In this section, I will argue that despite all the efforts (some are ontologically strong) from the advocates of the moving spotlight views discussed above, this view is not able to provide a satisfactory explanation about the open future. The general view of
think, metaphysically and intuitively, this is not an acceptable explanation for it cannot account for the open future, and so cannot allow that we possess free will.
To begin, I should define what I means when I say that the future is open. I should do this because there are a great many different meanings that this term may have. First, it may mean merely that the future is epistemically open, i.e. that we cannot know what the future will hold. I do not mean it in this sense. Second, it might mean that it is causally open, i.e. that our current actions cannot have an effect on the future. I do not mean it in this sense either. But third, it might mean that the future is alethically open. And it is this sense that I do mean it. This sense was first outlined by Aristotle in a famous passage in De Interpretatione, as follows:
A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not
necessary that it should take place tomorrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place tomorrow […] One may indeed be more likely to be true than the other, but it cannot be either actually true or actually false. (Aristotle 2006: 33)
As I understand the notion, I will take alethic openness to be:
The future is alethically open iff for all propositions p, p is not true now and p is not false now. (See Markosian, 1995: 96)
According to any eternalist view, of which the moving spotlight is one, the future is not alethically open, but closed. That is to say, even though we cannot now know what the future will hold (i.e. it is epistemically open) and even though our actions
now can have a causal influence on the future (i.e. it is causally open), there is still a currently existing fact of the matter, for each proposition p about the future, whether that proposition is true or false. This is true because the future already exists. It is “out there”, as it were, in reality. As the moving spotlight moves along the timeline, it merely passes along the times that are already there. As such, the future, just like the past, is fixed, according to the moving spotlight view.
It is worth reflecting upon how odd this view is. It entails that all future truths are just like all past truths. Just as there is absolutely nothing we can do to change the fact that World War II happened, because it exists in the timeline, there is likewise absolutely nothing we can do to alter the fact (if it is a fact) that World War III will happen in fifty years, because it exists in the timeline in just the same way. It is granted that our actions can have a causal impact on the future, unlike the past, but this does not change the fact that if an event is out there on the timeline already, it
will happen. That is, it is not that it might happen, but if we try hard to stop it, it might
not. No, it will, with 100% certainty happen, if it is out there already on the timeline. That means no matter what we try to do to alter the fact, and however we exert our causal powers to effect the future, all out efforts will invariably lead to the events that are already out there on the timeline.
The problem with the above view is fairly clear. It means that, in an important sense, our free will is limited. To see how the argument for this claim goes, consider that it is now true (because the event already exists on the timeline) that World War III will happen in fifty years time. Now consider:
2. If it is presently true that WWIII will happen in fifty years time, then we are not free to prevent WWIII from happening.
3.If we are not free to prevent WWIII from happening, then our free will is severely limited.
C. Our free will is severely limited.
One might balk at this argument, and claim that our free will is not severely limited by the mere fact that we cannot prevent one event from occuring. But note that this event was abitrarily chosen, and the same line of reasoning applies to every proposition regarding what will happen in the future, including ones about our own actions. For example, I could have run the same argument supposing it to be true that I will get married in a year’s time, or that I will become a plumber, or that I will die before I finish my thesis. If we take the set S of all true propositions about what will happen in the future, we have:
Freedom Argument 2
1. S contains all propositions about what will happen in the future.
2. All the propositions in S about will happen in the future are presently true. 3. If all the propositions in S are presently true, then we are not free to prevent any of the events mentioned in S from happening.
4. If we are not free to prevent any of the events within S from happening, our free will is severely limited.
C. Our free will is severely limited.
Strawson (1986) and Pereboom (2001)). But as far as I am concerned, this is again such a fundamental tenet of our view of the world and our place within it that I think we are justified in rejecting a view that limits our freedom in this way. This is not to say that I have a positive account of what it is to have free will either. That is, I do not know how to lay down sufficient conditions for having free will. But, I do think I know that the ability to actualize more than one possible future for myself is a necessary condition. And, for this reason, because the moving spotlight view rules this out, I believe we must reject the view.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have considered the moving spotlight view and rejected it. I have argued, however, that it can answer some of the objections that have been levelled against it. But, I have argued, it must be rejected because there is one objection that tells against it. We must retain the possiblity of having free will, and because the moving spotlight view does not allow for this, I reject it. In the next chapter I turn to the final metaphysical view of time, the growing block view.