S e e Chapter four S ection III for a m ore detailed d iscu ssio n ).
60 C o le argues that ev en this restriction is incom patible with the im partiality criterion sin ce natural b om citizen s are a llo w ed to be as illiberal as they w ish (C o le 2000: 144— 145). C o le ’s argum ent is at least partly b a sed on erroneous em pirical facts, as the tw o national ca se studies in this thesis dem onstrate. T h e German B a sic Law sp e c ifica lly curbs the freed om s o f p eop le w h o are h ostile to the essen tial valu es in the B asic L aw . Liberal freedom s cannot be used to overturn the system and article 9 and 21 outlaw parties and asso cia tio n s that w ant to im pair the constitutional freedom and dem ocracy. T he freedom o f academ ic teaching is a lso lim ited to p eo p le w h o d o not try to subvert the constitutional order, article 5, and individuals w h o com bat the free political order forfeit their right to freedom o f sp eech , article 18. Germ any is thus e x p r e ssiv e ly a com b ative d em ocracy w ere neither n o n -citizen s nor citizen s have a right to b e as illiberal as they se e fit. T he U .S . C onstitution con tains no sim ilar articles but the Suprem e Court has upheld several law s that lim it freed om s for in d ivid u als w h o se e k to underm ine a free so c iety . T h is in clu d es ex a m p les like the law s that banned syn d icalism and com m u n ism , law s w hich both w ere held constitutional b y the Suprem e Court (Currie 1994: 214— 2 1 5 ; se e article 4 0 o f the Irish Constitution for another exam p le and se e the Germ an case study for a m ore detailed argum ent). That is, there is n o reason in theory for liberal so c ieties to slip into the relativist trap, nor d o liberal so c ie tie s in practice d o so. The fact that there are relative fe w la w s restricting actions against the liberal order in liberal nation-states is arguably due to a lack o f need for these la w s and not due to a lack o f authority sh ou ld such need arise.
being able to exercise autonomy on a basic level, and this in turn means that, from a weak cosmopolitan perspective, states have the right to allocate citizenship on a discretionary basis.