and the Air Force used during the YF-16 Lightweight Fighter prototype effort.3 This included collocation of the entire development team, the formal prepara-tion of minimum essential documentaprepara-tion only, full and open program partici-pation by major subcontractors, and cost and schedule tracking by individual work breakdown structure (WBS) element; and in order to speed development and control cost, the F-16XL design would be based on a firm configuration definition and specific capability goals. Air Force participation was to begin as soon as possible, starting with coordinating the lease of selected F-16 assets needed for the program, and it would include continuous F-16 SPO coordina-tion with the GD F-16XL program manager as the program unfolded. Both the design and flight-test effort were intended to facilitate a smooth transition to an F-16XL-derived production program—if that option was selected by the Air Force. However, many technical, cost, and schedule issues associated with the F-16XL design were still being addressed throughout 1980. These included concerns over excessive wingtip flexibility, leading-edge flap and aileron actua-tion provisions, final vertical tail size and shape, environmental cooling system (ECS) capacity, external wing fuel tank location, electrical generation capacity, and the producibility of the composite wing skin design.4
In its evaluation of the preliminary F-16XL proposal, the Air Force F-16 System Program Office concluded that the aircraft was feasible and the pro-posed cost of the flight-test effort propro-posed by GD was realistic. The SPO also noted that the proposed schedule was challenging but feasible. Proposed costs for both the F-16XL Full Scale Development effort and the production pro-gram were considered to be somewhat optimistic. However, on May 1, 1980, the F-16 SPO informed GD that the Air Force did not have a requirement for the F-16XL at that time. They recommended that GD examine the possibil-ity of initiating an F-16XL flight demonstration using company Independent Research and Development funding with the possibility of some assistance being provided from the Air Force. Such assistance was noted as potentially including various items of GFE and flight-test support.5
General Dynamics undertook an extensive program of briefings on their proposed F-16XL flight demonstration effort in an attempt to gain Air Force support for the program. Meetings and briefings were arranged, and detailed presentations on the flight-test concept were given at all levels of the Air Force covering both systems development agencies and operational commands, including the Air Staff. However, GD was unsuccessful in obtaining Air Force funding to start the effort in 1981 or in convincing the Air Force to incorporate the F-16XL into the fiscal year (FY) 1982 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).6 After the Air Force had submitted their FY 1982 POM to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for review, GD and their supporters within the Air Force were able to convince the Undersecretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering (USDR&E) within the OSD to direct the Air Force to initiate a new Combat Aircraft Prototype (CAP) program. This was to be focused on design, construction, and flight test of the F-16XL. The Air Force objected to the USDR&E direction on the basis that commercial competition was required in order to initiate such an effort and also because OSD should not specifically direct what the Air Force should test to best accomplish its mission. In discus-sions with OSD, the Air Force noted that the F-15E was also a candidate for a flight-test demonstration along with the F-16XL. In a breakthrough for the program, the Air Force did agree to add necessary funding for a competitive prototype program that would involve both the F-16XL and the F-15E. This competitive prototyping effort would begin in FY 1982 and continue through 1983 and 1984. The Air Force budget request was then modified to provide funding for an F-16XL flight demonstration effort with $22.5 million provided in FY 1982, $25 million in 1983, and $10.2 million in 1984. These numbers closely corresponded to the General Dynamics estimate of funding required to execute the F-16XL flight demonstration program.7
On August 27, 1980, General Dynamics submitted its proposal for a USAF-sponsored development and flight-test program to the Air Force F-16 Systems Program Office (usually simply referred to as the F-16 SPO).8 In keeping with the streamlined program approach that GD advocated, the proposal was very concise, being only 40 pages long. GD referred to the flight demonstrator aircraft as “SCAMP” in their proposal. The actual company designation was Model 400, but the aircraft rapidly became known by the designation created by Harry Hillaker—the F-16XL. GD stated that they intended to initiate the development effort on October 1, 1980, using internal company IRAD funds. This approach would continue through September 30, 1981, at which time Air Force fund-ing would be used for the balance of the prototypfund-ing and flight demonstration program. Air Force support for the GD approach was soon forthcoming. In a October 15, 1980, letter to General Dynamics, Lt. Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze, commander of the USAF Aeronautical Systems Division, stated, “I support your plan to conduct the F-16XL program using IRAD… .”9 He also committed the Air Force to providing necessary material support for the project as laid out by GD in their proposal: “We can respond favorably to your request to provide GFE [Government Furnished Equipment] requirements… .” These GFE items were listed as “two F-16 aircraft (A-3 and A-5), three F100-PW-200 engines, and one two-place forward fuselage, equipments and assets available under the F-16 contract at no cost on a non-interference basis.” The two F-16A aircraft identified in the Skantze letter would be built as the F-16XL-1 (the single-seat prototype) and F-16XL-2 (the two-seat flight demonstrator).10
Shortly after GD submitted their proposal to the Air Force, articles describ-ing the anticipated capabilities of the F-16XL began to appear in the aviation
press, reportedly based on interviews with company representatives. Numerous claims, including one that stated that the F-16XL maximum sustained cruise speed was Mach 2.2—as compared to Mach 0.93 for the F-16A—were circu-lated in print. Others stated that air-to-air mission radius would be increased 125 percent and supersonic radius of action doubled. In the air-to-ground role, mission radius was reportedly increased by 120 percent. Sea level penetration speed was indicated as being 90 knots higher than the F-16A while carrying 2.5 times the weapons payload. Takeoff and landing distances were reported as being decreased by about 33 percent. Takeoff distance in the air-to-air configu-ration was claimed to be 1,640 feet versus 2,425 feet for the F-16A. Landing distance was claimed to be as low as 1,180 feet with the use of the F-16XL’s drag chute, as compared to the landing roll of 2,480 feet for the standard F-16A, which did not have a drag chute.11 As often is the case during the early stages of a nascent aircraft program, some of these early flight performance estimations subsequently did not match actual flight-test results. In particu-lar, supercruise, takeoff and landing performance, and subsonic maneuvering capability all fell short.