Force 38

Recall   that   this   discussion   of   Williamson’s   view   was   meant   to   check   whether   it   could   provide   a   satisfactory   answer   to   the   question   of   rationale   for   KNA,   i.e.   an   answer   to   the   question   of   why   KNA   should   govern  assertion  in  the  first  place.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  reason  to   believe   that   the   Williamson   uniqueness-­‐constitutivity   claim   is   false.   Even   so,   we   may   think   that   this   is   because   it   is   too   strong.   After   all,   maybe   Williamson’s   constitutivity   claim   is   correct   and   his   uniqueness   claim   mistaken   as   there   are   more   constitutive   norms   of   assertion.   Would   constitutivity   alone   not   be   enough   to   serve   as   a   rationale   for   KNA?  Think  of  games  again:  why  should  one  not  move  a  rook  diagonally   when   playing   chess?   Because   that’s   just   how   the   game   is   played:   it   is   constitutive   of   chess   that,   among   other   rules,   one   is   supposed   to   not   move  the  rook  diagonally.  

  Note,  however,  first,  that  it  is  far  from  clear  that,  once  we  have   some  proposals  for  further  constitutive  norms  of  assertion  on  the  table,   the  argument  made  here  will  not  generalize.  After  all,  what  we  would   then  get  would  come  in  the  shape  of  a  conjunctive  constitutive  norm  of   assertion   of   which   KNA   would   be   one   conjunct.   At   that   point,   all   we   need   for   the   argument   to   generalize   is   to   show   that   the   uniqueness-­‐ constitutivity  claim  fails  for  the  conjunctive  norm,  along  similar  lines  as   above   –   i.e.,   by   showing   that   one   can   engage   in   assertion   while   systematically  breaking  the  conjunctive  norm.    

35    _{In  fact,  it  seems  that  one  very  plausible  way  of  distinguishing  between  constitutive}  

rules  and  other  norms  that  govern  acts  necessarily,  such  as  moral  and  practical  norms,   is   that   constitutive   rules   come   with   conditions   on   what   it   takes   to   engage   in   the   constituted  act  like  the  one  Williamson  mentions  and  the  one  defended  above.  While   constitutive  rules  are  like  moral  and  practical  norms  in  that  they  are  not  contingent,   they   differ   from   the   latter   in   that   one   cannot   engage   in   a   constituted   act   unless,   for   instance,   one   is   sensitive   to   what   counts   as   conforming   to   the   constitutive   rule   and   breaking   it.   In   contrast,   in   the   case   of   moral   and   practical   norms,   such   insensitivity   does  not  prevent  one  from  engaging  in  the  act.    

  What’s  more,  to  my  knowledge,  no  one  has  defended  a  view  of   assertion   according   to   which   KNA   is   one   constitutive   rule   among   others.  It  looks  as  though,  then,  for  the  time  being,  it  is  on  the  shoulders   of  those  who  want  to  pursue  this  route  to  put  forth  some  candidates  for   further   constitutive   rules   of   assertion   and   to   show   that   the   argument   made  here  does  not  generalize  to  the  resulting  proposal.  

  Furthermore,  even  so,  that  is,  even  if  a  successful  proposal  is  put   forth,  there  is  reason  to  doubt  the  force  of  the  resulting  rationale.  To  see   this,   note   that,   importantly,   constitutivity   without   uniqueness   looses   much  of  its  normative  strength.  That  is  because  it  looks  as  though,  while   for  a  game  governed  by  one  and  only  one  constitutive  norm,  the  game   lives   and   dies   with   the   norm,   that   is   less   plausibly   the   case   when   it   comes   to   non-­‐unique   constitutive   norms.   Let’s   first   take   chess   as   an   example  again.  Why  should  chess  be  governed  by  one  set  of  rules  rather   than   another?   For   instance,   why   should   chess   be   governed   by   a   rule   according   to   which   the   pawn   can   move   two   squares   forward   if   it   has   not  yet  been  moved,  but  only  one  square  if  it  has  already  been  moved   (R1),  rather  than  by  a  rule  according  to  which  it  can  always  only  move   one  square  (R2)?  Note  that  games  evolve  over  time:  some  rules  get  lost   in   the   process,   new   ones   come   into   play.   It   is,   of   course,   plausible   to   think  that  we  are,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  playing  a  different  game  if  many   rules,   or   one   of   the   central   rules   are   lost   over   time.   However,   it   looks   somewhat   implausible   to   believe   that,   say,   just   because,   for   user-­‐ friendliness  considerations,  R1  comes  to  replace  R2  in  time,  we  thereby   stopped  playing  chess  altogether.  Even  more  implausibly,  consider  the   case   of   languages:   as   Williamson   himself   acknowledges   (2000,   239)   natural  languages  gradually  change  their  rules  over  time  without  losing   their  identity.    

  At   the   same   time,   it   seems   also   implausible   that,   in   the   case   of   norms  of  assertion,  KNA  could,  at  any  point,  disappear  or  be  replaced   by  a  different  norm.  In  sum,  supposing  that  assertion  really  is  governed   by  KNA,  it  is  somewhat  less  than  plausible  to  think  that  we  might  end   up  using  a  speech  act  that  is  governed  by  a  different  rule  instead  at  any   point.  For  instance,  it  is  rather  implausible  that  we  might  as  well  have   end  up  using  a  speech  act  governed  by  the  following  rule  of  assertion:        

The   Wondering   Norm   of   Assertion.   One   must:   assert  p   only   if   one   wonders  whether  p.  

