Emotion and Intentionality

Being able to assert that unintentional behaviour is not necessarily part of an emotional experience and that an emotion can exist in the absence of such behaviour but in the presence of intentional behaviour, is very important if emotions are to be ascribed to computers, in any sense. Unfortunately, philosophies and models of emotion are fraught with opposing views with respect to whether unintentional behaviour is a part of emo- tion. Consequently, the following section considers a number of philosophical theories of emotion so that I may develop a valid, well-supported and accurate mode of thinking with respect to this issue.

3.1.1.1 Spinoza’s Philosophy of Emotion

Within Spinoza’s “The Ethics” [185], two chapters are concerned with emotion; the first regards the origin and nature of emotions whilst the second is concerned with how emotions “enslave” the human mind. Spinoza conjectures that the mind and body are both part of nature and are therefore both subject to its laws. Consequently, this implies that Spinoza considers all behaviour resulting from emotion to be unintentional as the mind will never be able to act autonomously to produce intentional behaviour. Spinoza believes that perceptions and appraisals of external events give rise to emotions and that unintentional behaviour is a part of emotion rather than a consequence of it. Since gratitude has already been discussed in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, I will consider Spinoza’s treatments of this emotion here to clarify his philosophy.

According to “The Ethics”, gratitude is defined as:

“the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us”.

Thus, according to this definition, if “we” is denoted as x and “him” as y then gratitude has two premises. The first of these premises is thaty must perform an action that is beneficial towards x. The second premise is that love must exist between both x and y sincey’s motivation to confer a benefit on x and x’s motivation to reciprocate such a benefit are both due to the existence of love between these agents. Thus, for Spinoza, gratitude only arises in the context of mutual love, rather than giving rise to love, as is often thought. The definition prescribes that the elicitation of gratitude in x produces an unintentional behaviour that confers a benefit upon y due to some beneficial behaviour being received. Therefore, the unintentional behaviour is a part of the emotion rather than a consequence of it. It should also be noted that Spinoza explicitly states that gratitude is direct in its effect i.e. x endeavours to benefit y (an example of positive reciprocity, see chapter 2, section 2.4.1.2) rather than some other agent (an example of upstream reciprocity, see chapter 2, section 2.4.1.3).

For love to be elicited, a further two premises must also hold according to Spinoza’s definition of the emotion: an agent must first experience pleasure and second, this

Figure 3.1: The premises of gratitude according to Spinoza.

pleasure must have been produced by some external cause. Therefore, according to Spinoza, the root of gratitude is pleasure, defined as: “the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection”. This implies that some appraisal needs to be undertaken as the transition from a less to a greater perfection needs to be recognised. Based upon these definitions a tree of premises and consequences may be constructed that creates a fairly tractable model of emotion (see figure 3.1).

Considering the discussion thus far, it would appear that Spinoza proposes emotions to be composed of two factors: the perception/appraisal of an external event and an unintentional behaviour (this is similar to Descartes whose philosophy of emotion will be discussed in section 3.1.1.2). Whilst both philosophers agree that unintentional be- haviour is a part of emotion, Spinoza does not recognise the concept of intentional action since he does not agree with the notion that the human mind is autonomous.

The tractability of Spinoza’s emotional model is beneficial from a computer science standpoint since the tree of premises shown in figure 3.1 can be easily translated into program instructions. Modelling emotions in this fashion would allow any given emotion to be modelled in much the same way and is used notably utilised by Ortony et al. in their appraisal model of emotion [142] (discussed later in chapter 4) and is an important idea with respect to this thesis.

3.1.1.2 Descartes’ Philosophy of Emotion

Descartes’ “Passions of the Soul” [42] is an attempt by the philosopher to outline his philosophy of the passions or emotions. In this work, a “passion” is defined as:

“those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer par- ticularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits”

To put this in more specific terms, a passion is a mental state that arises from brain, nerve and other physiological activity. This proposition means that Descartes work is one of the earliest investigations which connects knowledge of human physiology to emotion, allowing his arguments to be grounded in physical evidence rather than abstract thought

alone. The “spirits” that are referred to in this definition warrant some explanation as such a term may nowadays imply that Descartes is invoking the paranormal to explain how passions/emotions are produced. “Spirits” are defined in the text as “lively parts of blood that are distilled by the brain and heart”, in modern physiological terminology Descartes is referring to what is now understood to be nerve impulses, connections between neurones in the brain, transmissions across synapses etc. It is proposed by Descartes that these impulses create unintentional physiological behaviours in the body and prepare the mind to potentially undertake some intentional behaviour as a result of the emotion elicited.

