ELADIO ALPUERTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JOSE PEREZ PASTOR and MANUEL ROA, provincial sheriff of Cebu, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-12794 October 14, 1918
FACTS:
The three parcels of real property which constitutes the subject matter of the contention in this case formerly belonged to Juan Llenos, and both the interested parties in this action claim titled under, the plaintiff as party in possession under a contract of sale with pacto de retro, and the defendant as purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos. The plaintiff, Eladio Alpuerto, asks the court to make a declaration against the defendant, Jose Perez Pastor, to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner thereof in full and absolute dominion. He also prays that the sale of the property effected by the sheriff, Manuel Roa, to said defendant be declared null.
The defendant Pastor denies the right of the plaintiff to the relief sought, and asserts that the transaction by which the plaintiff claims to have acquired titled was simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of defrauding the defendant as creditor of Juan Llenos.
This defendant therefore in turn prays the court to declare that he himself is the true owner of the property and that a judgment be entered condemning the plaintiff to surrender possession to him. From a judgment entered in the Court of First Instance of Cebu in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants have appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a privy is bound to a transaction.
RULING:
Yes. At the time of the supposed sale to Eladio Alpuerto there had been pending for nearly two years, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, an action in which Jose Perez Pastor was plaintiff and Juan Llenos was defendant. In this action the plaintiff sought to recover from Juan Llenos a considerable sum of money; and Eladio Alpuerto, as son-in-law of Juan Llenos, was aware of this litigation from the beginning. On January 27, 1913, or about six months after the alleged sale of the property in question to Eladio Alpuerto judgment was rendered in said action in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P3,789.13, with interest and costs. This judgment was affirmed upon appeal to the Supreme Court on November 20, 1914. An execution was thereafter issued on April 12, 1915, from the Court of First Instance upon said judgment was levied upon the property in question as the property of Juan Llenos. Before the sale was effected the plaintiff herein, Eladio Alpuerto, notified the sheriff that he claimed the property as his own.
Nevertheless, the sheriff proceeded under indemnification and sold the property at public sale to Jose Perez Pastor for the sum of P1,100.
The argument against the validity of the conveyance from Juan Llenos to Eladio Alpuerto is based on two propositions, namely: (1) that said conveyance must, under the second paragraph of article 1297, in connection with article 1227, of the Civil Code, be presumed to be fraudulent; and (2) that furthermore is shown by the evidence to have been fraudulent in fact.
Concerning the meaning of the expression "privies" (causabientes), in this article, the following passage is found in the Commentary of Manresa: The said word denotes the idea of succession, not only be right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it, etc., will be privies; in short, he, who by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal rights and obligations, is a privy. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, pp. 492 and 492.)
Under the interpretation thus placed upon the meaning of the term "privies", it is clear that Jose Perez Pastor, the purchaser at the public sale under an execution directed against Juan Llenos, must be considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to Eladio Alpuerto — and this from the date of the execution
of that instrument as a private document-unless this result is prohibited by article 1227 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
The date of a private instrument shall be considered, with regard to third persons, only from the date on which it may have been filed or entered in a public registry, from the date on which it may have been delivered to a public official by virtue of his office. In considering this article it is important to bear in mind that it has reference merely to the probative value of the document with respect to the date of its execution, and is not intended to lay down any rule concerning the efficacy of the act or acts evidenced by the document. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 8, p. 501.) The importance of the rule here declared is therefore most conspicuously revealed in the situation where the document itself contains the only competent evidence before the court bearing upon the date upon which the instrument in question was executed as a private document.
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CITY OF MANILA, petitioner;
vs.
JACINTO DEL ROSARIO, respondent.
5 Phil. 227 1905
FACTS:
This is an action to recover the possession of the 2 lots described in the complaint, located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, at present occupied by Del Rosario.
At the trial, after City of Manila rested, Del Rosario moved for the dismissal of the case upon the ground that City of Manila had failed to establish the allegations in the complaint. CFI of Manila entered judgment in favor of the City of Manila and against Del Rosario for possession and damages in the sum of $2,500, United States currency, and costs. This was overruled by the court, to which ruling Del Rosario duly excepted.
Del Rosario now puts in issue the trial court's finding that City of Manila was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila was entitled to the ownership and possession of the land in question.
RULING:
No. The Court scrutinized and struck out documentary and oral evidence presented by the City of Manila. The City of Manila introduced both documentary and oral evidence which failed to establish the allegations in the complaint.
The testimony of Villegas was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by City of Manila apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "Common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to.
From the foregoing it appears that the evidence introduced by City of Manila does not prove its claim of title to the land in question. Neither the testimony of the witnesses presented by City of Manila nor the documentary evidence introduced show that the City of Manila is the owner of the land, or that it has a right to its possession as claimed in the complaint.
Some of the documents introduced, as well as the two public instruments referred to as having been executed in 1900, tended to support the contentions of Del Rosario rather than those of City of Manila. The City of Manila itself admits in the complaint that Del Rosario's possession of the land in Calle Barcelona was recorded since March, 1901, and his possession of that in Calle Clavel since February, 1893. This shows that Del Rosario had been in the adverse possession of the land. According to article 448 of the Civil Code he must be presumed to hold under a just title, unless the contrary is shown.
C onfessions
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant vs.
