The Decline of the Manual Working Class?

Over the years in western Germany, employee rights as well as a comprehensive social state became popular demands among the SPD's traditional constituency of blue-collar and unionised workers. But from the late 1960s, deindustrialisation and technological developments led to a decline in the number of manual workers that continued into the twenty-first century. Figure 3.2a shows the occupational status of people in employment in West Germany from 1984 to 2002, the beginning of the SPD-Green government’s second term in office. Immediately obvious is that of the four occupational groups, blue-collar employment alone decreased steadily over the eighteen-year period, falling from just under 40% in 1984 (having already experienced decline in preceding decades) to below 30% in 2002. Conversely, the share of white-collar group increased, accounting for over 50% of employment by 2002.

The trend was similar in East Germany (Figure 3.2b), for which data is shown from 1990 (unification) until 2003. Once again, the proportion of blue-collar employment experienced a marked decline that contrasted with the steady increase in other types of work: whereas around 45% of the workforce were in blue-collar employment in 1990, this was true of less than 30% of the workforce within a twelve-year period. Even though unification increased the net number of workers, the pace of deindustrialisation of the new Länder within the unification process, meant that the additional workers from the former GDR did not manage to reverse the overall downward trend.

Figure 3.2a: Occupational status of people in employment, West Germany (%)

Figure 3.2b: Occupational status of people in employment, East Germany (%) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2005, p.3)

Deindustrialisation and the declining proportion of the blue-collar workforce resulted in a smaller core constituency of traditional working class support for centre-left parties such as the SPD. However, this raises two important points. First, it is reasonable to expect that a party faced with a sustained numerical contraction of its core voter base might choose to find ways to broaden its appeal and seek voters from alternative occupational groups. But this strategic reorientation need not inevitably involve the abandonment of the remaining traditional core voters. The choice lies with the party as to whether or not such a strategy is to be based on a policy shift that is likely to alienate the working class and abandon the articulation of what might still be acute divisions centred on the class cleavage (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011, p.109). In other words, broadening electoral appeal is not necessarily a case of 'either-or' for the party's policy supply. In addition, this kind of reorientation is not without potential pitfalls for the parties concerned; indeed, Kitschelt (2004, p.9) acknowledges that in the process of casting their nets ever wider, social democratic parties pursuing such a strategic course that risks completely undermining support from the traditional voter base.

Related to this, the second fundamental point to consider is that the numerical downturn in the working class does not equate with an inevitable decline in the significance of class tensions. This is because the size of the respective social group does not necessarily correspond with the depth or acuteness of the divisions between these groups (Elff and Rossteutscher, 2011, p.109). As such, the cleavage — the tension between capital and labour — continues to exist, even if there is a decline in the overall number of people mobilising around it at a given time.

The social mobility and rising incomes of the postwar era were accompanied by enhanced educational attainment and improved access to information. Arising from this development is the argument that 'cognitive mobilisation' in turn facilitated further social and economic mobility. As a result, voters were better equipped to make electoral choices based on independently acquired information and political awareness (Evans, 1999, p.7). As such, divisions between the working class and middle class became less distinct in terms of income and lifestyle, a process also known as the levelling-off of the middle class (Graf, 1977, p.192). According to this notion of the 'embourgeoisement of the working class' (Evans, 1999, p.6), social mobility facilitated greater interaction between social circles; consequently, individuals would identify increasingly with their own particular situations, rather than consciously associate themselves with their social or occupational group. Consequently, the so-called 'affluent worker' became less and less attached to status or class ('jenseits von Stand und Klasse’) (Müller, 1999, p.1). In

other words, the relationship to the respective social class was to have become increasingly ambivalent, thus further blurring Germany's already weakly defined labour-class cleavage (ibid.). Yet Graf (1977, p.192) points out that although improved standards of education were accompanied by higher wages and longer leisure time, an increasing proportion of this income and time was actually taken up by the cost of everyday living, as well as the cost and acquisition of consumer goods. Furthermore, the greater share in the consumption of goods was not matched by a greater share in power over the means of their production (ibid.).