The major difference between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s philosophies (see section 3.1.1.1 for a discussion of Spinoza’s philosophy) is rooted in this recognition of a rela- tionship between intentional behaviour and emotion. Unlike Spinoza, Descartes asserts that the mind and body are separate, distinct entities and whereas Spinoza believes that all behaviour is unintentional, Descartes rejects this idea. Instead, Descartes as- serts that human beings may gain control over their emotions, meaning that some kind of intentional behaviour may be produced by the experience of an emotional state.

The implied division between emotion and intentional behaviour is important as Descartes believes that intentional behaviour is not part of an emotion; it is a conse- quence of one. Essentially, Descartes recognises a functional link between emotion and intentional/unintentional behaviour and identifies a number of passions/emotions and dissects each in some detail. I will consider Descartes’ analysis of gratitude for the same reason outlined in the discussion of Spinoza’s philosophy of emotion in section 3.1.1.1. By doing this I also hope to make the distinctions between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s philosophies of emotion clear.

Descartes asserts that gratitude is elicited in a person, x when the action of another, y, has attempted to do some good for x. It is posited that the experience of gratitude by x causes it to want to reciprocate the action1 which stands in contrast to Spinoza who posits that gratitudealways causes reciprocation.

What Descartes appears to be outlining is the concept of action tendencies which will feature prominently in chapter 4, section 4.1.1.2. In very abstract terms, Descartes proposes that the experience of an emotion causes an unintentional behaviour to be exhibited in the experiencing agent but only the potential for an intentional action is created. To clarify this, Descartes states that with respect to fear, the “spirits” always have an effect on the nerves in the legs, the expansion and contraction of openings to the heart, and the nerves that agitate other parts of the body from which blood is sent to the heart. Intentional behaviour on the other hand is indirectly influenced by the “spirits” since the necessary resources to perform an intentional behaviour are made available to the body.

1

It is not specified as to whether Descartes believes that gratitude causes x to want to reciprocate the action to y (positive reciprocity, see chapter 2, section 2.4.1.2) or to some other agent (upstream reciprocity, see chapter 2, section 2.4.1.3).

It would appear that Descartes believes that an emotion is constituted of two parts and one consequence: the perception/appraisal of an external event and an unintentional behaviour are the two parts whilst intentional behaviour is the one consequence. This ad- vances Spinoza’s philosophy where only two parts are considered (perception/appraisal of an external event and unintentional behaviour). So, since the perception/appraisal of an external event and the unintentional behaviour in response to this is part of an emotion it can be asserted that, according to Descartes, if a perception exists without an accompanying unintentional behaviour then an emotion can not be said to exist. Such an assertion would argue that, from Descartes’ point of view, emotion may never be completely represented in a computational system since unintentional behaviour is a part of an emotion and unintentional behaviour cannot be manifested in computer sys- tems. What is notable however, is that Descartes recognises a functional link between emotion and intentional behaviour.

3.1.1.3 Hume’s Philosophy of Emotion

Hume’s theory of emotion is outlined in “The Treatise of Human Nature” [91] and follows in the appraisal-focused philosophies of emotion advocated by Spinoza and Descartes (see sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 respectively). Hume proposes a double relationship between “impressions” (emotions and sensations) and “ideas” (less lively copies of impressions) but, most importantly, Hume claims a link between emotion and practical reasoning making the treatise an exceptionally important piece of literature in the context of this thesis. Hume’s theory is the first of all the philosophies discussed so far to propose that intentional behaviour is a part of emotion and not just an adjunct consequence.

Hume’s theory of emotion is centred around the notion of impressions of which there are two types: impressions of sense and impressions of reflection. Impressions of sense appear to encompass sensations that originate from a human’s internal and external environment i.e. sight, sound, perceptions of pleasure and pain etc. whilst impressions of reflection encompass all passions and sentiments i.e. pride, reproach, love, hate etc. Impressions of reflection would therefore appear to be created by reflecting upon impressions of sense i.e. I feel pain (impression of sense) so that I feel angered since I am reflecting (impression of reflection) upon this pain. Impressions of reflection may then be divided further into direct and indirect passions; Hume argues that direct passions come first from an idea (perceiving a piece of art, for example) and then an impression that is associated with this idea (pleasure, for example). Indirect passions are altogether more complex and have an association between two ideas accompanied by an association between one impression and another. Therefore, I may have some initial idea with regards to a subject and this produces an impression. So, I may perceive a piece of art (an idea) that gives rise to pleasure (an impression) and if I know that I created the piece of art (an idea) then I may then associate the pleasure currently/previously experienced with pride (an impression) as they are both positive in nature.

