Guiding the Fighting Capabilities

In document Strategic logic and ability: revisiting the Arab-Israeli wars (Page 157-169)

If any factor in the 1967 War was decisive, it was the supreme fighting capability of the IDF, especially compared to the Egyptian and other Arab capabilities.

Guiding fighting ability from the strategic perspective is composed of two tasks:

providing strategic assumptions about the mission on which operational capability

should be modelled, and overall guidance for the proportional military capability vis-à-vis the enemy. The strategic leadership may delegate much of the detail of the second role, albeit being politically responsible anyway, but its role in the first task is utterly indispensable.

150Gluska, The Israeli Military, pp.142-151. 151

Avi Shlaim, “Israel: Poor Little Samson” in Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim, The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins

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The only strategic guidance regarding the mission was manifested in the security concept, which the military was primarily responsible for developing during the 1950s and 1960s, as Allon has shown. The concept required building armed forces with a qualitative edge over the Arabs for deterrence and attaining decisive victory in battle if needed.

Strategic leadership provided the IDF with two other elements essential for its maturation; domestic facilitators and external aid. Shimon Perez was the father of structuring the domestic and external facilitators in his long-term post as the main official in the Ministry of Defence from 1953 to 1963. Domestically, the IDF was given a generous budget which rose from $141 million in 1957 to $458 million in 1966.152 It benefited as well from the economy and from human resources as the population increased due to immigration, and from industrial and educational developments in Israel during the period.

External facilitators meant major arms providers and platforms for training. During the 1950s and 1960s, France was the main arms provider as links were tightened before the 1956 war, and was also the godfather of Israel‟s nuclear project. However, later on de Gaulle did not share the same enthusiasm for enhancing relations.153 , From the early 1960s the US became involved in arms supplies to Israel, albeit indirectly through West Germany. With the multiplying of German reparations from 1962 and offers of huge arms deals to Israel, Arabs who kept strong ties with Bonn threatened to cut diplomatic relations or, as Nasser did, to legitimize Berlin (the capital of East Germany), so the US started to deal directly with Israeli arms dealers. Training opportunities existed in France, Britain, West Germany and the US as well. 154

152

Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, p. 157.

153 Detailed accounts of the French military connections were mentioned in Shimon Perez, Battling for Peace:

Memoirs (Phoenix, Arizona: Orion Press, 1995) pp. 134-165.

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For the IDF itself, the security concept was manifested in all fighting capability dimensions; doctrinal, human, organisational and material.

Doctrinal

Due to geopolitical, human and strategic necessities, Israeli military doctrine highlighted the necessity to achieve rapid battlefield decisiveness with low human cost while shifting the war towards enemy territory. This rapid and decisive victory would require early warnings from efficient intelligence, outstanding mobilization techniques and scale, attaining air supremacy for the air force to be used freely to assist tactical victory and slow the invading forces if needed, and “armoured fists” for mobile offensives.

After the 1956 War, the IDF concluded that its battlefield decisiveness could be achieved by relying on air power, armour -- mainly tanks – and to a lesser extent Special Forces. Under this general doctrinal concept, the services doctrines emerged. An Air Power doctrine grew under Ezer Weizman, who had previously been an RAF pilot, and reflected the need to attain air supremacy before using the air force for tactical support. This was in contrast to the era of strategic bombing, whether in the American version of hitting the vital centres of a war-fighting economy as proposed by Billy Mitchell, or the British idea of Trenchard‟s of “moral bombing” by attacking the soft belly of the state -- its population -- which had its origin in Douhet‟s theory.155 After Weizman had attended the British Staff College, he returned with the conviction that what the IAF was already doing was correct.156

In Arab theatres with less developed infrastructure, a highly motivated population and dictatorial regimes careless of human losses, strategic bombing would be less effective, and its price would be less acceptable to the nascent Israel. The centre of gravity, as the IDF saw it, was battlefield decisiveness and a time window for mobilization.

