Generics vs Explicitly Quantified Sentences

Most natural languages exhibit two ways of expressing a generalization or a general

statement. The first employs explicit universal quantification where an overt universal quantifier like all or every is incorporated. The other way available is using characterizing sentences in which no overt quantifier is used. An example taken from Link (1995:359) lays this out.

(30) a. All planets of the solar system revolve about the sun on an elliptic orbit. b. Man-made satellites revolve about the earth on an elliptic orbit.

(30.a) is naturally interpreted as each member of the closed set of solar system planets, which contains nine planets, is such that that planet revolves around the sun in an elliptical orbit. (30.b),

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however, is not interpreted as quantifying over a closed set of man-made satellite objects similar to (30.a). Croft (1986) dubbed the former Closed Class Quantification (CCQ), and the latter Open Class Quantification (OCQ). A major difference between the two structures is that characterizing sentences seem inappropriate to express closed class quantification, while quantified sentences typically express closed class quantification, and may be used to express open class quantification too. According to Link (1995), this asymmetry can be accommodated if we observe the fact that universal quantification like (30.a) expresses an “actual universal truth,” while the generalization in (30.b) extends to every potential man-made satellite object that satisfies the property expressed in the predicate.

One of the most salient features of generic sentences that isolate them from their quantified counterparts is being exception-tolerant. In a generic sentence like ‘An orange contains vitamin C’, there is a room for some genetically-modified oranges which do not contain vitamin C. However, its universally quantified counterpart ‘Every orange contains vitamin C’, does not tolerate such an exception. In fact, if one orange in the set of oranges contains no vitamin C, the proposition will be false. This can be explicated if we observe that the latter puts a restriction on the number of

individuals in the Restrictor which hold the property attributed in the Scope. In the above example the quantifier ‘every’ requires that for the sentence to be true, all members of the Restrictor - the set of oranges, have the property in the Scope - to contain vitamin C. The generic sentence does not seem to behave in the same fashion. More precisely, it does not put a limitation on the Restrictor in terms of quantity. This major discrepancy between the two structures manifests itself in the quantified sentence being more amenable to formal semantic analysis than the generic sentence which appears more complex and vague. In set-theoretic semantics, for instance, the quantified sentence above can be rigorously represented by the formula in (31), while its generic counterpart requires much more investigation to figure out the truth conditions which capture the sentence’s exception tolerance.

(31) Every orange contains vitamin C = 1(is true), iff {x| x ia an orange} ⊆ {y| y contains vitamin C}

Informally, for the sentence in (31) to be true, the set of all things that are oranges has to be a subset of the set of all objects which have Vitamin C.

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Another pivotal characteristic of generic sentences that sets them apart from explicitly quantified sentences is that they are quantificationally vague. Carlson (1977) emphasizes that generics are not quantificational statements. They are not about how many or how much, in the same way as quantified sentences. A quantified sentence like ‘some/most/all trees lose their leaves seasonally’, can be an appropriate response to a question like ‘How many trees lose their leaves seasonally?’ However, it seems unsuitable to respond to the above questions as ‘trees lose their leaves seasonally’. Unlike quantified sentences which exhibit clear and explicit quantificational variability established by the quantifier, the quantificational variability of generic sentences appears to be vague and fluctuating. More precisely, generic sentences, Carlson argues, fluctuate in their truth conditions as the predicate varies. If there is a null quantifier associated with the generic sentence, its

quantificational force varies with the meaning of the predicate. In order to determine the meaning of the assumed null quantifier in generic sentences, Carlson notes, we need to have knowledge of the particular predicate; “no other quantifier in English behaves even remotely in a similar fashion” (P. 44).

The vagueness of the purported quantificational meaning of generic sentences is multifaceted. The first facet touches on the issue of how many individuals holding of the predicated property are enough for the generic sentence to be true. Consider the examples below (taken from Katz and Zamparelli 2005).

