Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1.2 Re � exivity and Di � raction
The concept of re�exivity has, for many qualitative researchers, become de rigueur as
a means to reduce bias (Becker1967), to focus attention on the components of practice (Llewellyn and Spence2010, p. 1421), or to clarify ‘taken-for-granted assumptions and blind spots’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg2009, p. 9). In my own thinking, I have tended to associate re�exivity with Alvesson and Kärreman’s description of it, where it is seen as part of an apparatus:
[T]hat encourages alternative constructions and the self-critical interpreta- tions of one’s own paradigmatic, political, theoretical, methodological, and social predispositions (Alvesson and Kärreman2007, p. 1269).
Re�exivity is also associated with sceptical constructivism, an anti-essentialist stance that brings together relativism, constructivism, and re�exivity as its primary ele- ments (Grint and Woolgar1997, p. 5). Thus, like the termleadership,1 re�exivity means
di�erent things to di�erent people in di�erent contexts.
Woolgar o�ers a spectrum of possible re�exivities, ranging fromradical constitutive re�exivity to benign introspection(1988, p. 21). He describes the former as being closely
linked to Gar�nkel’s (1986) ethnomethodological programme with the suggestion that: [I]n any act of representation, there is an intimate interdependence between the surface appearance (document) and the associated underlying reality (ob- ject) (Woolgar1988, p. 21).
As concerns the latter ‘reality’, Woolgar contends that re�exivity entails loose in- junctions to ‘think about what we are doing’ (1988, p. 22). Thus on one end of Woolgar’s spectrum,radical constitutive re�exivitycalls us to learn to see through surfaces to an ‘un- derlying’ reality, whereas, at the other end of the spectrum,benign introspectioncalls us
to critically look upon ourselves. O�ering a possible explanation for this range of under- standings, Woolgar further suggests this:
[V]ariation in reactions to re�exivity is also indicative of tensions at the heart of social science over the relationship between observation (image), observer and observed (subject/object) (ibid., p. 31).
Indeed, Barad con�rms as part of these tensions, re�exivity has been trenchantly critiqued by a range of scholars on two key points. First, she claims that science studies have ignored ‘crucial social factors such as gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, and nationality’ (2007, p. 87). Moreover, she links this omission to a lack of appreciation of the ‘mutual constitution of the “social” and the “scienti�c”’ (ibid.), pointing out that the supposed distinction between these has been:
[C]hallenged vigourously on multiple grounds by feminist, poststructuralist, postcolonialist, queer, and other critical social theorists, and that attending to the issues they raise is an integral part of questioning the constitution of the nature-culture dichotomy and the work it does: not onlythat it matters, but
howit matters andfor whom(ibid.).
Second, according to Barad, re�exivity presupposes that what is representedre-
�ects‘(social or natural) reality’ (emphasis added,ibid.), directly challenging the Gar�nkelian assumption of an ‘underlying’ reality in Woolgar’sradical constitutive re�exivity. In Barad’s
view, such a position ignores the possibility thatpractices of representation may them-
selves impact the objects of investigation. It also suggests that re�exivity implicitly priv- ileges itself with a quality of knowing that is somehow better/di�erent than other forms of knowing. Pointing to a precondition this position implies, she argues that:
[R]epresentation raised to the nth power does not disrupt the geometry that
holds object and subject at a distance as the very condition for knowledge’s possibility (ibid., p. 88).
In other words, Barad argues that knowledgeonly arises out of relations; know-
p. 146); and that it is an error to rely too heavily on re�exive knowledge.2
Thus, Barad argues for recognising the limitations of re�exivity as an optical meta- phor that biases towards re�ection and, in the words of Haraway, ‘only displaces the same elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and really real’ (1997, p. 16).
In response to these concerns, Barad o�ersdi�ractionas an alternative metaphor, based on patterns that are formed by wave energy as various waves additively combine. Such patterns are part of everyday life if one knows how to look for them. For example, in�gure3.1, an aerial photograph of the surface of the ocean displays various di�raction patterns as ocean waves combine, forming new patterns in the water as evidence of this
di�erentialprocess.
Figure 3.1:Di�raction Patterns on the Ocean Surface
2The reader may also observe that Barad includes in this argument a critique onrepresentationalism; this
argument turns on the point that what is represented does not necessarilyre�ecta ‘social’ or ‘natural’ reality (2007, p. 87), and is the basis for her alternative to representationalism:performativity.
According to Barad (2007), and Nicolini and Roe (2014), the metaphor of di�raction can also be extended methodologically. To approach one’s research through a di�ractive methodology means not�xing the identities of subjects and objects in advance (Barad
2007, p. 30), which enables the researcher to read ‘insights through one another in ways that help illuminate di�erences as they emerge’ (ibid.), including those from ‘one area of study through another’ (ibid.). Barad credits Haraway for the inspiration of this approach, however, Bateson also points towards similar concerns with his remark that:
[W]hat we mean by information—the elementary unit of information—isa di�erence which makes a di�erence(original italics, 1972 / Bateson1987, p. 470).
Moreover, the methodological approach of di�raction is aligned with the toolkit approach (Nicolini2012, p. 213) discussed in section3.1.1in its insistence to develop theory iteratively and dynamically. Given this study’s reach across the HCI, IS, OS, and leadership literatures, di�raction provides a crucial methodological support for establishing linkages among them.
Prior to reading Barad (2007), I had not considered how the optical metaphor of the termre�exivity might in�uence what I might do with it methodologically. Alvesson and Kärreman’s (2007) formulation falls more towards Woolgar’sradical constitutive re�exivity
(1988, p. 21), so it may not generate insights that are re�ective in the way Barad argues against. However, irrespective of whether re�exivity has made a useful di�erence in my past thinking or not, Barad makes an important point, one that helps to more carefully dir- ect the researcher’s gaze to di�erence and understandings that can arise from identifying emergent relations.
Practically, re�exivity involves allowing time to think and re�ect on ideas and al- lowing that thought process to surface unquestioned assumptions. Di�raction, however, involves actively trying out di�erent combinations, for example, linking data to extant theory and then assembling various theoretical perspectives from a range of disciplines which appear to describe the same phenomenon. Simply put, di�raction is methodolo- gically employed as a means for drawing new distinctions through extant data. This dif- fraction method is employed in the analyses carried out in of each of the three empirical chapters4,5, and6. The results of these are then further re�ected upon and di�racted in the�nal chapter7.
In conclusion, re�exivity, within this study, invokes sceptical constructivism, in- cludes questioning assumptions, the generation of multiple explanations for the phenom- ena of interest, and attention towards to the various cultural frames through which I see. All of this is useful, but so is being attentive to di�raction; that is, noticing di�erence and attempting to understand how di�erence comes into being.
Throughout this study, both re�exivity and di�raction are constant companions in my thinking as methodological anchors. For this reason, I take the re�exive position that my physical presence and thinking are themselves important apparatuses that shape this work in particular ways, hopefully enabling me to see through ‘surfaces’ towards what may lie ‘underneath’, to look critically upon myself as an instrument of research, and to be more aware of my own blind spots. Moreover, I take the di�ractive position by not assuming that the objects of human and computational object are�xed in enactments of leadership practice, by paying close attention to di�erences (both empirical and those found in the literature), overlaying them, and reading them through one another, feasibly generating novel insights on this basis.