155

For more details: Philip Meilinger, Air Power Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass, 2003) pp. 36-64.

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Weizman planned meticulously for years for attacking Arab, especially Egyptian, air bases deep in enemy territory. He believed in the importance of complementary actions – and concluded that proper air reconnaissance, not only intelligence, and low-flying fighters accompanied by highly able interceptors would be needed.157 When Hawk air-defence platforms were purchased in 1962 from the US, he deliberately underestimated the air defence elements, fearing they would make the politicians reluctant to sanction pre-emptive air strikes on bases deep in enemy territory. He also lobbied, as did as his successor Mottie Hod, for integration of all air defence elements -- anti-aircraft rockets, guns and intercepting fighters -- under the air service. This only materialized in 1970.158

With the lessons of the 1956 War in mind, and re-orienting the strategic and operational contexts, the IDF came to believe in the supremacy of tanks to provide the fire and protection needed in mobile battles in the desert.159 After Suez, the armoured corps received the finest of IDF personnel; one of them was Israel Tal who became the organizer/philosopher of Israeli armoured forces in the 1960s.

Tal believed, again in contradiction with the worldwide consensus, in two pillars of armoured doctrine: armoured fists and heavily armoured tanks with strong firepower.160 After WWII, the main armoured logic was in favour of combined armoured/infantry formation, and rapid tanks with modest armour and firepower to increase battlefield mobility. Tal, in contrast, claimed that in an open desert theatre, the entrenched enemy infantry with anti-armour weapons posed little threat because of the poor means of concealment and the proportionately shorter range of anti-tank weapons in comparison to tank fire which reaches more than 2000 meters.161

157 Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings (New York: Macmillan, 1976) pp. 180- 190. 158

Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings, pp. 180- 190.

159 Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975), pp.186-188. 160

Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army , pp. 186-188; Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, pp.160-161.

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Tal also believed that what preserves ground mobility is the tank‟s sustainability in the face of enemy fire rather than its speed alone. Hence, two dramatic changes were accelerated. Firstly, the rapidly growing armoured formations became mostly tank formations and mechanized infantry became rudimentary. Secondly, the IDF depended on heavy tanks such as Pattons, M-48s, Centurions, and equipped many older versions with 150mm barrels (Super Sherman) for increased firepower.162 Although Tal‟s second assumption was totally true, his first assumption generally worked in the 1967 War, or this was at least the well-accepted convention. In reality, as Creveld indicated, a meticulous operational and tactical analysis of the war uncovers the weakness in Tal‟s concept. In the northern sector of Sinai, where the finest of armoured forces were concentrated, tank formations penetrated the weak and hasty defences in the Giradi Defile but were left unsupported until other forces joined after breaking down the whole defence line, an operation in which tactical air support proved to be the major factor.163

In the middle and most formidable defences at Umm-Qatef/Abu-Ageila, Sharon‟s

ugda did not wait for the morning to enable tactical air support to work; instead, he

used sophisticated and combined arms tactical techniques whereby Special Forces, mechanised infantry and tanks participated to overcome the Egyptian defences within 12 hours.

Yoffe‟s ugda performed well, penetrating an undefended theatre and then mounting a surprise attack on tank columns from the Egyptian armoured 4th division at night; afterwards, its main role was to reach the centre of the Sinai defiles in order to obstruct the retreating forces, which were in a miserable condition, with the assistance of the now freed air support.

Nevertheless, Tal‟s most effective role was reshaping tank formations into highly disciplined forces with a strong ethos, away from the lapsed mode of the IDF

162

Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p.189.

