DOUBLE JEOPARDY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. TIRSO VELSCO AND HONORATO GALVEZ

G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, Bellosillo, J.

The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Facts:

A shooting took place and claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously injured his brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure. Thus, three informations -one for homicide and two for frustrated homicide - were filed against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against the accused upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was also charged with violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence, a fourth information had to be filed. The court found Diego guilty of murder and double frustrated murder. However, Mayor Galvez was acquitted of the crimes charged against him for insufficiency of evidence and finding that the act of carrying of firearm was not a violation of law. The acquittal of Galvez is now challenged by the Government in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution that the exculpation of Galvez from all criminal responsibility by Judge Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

Issue:

Whether or not elevating the issue of criminal culpability of Galvez despite acquittal should be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

Yes. A remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986). Thus, the doctrine that “double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial” may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was denied due process. In such case, the remand remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.” Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.

JASON IVLER v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO AND EVANGELINE PONCE

G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010, Carpio, J.

Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision, Jason Ivler was charged before with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by Evangeline Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of Evangeline's husband Nestor Ponce and damage to the Spouses Ponce's vehicle. Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in the first case and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information in the second case for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the criminal case.

Ruling:

Yes. Reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court's unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

Hence, Ivler’s prior conviction of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries bars a subsequent prosecution for the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide as it arises from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. BENJAMIN RELOVA AND MANUEL OPULENCIA

G.R. No. L-45129, March 6, 1987, Feliciano, J.

For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense.

Facts:

The police and personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. These electric devices and contraptions were designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said ice and cold storage plant. Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. An information against Opulencia was filed for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. Opulencia

pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. The court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense. Then, the city fiscal filed another information against Opulencia for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309(1), of the RPC. Before Opulencia could be arraigned, he filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of the second information was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Ruling:

Yes. Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.

For the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that

In this case, the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."

Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.