C. GAPS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOUTH KOREA
2. Differences on Rationales and Visions of the Alliance
During the Cold War era, it was clear that the primary purpose of the U.S.-ROK alliance was to deter the North Korean threat. Although South Korea’s ultimate goal in the alliance was peace or more specifically the peaceful reunification of Korea and the United States’ goal was preventing the spread of Communism and maintaining regional stability, there was no difference between the two countries that strong deterrence of North Korea is the best way to achieve their respective goals. The end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the security environment in Northeast Asia brought challenges to this common alliance rationale. Different perspectives toward the regional actors and different priorities in security policies also fostered this diverging rationale in the alliance.
Even before the transformation of the USFK, it was evident that the two countries were seeking rather different purposes through the alliance. Deterring North Korea from invading South Korea is not any longer the common alliance rationale to both countries.
The U.S. rationale in the alliance has shifted from the peninsula to the region and to the globe, whereas South Korea prefers the alliance to be confined in the peninsula rather than expanded to the region.179
Both countries’ divided perspectives on the North Korean nuclear issue exactly show this diverging alliance rationale. South Koreans recognize that North Korea’s conventional weapons are more of a threat to its security than the nuclear weapons. They
179 Taik-Young Hamm, “The Self-Reliant National Defense of South Korea and the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance,” Nautilus Policy Forum Online 06-49A (2006): 3.
do not think that North Korea will use the nuclear weapons to invade the South. For the United States, North Korea’s conventional weapons are not considered as much of a threat since South Korea’s military capabilities are recognized as much superior to the North’s. Based on the global war on terror, the United States’ primary interest is to prevent the proliferation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, and especially potential channels to terrorist organizations. Therefore, the worst scenario case to South Korea is a second Korean War on the peninsula, but to the United States it is another September 11 terrorist attack equipped with North Korea’s WMD weapons.180
In this context, the two countries also do not share the same vision about the U.S.-ROK alliance. For South Korea the first priority in the alliance is and will invariably be the security of the peninsula by maintaining strong deterrence toward North Korea.
Although the threat perception of the North has been weakened during the last five years, there have been very little improvements on military confrontation between North and South.181 Moreover, many Koreans think that a U.S. presence is still essential to South Korean security for the time being.182 From a South Korean perspective the U.S.-ROK alliance must guarantee its security first and foremost as long as South Korea perceives a threat from North Korea. Expanding the role of the alliance to the region and also globally is second to deterring the North Korean threat.
The United States has rather different ideas about the vision of the alliance. The current transformation process reflects the broader roles of the alliance together with other alliances in the region. In order to confront new threats, such as transnational terrorism, the United States seems to want to form a broad security alliance beyond securing the territory of South Korea. The new alliance system, the coalition of the
180 Won-Hyuk Lim, “Transforming an Asymmetric Cold War Alliance: Psychological and Strategic Challenges for South Korea and the United States,” Nautilus Policy Forum Online 06-30A (2006): 4.
181 Although both North and South Koreas are working on reducing military tensions by establishing periodic military consultation organizations, there have been frequent small conflicts within the border area including the “West Sea engagement” on June 2002, between the two Navies.
182 Nae-Young Lee, “Polls on South Korea’s Perception on U.S.-ROK Alliance (Hanmidongmaeng insik josa),” East Asia Institute, September 13, 2006. According to the polls, the 61 percent of South Koreans strongly supported the presence of the U.S. Forces in Korea.
http://www.eai.or.kr/korean/project/mainscr/projectDBView.asp (Accessed November 21, 2006).
willing nations, will take over the traditional fixed alliance in handling international crises.183 From the U.S. perspective, ideally the U.S.-ROK alliance will be a part of a regional coalition with other bilateral alliances, such as with Japan and Australia.184
In this context, it is significant to note that the United States and South Korea officially agreed upon working on the Joint Study on the Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance on the Common Understanding of the Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.185 It is stated that the “Study determined that the future Alliance would contribute to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and globally.” This will be a timely opportunity to restore the trust between the two countries by building common understanding and confidence, as well as narrow gaps between South Korea’s focus on the peninsula alone and U.S. efforts to expand to the region and globally. Consequently, exploring the common interests of strategic flexibility will be one of the key issues in this study.
In conclusion, the two factors discussed above, diverging perspectives on regional actors and differences on the alliance’s rationale and vision, seem to be the most fundamental and critical factors contributing to the gaps between the two countries.
Considering these two factors, the following chapter will examine the policy options for South Korea. South Korean policy options must take into account that the troubles regarding U.S. strategic flexibility within the two countries mainly stems from these two factors. In this context, how to cope with the strategic flexibility policy and changing role of USFK in light of enhancing the security of South Korea and also strengthening the alliance will be the key points in these policy options.
183 Won-Soo Kim, 166.
184 Perry and others, 67. “The ideal U.S.-ROK alliance for the U.S.”
185 U.S.-ROK 38th SCM Joint Communiqué. 2006.
V. SOUTH KOREA’S POLICY OPTIONS TO U.S. STRATEGIC