Even though the relative size of the SPD’s core constituency declined, parties on the centre-right, including Germany’s CDU, had been unable to garner mass support for openly free market policies, since the basic and universal elements of the welfare state had found broad acceptance across society (Green et al., 2008, p.78). But unification, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the wave of economic deregulation associated with globalisation all served to undermine the perceived validity of economic planning as a tool available to governments — there appeared to be no credible alternative to capitalism. Eager to provide the optimum market conditions to attract international finance, governments curtailed their utilisation of fiscal tools to stimulate demand and employment. The capacity for wealth redistribution and, consequently, welfare provision, was therefore narrowed. With voter expectations of welfare and redistribution ‘ratcheted down’ (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.43), parties were able to maximise their appeal despite offering policy packages that promised less.

Deindustrialisation, the subsequent shift towards a post-industrial society as well as the sell-off of public goods and services, meant that a diminishing number of employee groups were shielded from the pressure and demands of international markets.

Instead, employees were increasingly involved in ‘private, market-exposed and even internationally traded sectors of financial and managerial business services, information technologies, and personal services’ (Kitschelt, 2004, p.6). With the decline in the manufacturing sector and loss of many manual jobs, workers found themselves driven into increasingly precarious employment which often failed to pay a living wage or offer basic social security. The demand for redistribution via welfare benefits such as income support would presumably remain consistent among this group . Yet it is also ⁴⁷ argued (ibid.) that the workers who did manage to retain their jobs in the manufacturing sector were likely to have a better set of qualifications and skills and, most importantly, This claim is supported by data presented by Kitschelt (2004, p.3) which found that of seven

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social groups, low-intermediate skill public service sector and domestic private sector low skilled wage earners displayed the greatest propensity to support redistributive policies.

believed that their continued employment depended on company profitability in a market which was exposed to international economic factors. Kitschelt therefore suggests it is feasible that these employees, anxious to protect their jobs, prioritised the economic wellbeing of the company over any sense of identification with a particular class, and consequently favoured less redistribution and public sector activity . ⁴⁸ Furthermore, times of particularly severe economic pressure can lead to the perception that the future profitability of the employer takes precedence not only over any class identity, but also over one’s tangible needs. For instance, the individual might make the conscious decision to avoid 'burdening' the employer with the responsibility and cost of providing more comprehensive parental leave schemes; in a difficult employment market, he or she might ‘self-exploit’ in the hope of retaining a job or progressing within an occupation (Standing, 2011, p.18). The key aspect about these choices is that they are based on the values and perceived interests of the individual, rather than in accordance with class identity.

Yet Anderson (2009) offers a historical explanation to argue that support for egalitarian policies continued in both the western and eastern regions of Germany. After the fall of the Third Reich, the Federal Republic underwent a transformation in its industrial structure, that shifted the emphasis from huge corporations to the growth of the privately owned, medium-sized companies that still characterise the German economy today. According to Anderson, although this restructuring created the sense of classlessness at the top, there remained at the bottom a collective awareness of history and political potential (Anderson, 2009, p.23). As Lipset and Rokkan have described, this consciousness is essential for the expression of a social cleavage.

Moreover, even despite deindustrialisation, the Federal Republic did manage to maintain a manufacturing base. As a result, a labour force continued to exist, albeit smaller in size and not especially militant (ibid.). Meanwhile, in the socialist GDR, redistribution and the welfare state had become the norm, and it could therefore be anticipated that such attitudes continued to exist among the eastern population, especially in the years immediately following unification. However, this leads Anderson to make an important distinction between the roots of attitudes favouring redistribution and welfare. While in the East this ongoing support was largely attributable to the socialist heritage, in the West it was the result of the ‘residual strength of labour’ (ibid.).

In other words, it was in the western states that class actually played a significant role,

The same data shows that ‘trade-exposed sector intermediate skilled wage earners’ were

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among the social groups least likely to support redistributive policies (Kitschelt, 2004, p.3).

especially when the labour force was confronted with rising inequality and the concentration of wealth at the top (ibid.).