  Williamson   (2000,   239)   acknowledges   as   much,   that   is,   he   agrees  that  rules  of  games  and  languages  change  over  time,  but  argues   that  what  he  is  interested  in  is  not  the  ordinary  sense  of  game,  language   or  assertion,  for  that  matter,  but  rather  a  technical  one,  for  which  it  is  

the   case   that   “a   rule   will   count   as   constitutive   of   an   act   only   if   it   is   essential  to  that  act:  necessarily,  the  rule  governs  every  performance  of   the  act”.  He  motivates  this  by  fruitfulness  considerations:    

[I]n  a  technical  sense  of  ‘language’  which  the  philosophy  of   language   has   found   fruitful,   the   semantic,   syntactic,   and   phonetic   rules   of   a   language   are   essential   to   it   […].   The   richer   ordinary   sense   of   ‘language’   introduces   needless   complications.   Linguistic   conventions   and   the   consequent   possibility  of  linguistic  change  can  then  be  accommodated  at   a   different   point   in   the   theory:   a   population   which   at   one   time  has  the  convention  of  speaking  a  language  L  may  later   change   to   a   convention   of   speaking   a   distinct   language   L*,   constituted  by  slightly  different  rules”  (2000,  239).    

Similarly,  Williamson  wants  a  technical  sense  of  assertion,  which  avoids   the  issue  of  normative  change:      

Likewise,   in   the   present   technical   sense   of   ‘speech   act’,   the   rules  of  a  speech  act  are  essential  to  it.  A  population  which  at   one   time   has   the   convention   of   using   a   certain   device   to   perform  a  speech  act  A  may  later  change  to  a  convention  of   using   that   device   to   perform   a   distinct   speech   act   A*,   governed  by  slightly  different  rules  (2000,  239).    

  Two   things   about   this:   first,   it   is   not   clear   how   fruitfulness   considerations  are  supposed  to  work  in  this  case.  Say,  for  instance,  that   the  speech  act  governed,  among  other  constitutive  norms,  by  KNA,  and   called  assertion  –  in  its  technical  sense  –  disappeared  about  6  centuries   ago,  and,  due  to  simplicity  considerations,  was  replaced  by  assertion*,   governed  by  a  justified  true  belief  norm  (JTBNA).  After  all,  Gettier  cases   are   so   weird   and   rare,   that   imposing   a   stronger   epistemic   constraint   than  JTB  seems  like  a  waste  of  resources.  One  first  question  that  arises,   if   that   is   the   case   is:   why   should   we   care   about   philosophizing   about   assertion   rather   than   about   assertion*?   Secondly,   what   about   a   defender   of   JTBNA,   bringing   linguistic   data   forward   to   support   his   account?  He  will,  presumably,  have  to  be  satisfied  with  a  Williamsonian   response   along   the   following   lines:   ‘Strictly   speaking,   assertion   is   governed  by  KNA,  therefore  I  am  right  and  you  are  wrong.  It’s  just  that   it   disappeared   6   centuries   ago,   and   was   replaced   by   this   different   speech  act,  which  your  linguistic  data  makes  reference  to.  ’  It  would,  I   submit,  be  rather  surprising  if  the  JTBNA  fellow  will  rest  content  with   this  reply.  And,  last  but  not  least,  note  that  Williamson  himself  adduces  

quite  a  lot  of  linguistic  data  in  support  of  KNA,  which  suggests  that  he   takes  intuitions  about  what  is  ‘ordinarily’  taken  to  be  an  assertoric  act   seriously.    

  As   such,   all   in   all,   it   looks   as   though   the   defender   of   the   Williamsonian   account   faces   the   following   dilemma   at   this   point:   she   can  retreat  to  merely  defending  a  technical  sense  of  assertion,  but  then   (1)   she   can’t   avail   herself   of   (at   least   some)   of   the   linguistic   data     Williamson  puts  forth  in  support  of  KNA,  and  (2)  it  is  not  clear  why  we   should   care   about   the   epistemic   norm   governing   Williamsonian   assertion   rather   than   assertion.   Alternatively,   she   can   abandon   the   mere   technical   sense,   but   then   the   constitutivity   claim   is   not   left   with   much  in  the  way  of  force  to  offer  a  rationale  for  KNA.36    

2.4  Conclusion    

This  chapter  looked  at  several  extant  attempts  to  provide  a  rationale  for   the  knowledge  norm  of  assertion.  First,  the  belief-­‐assertion  parallel  was   shown   to   lack   the   advertised   normative   strength   to   ground   norm   correspondence.   Second,   the   claim   that   assertion   inherits   the   norm   of   belief  in  virtue  of  being  an  expression  thereof  turned  out  to  rest  on  an   invalid   derivation.   Third,   the   inheritance   argument   from   the   norm   for   action  was  proven  suspicious  of  deontic  equivocation.  

  Last   but   not   least,   I   have   looked   at   the   potential   of   Tim   Williamson’s  constitutivity  claim  of  delivering  a  good  rationale  for  KNA,   and  tried  to  cast  doubt  on  both  its  plausibility  and  its  force.  

36     _{Alternatively,   champions   of   the   Williamson   line   might   maintain   that   the   analogy}  

between   rules   of   assertion   and   rules   of   games   does   not   extend   to   the   rationale   question.  Note,  however,  that,  in  that  case,  Williamsonians  will  not  only  shoulder  the   burden   of   offering   a   satisfactory,   independent   answer   to   the   rationale   question.   In   addition,  they  will  also  need  to  offer  good  reason  why  the  analogy  between  norms  of   assertion   and   games   does   not   extent   to   just   the   point   where   it   becomes   potentially   problematic  for  them.