Guerrero vs.
St. Claire’s Realty & Corporation
124 SCRA 553, 1983
FACTS:
Spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos were the absolute owners of the disputed property, which is a parcel of land located at San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, with an area of 42,299 square meters, more or less. The spouses had six children, named Andres, Juliana, Aurelio, Leona, Jose and Cristina, and all surnamed Guerrero. Panay Ramos predeceased Isidoro Guerrero. Before his demise, Isidoro Guerrero verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be assigned and adjudicated to Andres Guerrero as his share in the inheritance, the other children having been assigned other lots. . Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres Guerrero entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, and allowed her to have the property cultivated and to retain the owner's share in the harvests.
The arrangement between brother and sister was that Cristina Guerrero could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner's share in the produce for as long as she needed the property.
Sometime in July 1943, Andres Guerrero died survived by his widow, Segunda Laquindanum, and their children, who are the petitioners in this case. Cristina Guerrero continued as trustee of the deceased Andres Guerrero.
The complaints further alleged that as early as December 10, 1957, the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as Lot No. 4752, Case No. 4, Cadastre No. 229 of the Parañaque Cadastre. Sometime during the latter part of 1971 certain people who introduced themselves as agents or buyers of the land ap¬proached some of the plaintiffs in order to secure their consent to the sale of the property. Said plaintiffs were informed that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero. The court ruled that Manuel Guerrero owned the lot; that despite oppositors' appeal to a higher court, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 4591 to the applicant; that on September 14, 1971, there was filed with the Register of Deeds of Rizal a "Deed of Absolute Sale" purportedly executed by Manuel Guerrero in favor of the defendants Guerreros; that the Register of Deeds gave due course to the registration of that deed, cancelled OCT No. 4591 and was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 339629 in its stead; that on the same day that the deed of sale was registered, the defendants Guerreros caused to be notarized an "Articles of Partnership" of St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd., constituting themselves as partners; that on September 28, 1971, the defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a "Deed of Absolute Sale" to the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.; that by virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 340842 in the name of said realty company.
However, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel Guerrero was discovered to be fraudulent, simulated and falsified for the reason, among others, that Cristina Guerrero was not the owner of the land at the time she purportedly sold it; that Manuel Guerrero obtained OCT No. 4591 in fraud of the plaintiffs; that the Deeds of Sale to the defendants Guerreros and St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd. and the transfer certificates of title in their favor are fraudulent and simulated, and ineffective against the plaintiffs for the reason, among others, that at the time of execution of the Deeds of Sale, the defendants Guerreros knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero; that long after the complaint in the present case has been filed, the plaintiffs came to know that the St. Clare's Realty Company, Ltd.
executed a "Joint Venture Agreement" with the United Housing Corporation under which the latter bound itself to develop the property into a residential subdivision; and that the said agreement was entered into in gross and evident bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Dead Man’s Statute will apply in the present case.
RULING:
No. The Dead Man’s rule is not applicable in the case at bar.
The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero.
The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased.
They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero.
"It has been held that statutes providing that a party in interest is incompetent to testify where the adverse party is dead or insane, must be applied strictly in accordance with their express wording, irrespective of their spirit. The law uses the word 'against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person.' It should be noted 'that after the mention of an executor or administrator the words or other representative follows, which means that the word 'representative' includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued n their representative, not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words 'against the estate of such deceased persons', which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the personal rights of such representative."
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FLORENCIA Q. DE ABRAHAM, ALFONSO ABRAHAM, and JESUS ABRAHAM, petitioners, vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN C. YSMAEL, PRISCILLA RECTO-KASTEN, respondent.
G.R. No. L-16741 January 31, 1962 FACTS:
On September 3, 1943, Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay.
On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid.
On November 13, 1954, in Special Proceedings No. Q-285 for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, Alfonso and Jesus, all surnamed Abraham, filed a pleading entitled
"Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamation" was not acted upon.
However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the claimants reproduced their
"Reclamation" before the lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. As agreed upon by the parties, the reception of evidence was delegated to a commissioner. During the hearing before the commissioner, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters against which he interposed a general objection. The appellate court concluding that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants have established a just and valid claim, and in allowing the claim — supposing it was a claim with consideration — when the same had been barred by prescription, estoppel and laches," reversed the Order-Decree appealed from.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim. And if the answer is in the affirmative, whether the same is already barred by prescription and laches.
RULING:
The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to destroy the same. It is interesting to note that the promissory note executed by the deceased was produced before the Court and marked as
Exhibit B-1, and the circumstances under which the same was executed was extensively described by Florencia Q. de Abraham during the hearing, who, strikingly is one of the witnesses to the said instrument. Much to the surprise of the Court this description was more vividly given by the said witness not in answer to the questions propounded by her lawyer but on cross-examination of counsel for the administratrix, who feebly attempted to destroy the due execution and genuineness of the said document.