(32) a. Snakes are reptiles. All snakes

b. Telephone books are thick books. Those of large modern cities c. Mammals give birth to live young. Only adult fertilized females d. Shoplifters are prosecuted in criminal courts. Most are not even caught e. Mosquitoes carry the paramecium that causes yellow fever. Very few do

f. White sharks attack bathers. Only a tiny minority A quick look at the data in (32) clearly shows the fluctuation of the truth conditions of the sentences on par with the variability of the meanings of the predicates used. Sentences (32.a-f) are all true. However, what makes them true? (a) holds for all snakes, (b) for perhaps less than half of telephone books, (c) for most female mammals ( less than half the total number of mammals), (d) for few

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shoplifters, (e) for less than one percent of mosquitoes, and (f) for very few white sharks. The truth of explicitly quantified sentences, however, does not appear to vary according to a variation in the predicate meaning. It is the quantifier, which is always given a unique interpretation, that sets the semantic structure of the quantified sentence, and truth values are assigned accordingly.

If the semantic structure of generic sentences were similar to quantified sentences - in

particular if generic sentences have a null quantifier with a unique interpretation - we would judge the sentences in (33) true because most of the individuals denoted by the NP in the restrictor hold the property predicated in the scope; nevertheless all the sentences are judged false.

(33) a.? Students in Yarmouk University are female. Most are female students.

b.? Seeds do not germinate. Most don’t (Katz and Zamparelli 2005) c.? Lions do not have bushy tails. Most don’t; all Females& young lions d.? Prime numbers are odd. An infinity minus two (Katz and Zamparelli 2005) e.? Bees do not lay eggs. All don’t except the queen.

f.? People are over three years old. The majority are (Cohen 2006) The intuition we get from the data in (33) is that generic sentences, unlike explicitly

quantified sentences, do not constitute the truth of the generalizations they express based on the size of individuals holding the predicated property. This characteristic exemplifies the intricacy of generic sentences compared to their quantified counterparts pertaining to stating and calculating their truth conditions. A hypothesis that assumes a semantic structure of generic sentences similar to that of quantified sentences except for the overt quantifier must face the difficult task of reconciling our intuitions about sentences like (32) with the proposal that all of these sentences contain the same null quantifier. Consequently, it needs to account for the diversity of readings exhibited in (32) based on the same null quantifier proposal.

Another facet of the vagueness and complexity of generic sentences is related to the issue of determining the relevant set of individuals over which the generic sentence quantifies. This reflects the exception tolerance with which generic sentences are characterized. Any model that investigates the semantics of generic sentences has to account clearly for this distinctive characteristic and capture

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the relevant set of individuals that the predicated property is attributed to, hence abstracting away from the exceptions. The examples in (34) lay this point out.

(34) a. Turtles lay eggs. Only adult fertilized females b. Lions have bushy tails. Only male adults

c. Mosquitoes suck blood. Only adult females

d. Mammals nurse their young. Only adult mother females

Another side of the vagueness of generic sentences, which is taken as a major difference between these sentences and the quantified ones, is the so-called the Port-Royal Puzzle. This puzzle was first introduced in the Port-Royal Logic first published in 1662 (Arnauld 1964). Let us consider sentence (35).

(35) The Flemish are good painters. (Arnauld, 1964)

For the generic sentence (35) to be true there must be individuals in the restrictor who hold the property in the nuclear scope, and hence rendering the sentence true. The puzzle that a sentence like (35) presents can be verbalized as follows: ‘since the sentence in (35) is true in virtue of some Flemish individuals being good painters, the sentence in (36) should also be true since there have to be at least as many Flemish painters as there are Flemish good painters. In fact, it is evident that (36) is false, and this proves the discrepancy between generic sentences which are not monotonically increasing and explicitly quantified ones in which such a puzzling situation is not attained with any quantifier. Quantified sentences (37), unlike generic sentences, are monotonically increasing.

(36) a. Flemish are good painters. (does not entail) b. ? Flemish are painters.

(37) a. Most/All/Some Flemish are good painters. (entails) b. Most/All/Some Flemish are painters.

According to Arnauld (1964) such a sentence is to be understood as ‘ The Flemish painters are good painters’, and that attributing the property to the whole class of Flemish people renders the sentence false.

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In sum, although characterizing sentences and quantified sentences entertain the same tripartite quantificational structure, both phenomena are crucially different6. Quantified sentences appear to give a unique characterization to the quantifier that would in turn tell us the portion of individuals in the restrictor which holds the property in the scope. Generic sentences, however, do not behave in a similar fashion. The generic operator of a generic sentence, if any, could not be a null quantifier with a unique force; it has to be able to accommodate all the above vagueness and variability of truth conditions that generic sentences exhibit, (see section 6 for a discussion of the generic operator).