Marlo Compil, accused-appellant
244 SCRA 135 (1995)
FACTS:
Respondent was convicted of Robbery with Homicide after he, together with his co-accused, robbed MJ Furniture’s in Sta. Cruz, Manila and leaving Manuel Jay killed as a consequence of the robbery. Several days after the incident, respondent was caught in Quezon Province by the police authorities. He was found lying on the couch and was immediately frisked and placed under arrest.
According to Jenelyn, the wife of the deceased Manuel Jay, respondent turned pale and became speechless and was trembling. However, after gaining composure & upon being interrogated, he readily admitted his guilt. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further investigated.
On their way back to Manila, he was again interrogated until he confessed his involvement in the crime.
The day after his arrest, respondent, after conferring with CLOA lawyer Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia, executed a sworn statement admitting his participation as a lookout in the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of his Miranda Rights which will render his extrajudicial confession inadmissible.
RULING:
Yes. It is evident that the respondent was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in Quezon Province. And the same goes upon his transfer from Tayabas to Manila Police Station. The arresting officers already elicited incriminating questions and he confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation. All these, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival of the CLOA Lawyer the following day will not cure the defect even if the actual signing of the uncounseled confession was made in the presence of the counsel. The operative act is that when the police investigation is no longer asking a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, and not the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
But the court still finds other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs
WONG CHUEN MING, AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG, CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN HUWA, and LIM NYUK SUN, accused-appellants
G.R. Nos. 112801-1. April 12, 1996
FACTS:
All the accused was charged with violation or RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. When they arrived at the airport, 34.5 kg of Shabu was found in their possession. The officers then made them sign the boxes containing the shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether the boxes containing shabu, signed by the accused is admissible in evidence.
RULING:
NO. The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveals that accused were never informed of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation.
When they were made to affix their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again at Camp Crame, accused were not informed of their Miranda Rrights, such as the right to remain silent, right to counsel and that any statement they might make could be used against them.
By affixing their signatures on the boxes and on the plastic bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights.
They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979
FACTS:
The case arose from the death of Adelina Sajoa spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom inside her house. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime. Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban. This was his first extrajudicial admission. Second admission was made in Pasay wherein he named his companions in the killing;
Alegre, Medalla and Comaya.
The prosecution presented SGT. Marianao Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he was investigating Cudillan, he pointed out Alegre, Medalla and Comaya and said nothing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his companions in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt.
RULING:
No, the silence of an accused or his refusal to testify may not be taken in evidence against him, and that he may refuse to refuse to answer an incriminating question.
While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence again him as he has right to remain silent, his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him. Thus, silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him a crime; especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations; cannot be considered a tacit confession of his participation in a commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self- incrimination.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
YIP WAI MING, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 120959. November 14, 1996
FACTS:
Yip Wai Ming and victim Lam Po Chun, both Hongkong nationals, came to Manila on vacation.
The two were engaged to be married. On July 11 1993 Lam Po Chun was brutally beaten up and strangled to death in their hotel room. Yip Wai Ming, was touring Metro Manila with Filipino welcomers while Lam Po Chun was left in the hotel room allegedly because she had a headache and was not feeling well enough to do the sights. The RTC ruled that that Yip Wai Ming killed his fiancee before he left for the Metro Manila tour. There was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Lam Po Chun. All the evidence about the killing is circumstantial. Yip Wai Ming admitted to the crime charged and participated in a re-enactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement, but he contends that this was under duress because the police men beat him up to obtain such confession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confession of Yip Wai Ming is admissible as evidence RULING:
The court ruled in the negative. He was not informed of his right to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime. The custodial interrogation of accused-appellant was violative of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible against him. Section 17, Article III provides: No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence. The degree of intimidation needed to coerce a person to confess to the commission of a crime he did not commit would be much less if he is in a strange land. Accused-appellant states that his lawyers told him not to file any charges against the policemen. He followed their advice, obviously not wanting to get into more trouble.
The desire of a police officer to solve a high profile crime which could mean a promotion or additional medals and commendations is admirable. However, an investigator must pursue various leads and hypotheses instead of singlemindedly pursuing one suspect and limiting his investigation to that one possibility, excluding various other probabilities. The killing of a tourist is a blot on the peace and order situation in the Philippines and must be solved. Still, concentrating on pinning down an alien companion of the victim and not pursuing the possibilities that other persons could have killed the victim for her money and valuables does not speak well of our crime detection system. It is not enough to solve a crime.
The truth is more important and justice must be rendered.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs
HECTOR MAQUEDA, Accused-Appelant
242 SCRA 565
FACTS:
British Horace William Barker was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly beaten with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery.
Their two household helpers testified and identified Rene Salvamante who was a former houseboy of the spouses Barker and Hector Maqueda as the robbers. Two other persons testified seeing the two accused person walking a kilometer away from the house of the victims.
The two accused asked them for directions implying that they were not familiar of the place.
While Rene Salvamante still remains at large, Hector Maqueda was soon caught and arrested by the authorities in Guinyangan, Quezon.
He was then taken to Caluag, Quezon where he then signed a SinumpaangSalaysay wherein he stated his participation in the crime. Before signing the document, SPO3 Molleno informed Maqueda of
He was then taken to Caluag, Quezon where he then signed a SinumpaangSalaysay wherein he stated his participation in the crime. Before signing the document, SPO3 Molleno informed Maqueda of