EX-POST FACTO LAWS

SR. INSP. JERRY VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008, Reyes, J.

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused.

Facts:

Jerry Valeroso was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 in which he pleaded not guilty. The trial court found Valeroso guilty sentencing him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of P15,000. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision stating that

“Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.”

Issue:

Whether or not the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed.

Ruling:

Yes. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states that the of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four [4] years and

two [2] months). Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) v. HON.

OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES, et al.

G.R. No. 206357, November 25, 2014, Velasco, Jr., J.

In the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.

Facts:

President Ramos issued A.O. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. The Ad Hoc Committee investigated the loans of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC). RHC was incorporated in 1968 with a paid-up capital of P1 million, was 37.2% owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a Marcos business associate. RHC obtained loans to finance its projects from DBP. RHC offered as collaterals the assets that were acquired by these loans.

40% of the amount were converted into DBP's common shareholding in RHC, and the balance was restructured. The properties were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of P1.97 million. The Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP's total exposure as of 1986 amounted to P99.1 million. The Ad Hoc Committee submitted a report to the President where it concluded that the RHC account qualifies as behest in character. Hence, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. PCGG filed a MR but was again dismissed by the Ombudsman on the ground of prescription stating that “In as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint was filed with this office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten years from the time the crimes were discovered on 4 January 1993, the offenses charged herein had already prescribed.” Aggrieved, PCGG appealed claiming that the prescriptive period should only commence to run it filed the Affidavit-Complaint Moreover, Section 11 of RA 3019 sets the prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen years and not ten years.

Issue:

Whether or not the prescriptive period for the filing of the case has already prescribed.

Ruling:

Yes. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. In the interpretation of the law on prescription

of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16, 1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for determination is the reckoning point for the 10-year period.

As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the date of discovery thereof. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.

In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which We have recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation, the second mode applies. We, therefore, count the running of the prescriptive period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC's loans. This being the case, the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, et al. v. HON.

MARGARITO TEVES, et al.

G.R. No. 181704, December 6, 2011, Villarama, Jr., J.

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.

Facts:

Congress enacted RA 9335 which imposed a revenue collection quota for BOC employees. It also provided a penalty of removal in case of failure to meet the said quota. The Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) question the constitutionality of the law, saying that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at their and their respective families' prejudice.

Issue:

Whether or not R.A. 9335 is a bill of attainder and hence, unconstitutional because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial.

Ruling:

No. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.

In this case, RA 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.

CITIZENSHIP

ERNESTO MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, Mendoza, J.

Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance.

Facts:

Mercado, Manzano and Daza III were candidates for vice mayor in Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano garnered the highest votes however the proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US which was later granted and the cancellation of the CoC on the ground that he is a dual citizen was ordered. The Comelec's Second Division said that the petition is based on the ground that Manzano is an American citizen based on the record and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the US and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

Issue:

Whether or not Manzano is disqualified from the position of vice-mayor.

Ruling:

No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;

that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, Manzano’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE