Global conflict and the UN Complex Peace Operations Model

As part of the ongoing developments in terms of UN peace missions, the concept of complex peace operations was also established. This term is used by the UN to denote the inclusion of peacebuilding mandates into peacekeeping operations. Prior to the emergence of the concept of „complex peace operations‟, „traditional‟ UN peacekeeping typically involved primarily military tasks, such as monitoring ceasefires and separating hostile forces (Cilliers and Mills, 1999:1). The UN‟s current Complex Peace Operations Model prescribes that peacekeepers deploy to do more than separating belligerents, but also to stabilise conflict between warring factions. As a rule, this entails separating warring factions, and assisting the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a ceasefire line (UN, 2004b:8).

Apart from monitoring ceasefire agreements and patrolling buffer zones, UN

mandates were expanded to include the organisation of elections, the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction.

The shift from traditional border-monitoring peacekeeping to more complex and multi-dimensional operations has entailed substantial civilian components, including experts in political affairs, law, civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian affairs, gender, child protection, elections, disarmament and demobilisation. The concept of peacebuilding is increasingly being considered as a tool to be used across the spectrum of conflict. This broadening of the concept implies a more fluid, non-linear interpretation of peacebuilding and suggests that peacebuilding can either accompany or immediately succeed military operations, accentuated its importance as a strategy to prevent violent conflicts in addition to preventing its re-occurrence and assisting with reconstruction in order to ensure sustainable development and security (Tschigri, 2003:2)

The first significant changes to the traditional peacekeeping model was observed during the UN‟s missions in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia when the UN authorised the use of force to protect humanitarian aid. However, the ultimate objective was still held to be the restoration of peace and the support to rebuild state infrastructures. This approach was applied in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Ivory Coast, Kosovo and East Timor, marking a new departure with „transitional administrations‟

(Pouligny, 2006:2). In all these cases, the objective was no longer to interpose between two states or two armies, but to assist the installation of the foundations necessary for the restoration of law and order in a given society.

However, whilst the Complex Peace Operations Model has gradually become incorporated into the UN‟s conflict management repertoire, its success rate remains limited. About 40% of countries emerging from conflict relapse into conflict and in Africa, this figure rises to 60% (UNDG/ECHA Working Group, 2004). Faced with these challenges, the then UNSG, Kofi Annan, commissioned the Brahimi Report with a view to reviewing the shortcomings of UN peace operations and to take practical recommendations to ensure their future success.

After reviewing the successes and failures of current and previous UN peace missions, the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000:1) offered clear advice about the minimum requirements for successful UN operations. These recommendations include aspects such as political support, a rapid deployment capacity and robust force structures, as well as a sound peacebuilding strategy. The Brahimi Report encouraged the UN to update its peacekeeping doctrine and strategies from primarily observing ceasefires to laying the foundations for peacebuilding (UN, 2000:1). It also emphasised the

need for a more integrated post-conflict peacebuilding strategy. The report prescribed that the revised strategies for peacekeeping and peacebuilding need to combine in the field to produce more effective complex peace operations (UN, 2000:2). Gueli et al (2006c:9) argues that by expanding the concept of peacekeeping beyond conventional military operations, the Brahimi Report gives some recognition to the underplayed role and untapped potential that initial development work can bring to address the causes of conflict and to prevent the recurrence of conflict.

As part of the transformation that took place in UN systems, following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report (UN, 2000), the UN made several structural changes to its organisational framework in order to play a more coordinated role in peacebuilding activities. In December 2005, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an inter-governmental body, which will convene representatives of the UN‟s major organs, financing institutions, troop contributors, the respective governments in question, as well as other stake-holders in order to improve on the coordination activities and the marshalling of resources for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives (UN, 2000).

The establishment of the PBC was based on the realisation that nearly 50% of countries in which the UN had intervened, had slid back into conflict within five years of signing the peace agreement. This phenomenon has primarily been ascribed to the lack of effective coordination of activities, the lack of sustained commitment, poor financing and funding gaps and poor coordination of peacebuilding activities (UN, 2004a:par 261–269).

The recommendation for the establishment of a PBC were first presented to the UN in the 2004 reports of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that was convened by the UNSG to assess the greatest threats to global insecurity. This Panel reported that the UN suffered a key institutional gap in specific areas in that the UN system was explicitly designed to avoid state collapse, as well as to assist war-torn societies in their transition from war to peace (UN, 2004a:par 261–269).

In the light of the latter, the PBC was established as an UN inter-governmental advisory body during the 2005 World Summit. The Summit Declaration called for the PBC to (UN, 2005a:24-25; UNSC, 2005:2-3):

bring together all actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacekeeping and recovery;

focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts for recovery from conflict;

support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the UN; and

develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

The PBC‟s role and resources are limited. A small staff and a small peacebuilding fund that is made up of voluntary contributions will support the activities of the PBC. The PBC will be tasked with addressing critical gaps, particularly after the signing of peace agreements, until long-term support is made available (UNSC, 2005:2-3; UN, 2005a:24-25). However, several issues regarding the working of the PBC are yet to be finalised. Still, the contribution of the PBC in terms of more effective coordination of peacebuilding activities will clearly contribute to greater success with peace missions in general and the establishment of the PBC is a clear indication that the UN is working towards more practical solutions for bringing peacebuilding closer to peacekeeping.

Despite significant changes to UN peace mission strategies that expand the concept of what was initially understood in terms of complex peace operations, Gueli et al (2006a:1) point out that, although this expansion heralds a significant change to the approach to UN peace missions, the changes to processes that have been instituted, have not been formalised to its required depth as yet. A crucial factor in effecting successful peace missions is the contribution of the civilian reconstruction sector.

However, very few UN-contributing states have paid sufficient attention to enhancing their civilian capacities in a systematic way. As a result, civilian experts, especially those involved in reconstruction, are in short supply during peace missions. As an example, only 19% of the total UN forces in the DRC in April 2006 were civilians – a very poor contribution if one considers that the UN mission intends to fast track the provision of social services and other reconstruction programmes in the course of 2006. During the same time, merely 12% of the UN mission in Côte d‟Ivoire (UNOCI) was civilian (Gueli et al, 2006b:81).

Gueli et al (2006c:7) also point out that, despite a general acceptance that the processes of peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be managed in a parallel fashion, the manner in which current UN Complex Peace Operations Model is operationalised is essentially still based on the premise that peacebuilding work is

generally not feasible during conditions of instability, and that long-term humanitarian, development and reconstruction efforts at this time would likely be wasted. As a result, peacebuilding will usually only commence, once the environment has been secured by peacekeepers.

In this respect, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under-UNSG for Peacekeeping once remarked: “We (the UN) have peacekeeping operations that succeed – only to lapse back into conflict. Successful operations, as it were, in which the patients dies”

(Guehenno, 2005:2). These comments are relevant to most developing countries in which cease-fires are only partially adhered to, peace efforts often fail and post-conflict societies often relapse into post-conflict. It is these challenges that prompted the re-evaluation of the systems, approaches and processes that are currently being utilised during peace missions.