Stalinism was a regime of terror, which by 1939 far outstripped either Nazism or fascism by the simple measurement of casualties caused among the people of its own country. At that date, in sheer destructive capacity, Stalin made Hitler look a mere beginner. Moreover, the main features of Stalinism were essentially inward-looking. The Soviet Union was a fortress of socialism in one country, fighting its own internal battles and building its own industrial base.
But despite these characteristics, the Soviet regime attracted powerful support outside its own frontiers. This sprang from faith: the conviction that the Soviet Union was the Workers’ Fatherland, and the home of the only successful proletarian revolution so far achieved. Many believed that communism was the best (or even the only) way forward for mankind, and during the 1930s Stalin became by common consent the leading communist. More, he was a father-figure, at once stern and reassuring.
This faith was fostered and directed by the disciplined organisation of the Communist International (Comintern). This body was set up in Moscow in 1919, and its Second Congress in 1920 laid down the Twenty-one Conditions which had to be accepted by all parties affiliated to it. A powerful form of central control was created; and the overriding duty of all communist parties was declared to be to protect existing socialist states – which meant in practice the Soviet Union, because no others emerged.
Through this combination of faith and organisation there emerged communist parties which followed whatever line of policy was laid down in Moscow, with effects which were felt across Europe and played no small part in the coming of the Second World War. In the 1920s and 1930s Comintern proclaimed that the main enemies of communism were the social democratic parties, often denounced as ‘social fascists’. In Germany, the communists pursued a tactical co-operation with the Nazis against the social democrats, and so indirectly helped Hitler come to power. Then in 1935 the Comintern line was changed to the formation of a Popular Front against fascism, and the social democrats became allies. In France, the Communist Party, after years of denouncing militar-ism and conscription, supported the two-year conscription law of 1935 after the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact. Later, the policy of the Popular Front and anti-fascism was itself overthrown after the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939. This reversal was a severe trial for many communists, but after a period of confusion and heart-searching, discipline usually
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prevailed, and the parties (though not all their members) fell into line behind the new policy.
The obedience that carried the communist parties through these drastic changes was reinforced, and the attraction of communism to outsiders was
Stalin: benevolent father-figure for communists and fellow-travellers.
Source: Bettman /Corbis
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strengthened, by many of the circumstances of the 1930s. The economic depression, with its attendant mass unemployment, seemed to demonstrate that capitalism was not only evil but also a failure. Over against the dire spectacle of capitalism in disarray stood the shining contrast of the Soviet Union, with its planned economy and a society where all worked together for the common good. Moreover, it appeared in the late 1930s that only the Soviet Union and the communists were really determined to oppose fascism. The Spanish Civil War (1936–39) threw this aspect of communist virtue into particular prominence, and increased the attraction of com-munism for all those who were inspired by the struggle of the Spanish Republicans against what appeared to be the massed forces of fascism.
Much the same was true with regard to general British and French policies towards Germany and Italy. If Chamberlain, Daladier and appeasement were the best that the parliamentary democracies could offer, then many turned (whether in hope or despair) to Stalin.
The Soviet Union thus drew on a substantial body of support outside its own borders. The hard core was made up of committed communists, dis-ciplined and determined, willing if need be to go underground, to betray their own countries, and even to die for the cause. Outside that core were the fellow-travellers and sympathisers, vitally important for propaganda purposes, because they seemed to offer independent endorsement of the Soviet regime. The prestige – and the gullibility – of western intellectuals were considerable assets to Stalin in his dealings with the outside world.
All this had far-reaching effects on international affairs. The Soviet government could rely on an organised body of support in every other European country to promote its interests. (It could also rely on certain well-placed individuals to provide valuable intelligence.) Equally, every other European government knew that a group of its own citizens owed its primary allegiance to a foreign state, and was working to overthrow the existing social and political order. Relations with the Soviet Union were thus bound to be difficult in themselves, and a contentious issue in domestic politics. Even when calculations of power politics made it expedient to form an alliance with the USSR (for example, the Franco-Soviet treaty of 1935), it could only be an uneasy partnership. Indeed, there were bound to be obstacles to any close relations with the Soviets. It was natural for European states, and especially the great imperial powers, Britain and France, to regard Soviet communism as their sworn enemy – for so it was.
From this fact of life some took the short step to the belief that the enemies of communism were your friends, and that fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were useful bulwarks against Soviet influence. Once this notion took root,
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it was hard to accept that the Nazi regime was itself a threat, nearer and more dangerous than the Soviet Union. Even when this threat was recognised, the background of hostility to the Soviets could not be instantly dispelled or ignored, but remained to hamper diplomacy – as was shown in the British and French negotiations for a Soviet alliance in the summer of 1939.
Ideological conflicts, and the presence of committed adherents of the Soviet system in all countries, therefore affected the foreign policies of almost every European state. How far did ideology affect the foreign policy of the Soviet Union itself?