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inherited from Hagana‟s days, and to improve the quality of training, maintenance and control to the maximum. Tank crews were to be trained in all functions for better flexibility and readiness, and strict checks with log books were essential, including every item from the parade and uniform to maintenance and electronic utilities.164

The Israeli doctrine for ground forces was developed in the light of nullifying the Soviet doctrine which was studied carefully. Within the concept of three layers of well entrenched infantry defences, with the artillery fire zone in front and the tactical armoured reserves behind, the role of Special Forces was enhanced to disrupt the infantry and artillery constellation, mostly after the armoured spearhead.165Hence, the IDF expanded its Special Forces element. Starting with one brigade in 1956, by 1967 the IDF had 5 brigades and had transformed the Golani brigade into a diluted Special Forces (Ranger-like) brigade, at the expense of infantry, both dismounted and mechanised.

The expected downside of these doctrinal and structural biases was the neglect of other components in ground forces, notably the artillery and infantry. Sharon‟s ugda had the biggest composition of artillery in the IDF, and the payoff was high. At a higher strategic level, looking at air power and armoured fists as a panacea, without acknowledging either the strategic and operational conditions needed for them to work or their potential vulnerabilities, were a more difficult problem which took another six years to be realised.

Human

In terms of the human dimension, the IDF always believed in its qualitative supremacy in its command, soldiers, morale and training. No doubt this supremacy over Arab opponents was at its clearest in the 1967 War, to the extent that it was seen as immutable rather than contextual and open to change.

164

Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, p.161.

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Many strategists attributed a major part of the military victory in the 1967 War to the higher social parameters in Israel. These parameters, including literacy, innovation, national identity, and sophisticated social infrastructures, fed the IDF with far better recruits more compatible with modern warfare and its human and organisational needs, and this contrast was strongly apparent when comparing Israel to Arab societies during the 1960s. Social weaknesses within Israel, such as the rift between immigrants of different national backgrounds, the divisions between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, and ideological contradictions between maximalist Zionists and those concerned to make concessions to their neighbours were still in their infancy at this stage.166

However, adding to these generically superior social conditions in Israel, special modalities were followed in the IDF to enhance the human dimension.

The general theme in the IDF was to give priority to innovation, practical experience, and group morale rather than formal education and a bureaucratic mentality.167 This theme had huge payoffs but also showed inherent shortcomings.

No formal military academy existed as in other countries, but officer selection was based on a practical and complex approach. Conscripts who showed high qualities in passing both the company leaders‟ courses would undertake further officer courses. Hence, the new officers were generated from the bottom of the army, undertaking duties and acquiring skills on their way up, with more emphasis on strong relations between officers and soldiers and a strong ethos of informality and similar living conditions. These officers would rotate through different professions during their service and this would loosen the bureaucratic sense and increase flexibility.168

166

Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p.202.

167 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in

Military Affairs in Russia, US, and Israel (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies) p.120.

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IDF policy regarding promotion had a low threshold for redundancy and the retirement age was low. Officers were encouraged to study at civilian universities alongside their military service to establish another career to prepare for the early age of retirement. Around two-thirds of command officers were reservists, and the civilian input and multi-disciplinary mentality was very high.169All these measures proved themselves in creating an innovative and practical officer cadre rather than desk adherents, a more civilianized environment with better cohesion and communal trust, and a more flexible organization which were all needed for mobile warfare with changing conditions.

However, the consequent decentralisation, lack of a strong theoretical base and ethos, and informality would prove hazardous in the future although these problems did not manifest themselves during the 1967 War due to the weakness of the enemy.

The IDF adopted the Mission (optional) command system in which operational and tactical commanders were given mission objectives and left to their own resources to formulate and execute detailed plans and moves. Temporary command structures were set up to combine any amount of forces needed for a specific mission170. However, as Sloan indicated, to work in practice, the mission command system requires a well-disseminated doctrine.171 As this was not the case in the IDF, a degree of control was somehow applied. The military authority retained the capacity to follow up the tactical and operational events and decisions and intervene if needed. The military command did not rely only on their subordinates‟ decisions but had the facility to listen to their wireless communications. 172

169

Luttwak and Horowitz, pp.181-104

170 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British and Israeli Armies

(Redwood City: Stanford Security Studies, Stanford University Press, 2011).

171 Geoffrey Sloan, “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy, and the Generation of Fighting Power: Genesis

and Theory”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 88, Issue 2, March 2012.

172 Sloan, “Military Doctrine, Command Philosophy”; Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge Mass: Harvard

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This system of command was tried and improved many times before the war. One of the modifications ordered by Rabin after 1963 was to permit the tactical and operational commanders to always accompany their formations in command cars.173 This system was flexible and innovative and also increased the cohesion of small units and imposed a form of leading by virtue. However, the chaotic practice in the northern sector of Tal‟s ugda when one brigade lost its way in the desert and the other was delayed on its Gaza mission resulted from a lack of proper planning. The IDF was motivated by different aspects of national and religious ideas and aimed to even out the different ethnic and social backgrounds. It succeeded in this mission to a large extent until 1973 at least.

The sense of militarism and the idea of the “new” Jew (Sabra) that occupied the popular perception in the 1950s and 1960s, and the sense of impending extermination before the war brought the will to fight to a peak.174 The excellent mobilization was not manifested only in getting men into the army, but also in motivating them to fight. The strong officer-soldier relations, the civilianized corps, and command by example all helped to entrench this motivation.175

Organisational

The IDF kept its organisation flexible enough to accommodate the reservist-centred approach on one side and the dynamic security environment, even during peacetime, on the other. The IDF was divided into three services under the command of a Chief of General Staff, who also ruled over ground forces HQ. There were special departments under his command; quartermaster (organisation, acquisition and budgeting), manpower, operations and intelligence.

Ground forces were divided into three fronts; northern, central and southern. ugda, as a divisional formation, was used temporarily as a body for command in the 1956

173 Creveld, Command in War, pp.194-200. 174

Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, pp.124-125; Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, p.120.

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War but lacked a well formed administrative structure. Rabin managed to impose the maturation of the ugda system. But still, the smaller structures, brigades, battalions or even companies could be transferred easily to different formations or independent missions.

What differentiated the ugda from conventional divisions was that it was merely a functioning command for a task force with no organic elements attached to it; hence, it was very flexible for different formations and missions and devoid of the burden of controlling support elements.176 For example, some brigades under the southern command were used against the central front. Two brigades from Peled‟s ugda in the north were used centrally also, and then moved up to attack Golan on 9 June.

The IDF focused heavily on maintenance and logistics in training, control and war games. The familiarity of its recruits with technical matters helped in introducing strong discipline in checks and repair of equipment. Graduates in the technical and engineering sciences formed the basic skeleton for this service as no technical military school existed. As Horwitz and Luttwak showed, the IDF followed a “pushing” approach in applying logistics. In contrast to the classical “pulling” system in which advance units ask for supplies, in the pushing approach, supply materials were sent straight through the lines of operations until they were met in order not to slow the pace of operations.177

The real achievement in this area in the 1967 War was in air bases, where the highly professional and motivated maintenance teams were repeatedly able to get a plane returning from a sortie fixed and prepared to fly again in around 10 minutes.178

Material

The Israeli acquisition policy was highly efficient in two ways: firstly it reached the requirements of both the security concept in preserving a qualitative edge over the

176 Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p.176. 177

Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, p.175.

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combined Arab armies. It applied this doctrine by focusing on equipping the air power with tools for air supremacy and tactical support, and the armoured divisions with highly efficient medium-heavy tanks with greater firepower.

Secondly, in the face of budgetary and producers‟ restraints, the IDF had to select carefully and critically among available weaponry systems to achieve its strategic and operational requirements and to respond to tactical difficulties at the same time. As indicated in the doctrinal section, the IAF sought the most modern fighters available and chose to purchase French Mirage jets versions I-III and 40 US Skyhawks, although the latter did not arrive before the war. It also had older aircraft types such as light bombers Vougans, Ouragans, super Mysteres and Mysteres. The

In document Strategic logic and ability: revisiting the Arab-Israeli wars (Page 157-169)