ELECTION LAW

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST, et. al. v. COMMISSION ELECTIONS G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.

Facts:

President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 which mandates the COMELEC to implement a mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters. RA 10367 was duly published on February 22, 2013, and took effect fifteen (15) days after. Pursuant to that, the COMELEC issued resolutions which commenced the mandatory biometric system of registration and implemented the NoBio-NoBoto policy.

Consequently, herein petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolutions related thereto. They contend that the said law violates the right to suffrage on grounds that it rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is penalty of deactivation and biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution related thereto, unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes. The right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law.

The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing statutory disqualifications, with the restriction, however, that the same do not amount

to a literacy, property or other substantive requirement. Moreover, the concept of a "qualification" should be distinguished from the concept of

"registration", which is jurisprudentially regarded as only the means by which a person's qualifications to vote is determined. The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter and one may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registration is a form of regulation and not as a qualification for the right of suffrage.

Therefore, the State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement, the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, Sereno, J.

Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration.

Facts:

Magdalo Sa Pagbabago (Magdalo) filed a petition with Comelec, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party.

However, Comelec denied the petition for registration by taking judicial notice that the party organizer and Chairman of Magdalo, Senator Antonio F.

Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the Oakwood Mutiny thereby employing violence and unlawful means to achieve the goals of the party.

Issue:

Whether or not the Comelec acted in grave abuse of discretion in denying the registration of Magdalo.

Ruling:

No. At the outset, the Court held that Comelec properly took judicial notice of the Oakwood incident, because I was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.

Moreover, the finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of the criminal proceedings against several member of Magdalo. The power vested by Article

IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the Comelec to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the Comelec only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.

In the case at bar, the challenged Comelec Resolutions were issued pursuant to its administrative power to evaluate the eligibility of groups to join the elections as political parties, for which the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence is applicable. In arriving at its assailed ruling, the Comelec only had to assess whether there was substantial evidence adequate to support this conclusion.

ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR.,

G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012, ABAD, J.

A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.

Facts:

After 26 years of being an Australian Citizen, Rommel Jalosjos returned to the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the Republic and renounced his Australian citizenship. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. However, Dan Erasmo moved to cancel the COC of Jalosjos on the ground of material misrepresentation since the latter failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. Apparently, Jalosjos had been a mere guest or transient visitor in his brother’s house and, for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil, Zamboanga as his domicile.

Issue:

Whether or not Jalosjos has complied with the residency requirement.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no hard and fast rule to determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one;

and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

When Jalosjos came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that he did so with intent to

change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

The Comelec concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N.

ONRUBIA, AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY, AND ELBERT C. ATILANO

G.R. No. 205033, June 18, 2013, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Facts:

Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness. His conviction carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Thereafter, his prison term was commuted by the President to 16 years. After serving the same, he was discharged from prison. Jalosjos then filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for mayor. In response thereto, five petitions to cancel his CoC were filed with the Comelec. Pending resolution of the petitions, the Comelec En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement.

Issue:

Whether the Comelec En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner’s right to due process.

Ruling:

No. Comelec En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions.

Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner’s CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the Comelec En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the Comelec En Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the Comelec En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of course, or else it be remiss in fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.

Also, it was held that Jalosjos’ perpetual absolute disqualification had not been removed by the Local Government Code (LGC), because Sec. 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision—such as Article 41 in this case—directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner’s service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR.

G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015, PERALTA, J.

Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Facts:

Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio Caballero’s certificate of candidacy (COC) on the ground of false representation. It was alleged that Caballero was actually a Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for mayor.

Caballero argued that he already took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and has renounced his Canadian citizenship.

Comelec nevertheless cancelled the Caballero’s COC for failure to comply with the one year residency requirement, reasoning that Caballero’s naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Caballero insisted that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the law.

Issue:

Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile.

Ruling:

Yes. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile”

or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

In this case, Caballero was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in Caballero's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.

His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

Moreover, it was held that Caballero’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,

Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.

ALROBEN J. GOH, v. HON. LUCILO R. BAYRON and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014, CARPIO, J.

When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures,” such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections.

Facts:

Alroben Goh filed a recall petition against Mayor Lucilo Bayron due to loss of trust and confidence anchored on the alleged violations of Bayron of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9864 finding the petition sufficient in form and substance. However, the Comelec resolved not to continue with any proceedings relative to recall as it does not have a line item budget or legal authority to commit public funds for the purpose. According to Comelec, until a law is passed by Congress appropriating funds for recall elections, any proceeding relative to the petition should be suspended.

Issue:

Whether or not the 2014 GAA provided the line item appropriation to allow the Comelec to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.

Ruling:

Yes. The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the Comelec with the power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.” The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the Comelec's fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings. The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the Comelec Chairman, contrary to what Resolution No. 9882 said. This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which the Comelec admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a “line item for the 'Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites.” In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the Comelec is to conduct recall elections. When the Comelec receives a budgetary appropriation for its

"Current Operating Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the conduct of recall elections. Thus, in Socrates v. Comelec, recall elections were conducted even without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA.

Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of recall elections in the 2014 GAA, there is no reason why the

Comelec is unable to perform its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of recall.. Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the Comelec Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item appropriation from the Comelec's existing savings, as this augmentation is expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA.