Emanuel Levinas has been called “an increasingly central presence in contemporary debates about identity and responsibility” (Hand, 1996: 1). His work encompasses the major philosophical and ethical problems of the 20th
century. Almost everything Levinas wrote refers to the face-to-face relation, or the encounter with the Other (human being) (Bernasconi, 2000). One of the most outstanding features of his philosophical ethics is his consideration of the face. He himself writes that it was the Bible that was one of his main inspirations for treating the concept of face (Levinas, 1990a: 140):
For us, the world of the Bible is a world not of figures, but of faces.
Discussing this source of Levinas’ inspiration, Astell (2004: 32) states that:
He associates the Glory of God’s face-to-face encounter with Moses in Exodus 33: 20 — “My face you cannot see, for no one sees me and still lives” — with the glory of the divine commandments, vulnerable to disobedience, that were given to Moses on the holy mountain: “The Torah is given in the Light of a face” (Levinas, 1990b: 39, 47).
In Levinas’ description of the face of the Other, it is possible to see a reminiscence of the Holy Face (Levinas, 1981: 49):
The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as a cheek is offered to the smiter.
How are we to define Levinas’ concept of face? For Tischner (2002: 174), “the face goes beyond every ‘what.’ The face is the face.” In Totality and Infinity (1969), Levinas discusses the face at great length. For him, when we come into social interaction with the Other, we have to forget about his corporeality. His face as a part of his body no longer matters. What we have to take into account is human well-being, as
access to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other (Levinas, 1985: 85).
Thus the face cannot be reduced to an object of perception. It is a “disincarnate presence of the Other. [...] It is the source of revelation of the other who cannot 92 The face as a part of the body
be encompassed in cognition” (Wyschogrod, 2000: 245). We can get to know him by looking into our own self. The face of the Other is accessible only “starting from an I” (Levinas, 1969: 220). Discussing the character of the face of the Other Levinas (1969: 194) writes: “His face in which his epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common to us.”
The Other’s face is the bearer of values and human personality (Wyschogrod, 2000). Levinas writes about its upright exposure, its lack of defence. It is naked and destitute. “[...] there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on a countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of violence” (Levinas, 1985: 86). But at the same time it says: “you shall not commit murder.” This is its meaning. For Levinas, the face is meaning without context. When we talk about people, we usually refer to them by the roles they perform or by special attributes they have. So they are characterized in relation to others. Here, the face is meaning by itself. You are you (1985: 86).
For Levinas, there are two dimensions of face, the physical face, belonging to a particular person, and face as the relation with the Other. In Time and the
Other, he describes this relation in the following way (1987: 78—79):
The relationship with the Other, the face-to-face with the Other, the encounter with the face that at once gives and conceals the Other, is a situation in which an event happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is utterly unable in this regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front of the subject.
During the encounter with the Other the face simultaneously gives away the information about the Other and acts as a façade, behind which he can hide.
The face is like a façade. “By the façade the thing which keeps its secret is exposed, enclosed in its monumental essence and its myth, in which it gleams like a splendour but does not deliver itself” (Levinas, 1969: 193). However, the face is not given to us in the mode of sense experience; we do not see it. It is given to us as language. There is a strong connection between the face and discourse. Levinas says that “The face speaks” (1985: 87; see also Sections 1.5. and 2.5.). It invites us to a relation and by discourse maintains the relation with us (Levinas, 1969). It is “only in cooperation with the Other that any cognition is possible” (Bogdanowska, 2001: 139). Through discourse the Other tells us something about himself, The face cannot be contemplated; it must be responded to. The Other is greeted, answered for. “Speaking, rather than “letting be,” solicits the Other” (1969: 195). Finally we can see his disincarnate face.
“The epiphany of the face is ethical” (1969: 199). The relationship with the Other can result in conflict, but such conflict can arise after the epiphany of the face. Levinas claims that entering into a social relationship with the Other, we
present and expose ourselves at the same time. Such a presentation in face-to-face interaction always involves imposition. Any imposition can potentially lead to conflict:
To manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and beyond the manifested and purely phenomenal form, to present oneself in a mode irreducible to manifestation, the very straightforwardness of the face to face, without the intermediary of any image, in one’s nudity [...] (Levinas, 1969: 200).
Certainly, the expression of the face does not provide us with information concerning the Other’s inner state, but is rather a presentation of the self, which does not have to be true. And as such it should always arouse our suspicion:
The Other who expresses himself precisely does not give himself, and accordingly retains the freedom to lie. But deceit and veracity already presuppose the absolute authenticity of the face [...]. What we call the face is precisely this exceptional presentation of self by self, incommensurable with the presentation of realities given, always suspect of some swindle, always possibly dreamt up (Levinas, 1969: 202).
The truth of the face is its own truth. The Other guarantees what he says no matter whether he is lying or is telling the truth. Social interaction is a revelation of the inequality between self and others.
The Other is always superior (Wyschogrod, 2000). He stands in an asymmetrical relation with the self. The Other always commands and is the teacher of the self. The face of the Other bears the trace of God. Our relationship can never be one of equality:
The relationship between us and the Other is asymmetrical. The Other is higher, he gives us an order, ‘you shall not commit murder.’ It is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me (Levinas, 1985: 89).
But on the other hand, the face of the Other is destitute, and to it we owe all. In
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1981), Levinas writes about the
responsibility for the Other and for his face. Entering into the relationship with him, we create the image of his body (face), which makes us serve him. This is a moral relationship, which Zygmunt Bauman (1990: 17) characterizes as “I being for the Other, I bearing responsibility for the Other.” This is a non-reciprocal relationship; we are responsible for the Other, but cannot expect reciprocity from him. Bauman (1990: 20) interprets Levinas’ concept of responsibility in the following way:
Responsibility is my affair, reciprocity is his. My responsibility is unexceptional and unconditional. The Other need not “prove” anything to “deserve” it.
All human relationships can be characterized by the “mastery” and poverty of the Other at the same time. This is a distinctive feature of all social relations. Levinas illustrates this with an example: before an open door we say to the Other, “After you, sir!”.