Whilst Hume covers in great detail how an emotion is elicited, specific behaviours in relation to particular emotions are not considered however, a link between emotion and practical reasoning is posited (as mentioned previously in this section). It is claimed that, in the absence of emotion, there is no drive to act (to perform intentional behaviour). In this sense, Hume appears to agree with Descartes (see section 3.1.1.2) in that there is a functional relationship between emotion and intentional behaviour and even goes as far to argue that only passions may select ends.

3.1.1.4 Kenny’s Philosophy of Emotion

In his book “Action, Emotion and Will” [103], Kenny proposes that an emotion is composed of three elements: a stimulus, a physiological symptom and a deliberate, intentional response. Following on from the discussions regarding Descartes and Hume and their recognition of a functional link between intentional behaviour and emotion (see sections 3.1.1.2 and 3.1.1.3 respectively), Kenny’s assertion is again vital in underpinning the functional model of emotion proposed in my work. Importantly, Kenny’s philosophy of emotion proposes that, if two of the elements previously listed do not exist, then an emotion cannot be said to be experienced. But if at least two of the aforementioned elements are present, this is sufficient to assert than an emotion exists in an agent; this is especially important with respect to the thesis. Crucially, Kenny’s philosophy of emotion allows for emotions to be composed of at least a perception of an external stimulus and an intentional action.

To illustrate Kenny’s point, consider a soldier in some environment and the three elements mentioned previously (stimulus, unintentional behaviour and intentional be- haviour) along with an emotion (fear). For the purposes of this example suppose that the stimulus is that of an attack by the enemy, the unintentional behaviour is that of profuse sweating and the intentional behaviour is to run away. This allows the truth table shown in table 3.1 to be produced.

As can be seen in table 3.1, at least two of the three components (stimulus, uninten- tional behaviour, intentional behaviour) must exist in order for an agent to claim the experience of a particular emotion. Kenny’s philosophy is crucial to this thesis since he argues that an agent can still be said to have experienced or be experiencing an emotional state even if no unintentional behaviour was or is produced. As a result, Kenny refutes the philosophies of Spinoza and Descartes (see sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 respectively) in that he asserts that unintentional behaviour is not a part of emotion. Furthermore, Kenny also recognises the functional link between emotion and intentional behaviour that is required in order for emotion to be able to be computationally modelled in a functional context. It is however proposed by Kenny that, if unintentional behaviour is removed and only a stimulus and an intentional behaviour hold, then the associated emotion may only besimulated. Even if this is so, for the purposes of this thesis, being able to simulate an emotion is sufficient since a functional correlate of emotion is to be developed rather than an exact replica.

Table 3.1: Truth table outlining Kenny’s proposed relationship between stimulus, unintentional behaviour, intentional behaviour and emotion.

Stimulus Unintentional Behaviour

Intentional

Behaviour Emotion Description

Y Y Y Y Fearful Y Y N Y Controlled fear Y N Y Y Fearful Y N N N Fearless N Y Y Y Irrational fear N Y N N Medical condition? N N Y N Emergency? N N N N Normal

Kenny’s philosophy of emotion is also beneficial in that it suggests the possibility that the same object may give rise to different behaviours and different emotions. Therefore, whilst I may run away when I see a spider another person may freeze on the spot i.e. intentional behaviour is not uniform across emotions. Rather there is a group of unintentional/intentional behaviours that have a “family resemblance” as defined by Wittgenstein in [211] (such behaviours have common features but no one feature is common to all) which may be expressed.

With respect to the stimulus of an emotion; Kenny’s distinction between sensation and emotion is particularly interesting as it is proposed that an emotion has an object whilst a sensation does not. For example: if a man runs past me on the street I cannot infer anything about his emotions until I ascribe some object to his behaviour. Therefore, if I know that the man is running away from a horse I could infer that he is fearful of the horse otherwise I cannot confidently infer the emotion of fear solely based upon a perception of his behaviour (he may simply be jogging). Of course, not every stimulus- symptom-response triple relates to an emotion, but every emotion requires association with all three of these elements.