Dual-Processing in Decision-Making Research

In a series of studies investigating dual-processing, various characteristics have been identified and associated specifically with the two systems. system 1 processing is generally described as automatic or impulsive, while system 2 processing is mostly described as deliberative. In the next section, I generalize the findings from the previous sections, and present and illus- trate the most relevant characteristics that have been identified across current dual-process theory research to provide a common groundwork for the subsequent studies. Based on the suggestion of Evans (2008), I organize these associated attributes of the two kind of cognitive systems according to four groups of characteristics: consciousness, phylogenetics, processing, and capacities (as in Table 7).

The first group of attributes associated with dual-processing can be summarized under the context of cognitive consciousness of decision-making (Evans, 2008). Decisions made through of system 1 processing are mostly the result of automatic, effortless, and fast processes. On the other side, system 2 processing is characterized as controlled, effortful, and slow. This dif- ference, can be illustrated by the analogy of a child learning to ride a bicycle. The automatic system starts without knowledge or intuitive associations and rules in this activity. System 2 will probably try to understand each movement and compute the correct behaviour by con-

sidering all information consciously. However, that approach will consume much cognitive capacity and the learningprocess itself will be very slow. Hence, the child experiences this phase as very difficult. However, after some time the child’s system 1 will have learnt some simple heuristics and reflexes to handle the bike. These processes are unconscious and effort- less, and through them, biking becomes an easy activity. Such examples do not illustrate that the outcome of one type of processing is worse or less useful, however. For instance, many scenarios exist in which automatic decision-making can save a person’s life (consider a car accident, where one must decide how to behave without time to consider all consequences), and much evidence is available that system 1 allows us do stupid things (see Kahneman (2011), for a review). Recent evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that the two types of pro- cesses can overlap, for instance that system 1 processes can be partially built by intention and automation (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001).

The second group, includes phylogenetic attributes of dual-processing (Evans, 2008). The main idea of most dual-processing theories is the assumption that the system is phylogenetically older than the cognitive structures of system 2. It is assumed that humans share this part with animals. However, this aspect has recently received much criticism in judgement and decision- making research, because the human mind evolved as a whole, and it may not be comprised of one distinct system that has evolved due to a single evolutionary process (Evans, 2008, p.259). Furthermore, there is evidence that humans share with chimpanzees certain system 2 characteristics (e.g. high-order mental representations; Whiten (2000); Evans (2008)).

A a third group of attributes can be classed as processing or functional characteristics (Evans, 2008). Decisions based on System 2 are described as serial-processing, abstract or reflective. However, that System 1 is parallel-processing, concrete, and non-reflective is not a contention shared by all dual-processing theories (Evans, 2008, p.261). For instance, speaking in one’s mother tongue is based on system 1, while speaking a foreign language, requires use of sys- tem 2 (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.20). In the first case, humans rely on fast and intuitive rules of thumb (e.g., what feels right), and in the second, humans rely on systematic grammar and rules learnt in language classes. Rule-based speaking is slow, exhausting, and strenuous, so people do not like to use it very much. They may even lose the desire for the other language quite quickly. Consequently, dual-processing models suggest that people should try to ac- tivate system 1 and to rely more on intuitive processes in speaking, or integrating another language into everyday activities. However, humans cannot always train themselves to learn intuitive rules that rely on system 1 to make a system 2 processes less taxing. Moreover, slow, sequential or rule-based processing is something that can also happen in system 1 processing. For instance, an impulsive response can be sequentially processed. Fortunately, though, this argument does not work in reverse. A wide range of evidence supports system 2 processing as mostly characterized by the attributes in Table 7, allowing us to separate these two kinds of cognitive systems. In other words, it can be assumed that System 2 processing is slow, but it cannot be assumed that every exhausting, slow decision is based on system 2.

(Evans, 2008). For instance, some studies suggesting an association with System 2 processing and general intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2008). Others suggest that System 1 is related to affective or emotional decision-making. Furthermore, a relevant distinction in this area is "that between measures of cognitive capacity and dispositional thinking styles" (Evans, 2008, p.262). These conceptualizations target differentiating the cognitive or what decision-makers are cognitively capable of, and the motivational, or what they are motivated to do.

Table 7:Overview of the characteristics of the dual-processing theory processes. Type 1 Process Type 2 Process Sources (Selection) Category 1

Consciousness

Preconscious Conscious, self-aware Epstein (2008), Kahneman (2003), Strack and Deutsch (2004)

Experienced passively and preconsciously

Experienced actively and con- sciously

Epstein (2008)

Implicit Explicit Epstein (2008)

Automatic Deliberative, controlled Epstein (2008), Kahneman (2003), Strack and Deutsch (2004)

Effortless Effortful Kahneman (2003), Strack and Deutsch (2004)

Slow learning, resis- tance to change

Fast learning Epstein (2008),Kahneman (2003), Satpute and Lieberman (2006)

Fast Slow Kahneman (2003)

High capacity Low capacity Satpute and Lieberman (2006), Strack and Deutsch (2004) Default Process Inhibitory Evans (2008)

Holistic Analytic Epstein (2008)

Category 2 Phylogenetics

Phylogenetic older Phylogenetic younger Satpute and Lieberman (2006) Evolutionary rational-

ity

Individual rationality Evans (2008)

Table 7 – Continued from previous page

Shared with animals Uniquely human Satpute and Lieberman (2006) Nonverbal Linked to language Evans (2008)

Modular cognition Fluid Intelligence Evans (2008) Category 3

Processing

Associative Cause-and-effect relations, de- ductive

Epstein (2008), Kahneman (2003), Strack and Deutsch (2004),Thaler and Sunstein (2008)

Outcome-oriented Process-oriented Epstein (2008)

Intention activation Spreading activation Strack and Deutsch (2004) Mediated by “vibes”

from past experience

Mediated by conscious appraisal of events

Epstein (2008) Categorical thinking Nuanced thinking Epstein (2008) Organized in part by

cognitive-affective modules

Organized in part by cross- situational principles

Epstein (2008)

Self-evidently valid: "Experiencing is believing"

Requires justification via logic and evidence

Epstein (2008)

Parallel-processing Serial processing Kahneman (2003), Satpute and Lieberman (2006), Strack and Deutsch (2004)

Non-reflective Reflective Satpute and Lieberman (2006) Symmetric knowledge

relations

Asymmetric knowledge rela- tions

Satpute and Lieberman (2006) Knowledge in form of

common cases

Knowledge in form of special cases

Satpute and Lieberman (2006) Concrete Abstract Epstein (2008), Satpute and

Lieberman (2006)

Continuous Specific (after alert) Satpute and Lieberman (2006) Skilled Rule-following Thaler and Sunstein (2008) Category 4

Table 7 – Continued from previous page Capacities

Universal Heritable Evans (2008)

Associated with affect or emotions

Affect-free Epstein (2008), Kahneman (2003)

Independent of general intelligence

Linked to general intelligence Evans (2008) Independent of work-

ing memory

Limited by working memory ca- pacity

Evans (2008)

In summary, the research has been unveiled numerous properties associated with the two types of processes. The differences occur on four conceptual levels, and they describe how the two systems work together. They also allow conclusions to be drawn about the function- ing of our brain, or they allow researchers to design experiments and to identify situations in which a specific type of process is preferred. Although most dual-processing approaches ascribe great importance to both systems, it is generally accepted that System 2 is rarely ac- tive in contrast to System 1. However, this asymmetry has serious implications for judgement and decision-making research, because "we often make mistakes because we rely too much on our automatic system"(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, p.21). Much research in judgement and decision-making research has focused on understanding the driving factors across situations and domains. However, the interaction of both systems and the role of System 1 is a promising path to fully understand the numerous decision anomalies in when, why, and how decision- makers act against their own interests in judgements and decision-making.