It is indeed unfortunate that counsel for the administratrix did not choose to present evidence to destroy the alleged genuineness of the promissory note (Exhibit B-1) in support of his theory, despite his insinuation during the course of the trial that he might try to secure the services of an expert to determine the genuineness of the signature of the late Juan C. Ysmael mentioned therein. Again counsel manifested that if Exhibit B-1 is a genuine document the same has been fully paid already, (t.s.n., p. 83), however, counsel did not present any proof to support this contention.
It is true that Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides:
(c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind;
The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which he may pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite party to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in accordance with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different selection.
Such course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be countenanced in any court of justice.
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GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, et al, petitioners-appellants, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees
GR No. L-27434 September 23, 1986
FACTS:
Praxedes Villanueva was interested in buying the haciendas of San Sebastian, Sarria, and Dulce Nombre de Maria owned by Tabacalera. Due to insufficiency of funds, Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of Tabacalera. Villanueva further promised to sell field nos. 3, 4, and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for P13, 807.00 in favor of Vicente. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by herein petitioner Genaro Goni as the attorney-in-fact of Villanueva.
Shortly after the execution of the promise to sell, Villanueva was able to raise the funds needed for the payment of the haciendas which prompted him to rescind the agreement. However, since the amount has already been credited from Vicente’s account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 would be leased to the latter for five years.
Villanueva thereafter died, and intestate proceedings followed. Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages against Goni in his capacity as the administrator of the estate of Villanueva. Said complaint was based from the promise to sell executed by the deceased. Full trial ensued, for which Vicente testified on matters of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva. The opposing party was likewise given the opportunity to cross examine him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Vicente is barred by the Dead Man’s Statute.
RULING:
Under ordinary circumstances, private respondent Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such
disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows:
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of field nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
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INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARCELINO TONGCO, represented by JOSEFA TONGCO, administratrix, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ANASTACIO VIANZON, Defendant and Appellee.
G.R. No. 27498, September 20, 1927
FACTS:
MarcelinoTongco died leaving his widow, Anastacia Vianzon. But before his death, in a cadastral case, he was able to have some of his properties titled in the name of the conjugal partnership. However, within the one-year period provided under the Land Registration Law, Vianzon asked for revision of certain decrees in the same cadastral case.It was opposed bythe niece of the deceased, Josefa Tongco, who is also the administratrix of the estate of Marcelino Tongco.
The cadastral case was decided in favor of Vianzon. The original certificates of title were annulled and new titles were issued making the subject lots the exclusive properties of Anastacia Vianzon. Thereafter, Josefa Tongco filed an action for recovery of specific property with damages against Vianzon. But defendant therein, Vianzon, was absolved.
From the judgments of the above cases, Josefa Tongco appealed. The two cases were tried together. The first action, the cadastral case, becomes the last in number, 27499, whereas, the first action, the property case, becomes the first in number, 27498.
The two cases taken together, Tongco assigned as error the competency of the widow, Vianzon, to testify in order to prove that she indeed owned exclusively the properties in question in view of the provision under the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting parties or assignors of parties in whose behalf an action is prosecuted from testifying against an executor or administrator or other representative of the deceased person upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Anastacia Vianzon is competent to testify in order to prove exclusive ownership over the properties alleged to be in the name of conjugal partnership.
RULING:
Yes, Vianzon is competent to testify that the properties in question exclusively belong to her.
The purpose of the law is to guard against giving false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. It is noteworthy to emphasize that it was designed to arrive at the truth and not to suppress it. Furthermore, the law makes use of the word “against” twice. In the case at bar, the actions were not brought either “against” the administratrix of the estate or upon claims
“against” the estate. In the first case, the action is made by the administratrix to enforce a demand “by”
the estate. In the second case, the claim was presented in a cadastral proceeding wherein there is neither plaintiff nor defendant involved.
In addition, there was a waiver to question the competency of the witness when the adverse party proceeded to cross-examine her regarding the prohibited matters. Thus, the court is of the opinion that the witness is competent to testify and therefore, findings and rulings of the trial judge must be sustained.
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Estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased, MARCIAL P. LICHAUCO, administrator-appellee,
vs.
ATLANTIC, GULF and PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, claimant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-2016 August 23, 1949
FACTS:
Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of said company when the Pacific war broke out on December 8, 1941. As such president he was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month. He held 1,000 shares of stocks, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favour of the company aggregating P245,250, at the rate P450 a share.
In 1941 the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favour on account of the purchase price of the said 545 share of stock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the company.
Under his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545
Under his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545