In this chapter I use four cases drawn from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to eval- uate the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3. I selected the four cases used in this chapter intentionally on the basis of their values on the independent variables in order to ensure variation on those variables, which is necessary in order to make any inference regarding causality (King, et. al. 1994).
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are complementary and can be evaluated together. Consistent with both hypotheses, in the cases of greater divisiveness between factions (Cases 2 and 3), efforts at peace with at least one of the factions are made, while they are not made in the cases of greater cohesion (Cases 1 and 4). However, since this means that there were no peace agreements reached under high cohesiveness, it was not possible to evaluate the second part of Hypothesis 1 - that is, the success with which such an agreement was implemented. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are further supported by the signing of peace agreements including Oslo I and II in Case 2 and the Geneva Accord of 2003 when divisiveness was high, as well as by the fact that these agreements did not produce a broad peace in implementation. Therefore, I can conclude that the cases support the first half of Hypothesis 1, but I can make no conclusion regarding the support for the second half of the hypothesis.
4Although in both territories a larger percentage (18.1% of the population of the combined
territories) of respondents supported cancellations of the Fatah-led government of the West Bank and a return to the Hamas-led unity government than supported the reverse (10.3%).
Hypothesis 3 is supported by negotiations between Israel and the stronger Pales- tinian faction, Fatah, in Case 2 and in a more limited fashion by the negotiations at Taba in Case 3. While Israel was clearly negotiating with the dominant Palestinian actor during the 1990s, the relative power between Fatah and Hamas was more closely balanced in Case 3. Evidence from public opinion polls concurrent with the Geneva Accord indicate that Fatah may have been at least slightly more powerful at the time. In Cases 1 and 4, the absence of negotiations prevents evaluation of Hypothesis 3 from these cases.
This analysis did not allow for a complete evaluation of all of the competing hypotheses. However, through the design of the study, specifically the use of cases drawn from a common context, I was able to control for several of the competing explanations for the occurrence or implementation of a peace process by holding the relevant explanatory variables constant across cases. This eliminated the possibility that it was these controlled for variables (regime type of the target state, the salience of ethnic or identity issues, the divisibility of stakes,5 presence of a mediator,6 and factionalization7), rather than the hypothesized variables that produced the observed
results. Therefore, while I was unable to evaluate the effect of the controlled for variables with this analysis, I was able to ensure that variation in their values did not affect variation in the outcome of the cases.
The cost of war is identified in the previous literature as a variable likely to increase the likelihood of a negotiated resolution to conflict. It is not possible to measure the costs of conflict with precision in any of the cases, and it is reasonable to expect that
5It is possible that this variable could have taken a different value in Case 1 than in the remaining
cases due to the change in relevant factions. However, it will have been constant across the remaining variables.
6Although the identity of the mediator may change, the presence of a mediator (or willing po-
tential mediator) is a constant across all cases.
7Again, the identity and exact number of factions varies across cases, but the number is always
these costs will have varied across the cases. Furthermore, it is reasonable (and, in fact, consistent with the theoretical model developed in Chapter 3) to expect that as the costs of conflict increase, the ability of the parties to conflict to find a point within the bargaining range on which to settle improves due to the expansion of the bargaining range. However, it seems unlikely that the costs of conflict decreased from Case 3, in which bargains were struck (though implementation was unsuccessful), to Case 4, in which agreements were not made. Although Case 3 saw the Second Intifada and there were many suicide attacks and rockets and mortars launched into southern Israel, Case 4 saw the Gaza War of 2009 (though Israeli costs, beyond public opinion) and a continuation of missile attacks as well as other types of attack.8 That a deal
was struck in only one of these periods, despite similar costs of conflict, suggests that some variable(s) other than cost of war is responsible for the change in outcomes.
Government and challenger parity is another of the variables taken from the al- ternative hypotheses. Israel is clearly far more powerful than the Palestinians across all periods - therefore, the parity variable is controlled for in that it is not present in any case. However, this variable raises the specter of a related variable that ought to be considered. This is the balance of power between the government and the opposition. This variable, unlike the presence or absence of parity is not constant across the cases. It is reasonable to speculate that the Israeli government in Case 1 might have negotiated over the future of the contested territories with Egypt rather than the Palestinians because of the great weakness of the Palestinians in this pe- riod - in other words, the Israeli government may have believed that the Palestinians were not powerful enough to demand any concessions from the Israelis, and there- fore the Israelis offered nothing. Although this is possible, I suggest that the Israelis avoided negotiating with the Palestinians because the Palestinians were sufficiently
8Additionally, although missiles are a constant across the two periods, accuracy of such attacks
unified that they would have required greater concessions than Israel hoped to make
and because Israel hoped to avoid increasing the legitimacy and popularity of Fatah by recognizing it or the Fatah led PLO in negotiations when there were no viable alternatives to it in Palestine.
The conflict over Palestine represents a crucial starting point for the analysis, and provides support for the theory. Moving forward, it will be beneficial to also test the Hypotheses 1 through 3 using data drawn from other cases. Testing against different conflicts will allow for increased confidence that it is indeed the hypothesized independent variables that produce change in the dependent variables - the occurrence and outcome of peace negotiations - rather than some latent variable related to the specific context of the conflict over Palestine. Furthermore, developing additional case studies to evaluate the hypotheses will enable me to evaluate the second part of Hypothesis 1, which suggests that when peace agreements are reached in cases of high preference similarity they are more likely to be implemented than when similarity is low. This can be done by purposefully selecting cases in which agreements are reached and ensuring variation with regard to whether preference similarity is high or low - for the purposes of testing only the second part of Hypotheses 1 and 2, this method of case selection will be appropriate as I will be selecting the cases only on the independent variables (since the dependent variable here is implementation of the agreement, rather than negotiation of the agreement).
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks