Historical background

As I have already indicated, phenomenology is concerned with the lived experience of the individual or, as J. A. Smith, Flowers, and Larkin (2009) state, “a philosophical approach to the study of experience” (p. 11). There are a number of philosophers who have contributed to the development of phenomenology as a social science. These are now considered in relation to the specific contributions that they bring to the discipline and the influence these contributions made to my development of the methodology. The following section will discuss descriptive phenomenology in order to provide the context for the interpretive phenomenological approach that this study uses.

3.4.5.1 Descriptive phenomenology

Husserl (1859-1938)

It is well acknowledged that descriptive phenomenology was first recognised by Edmund Husserl as a robust methodological approach by which the human sciences may be investigated (Brooks, 2015). Husserl argued that human experiences can only be known and understood by exploration of the lived experience, or “lifeworld”. Husserl proffers that exploration of the experience revolves around “intentionality”: this is the melding of a conscious thinking about the exploration process and the object of consideration for that process (Sloan & Bowe, 2013; J. A. Smith et al., 2009; Spinelli, 2005). Husserl argues that conscious account of the experience from the individual experiencing the phenomena is critical to phenomenology, and suggests that the focus of the individual is on “what” is being perceived rather than “how” it is being perceived (Brooks, 2015). Husserl’s approach was for individuals to focus on and describe in detail the specific features of the experience – he called these features “essences” (Morrow, Rodriguez, & King, 2014) – and he believed that it was possible to isolate the distinctiveness of the experience, or phenomenon,

through detailed exploration of these “essences”, such that the researcher is able to “give voice” to the original experience itself, without interpretation.

Husserl also posited that any presuppositions that the researcher brings with them to the process of phenomenological inquiry should be intentionally put aside – or “bracketed” – so that a clear, neutral and unbiased view of the lived experience can be exposed. Finlay (2011) describes this bracketing as:

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“pushing aside our habitual ways of perceiving the world … [with the purpose being to exclude our] taken-for-granted assumptions, judgements and theories…” (p. 23). Husserl argues that this “putting aside” the taken-for-granted aspects of our world allows us to focus on our perceptions of the world (J. A. Smith et al., 2009), and he termed this phenomenological approach epoché.

Following epoché, the process of phenomenology was developed further to support the researcher through a sequential process of description and understanding. Langdridge (2007) reports that a comprehensive description of a lived experience is developed through a process of initially describing the experience, followed by horizontalisation of the

experience (treating all experiences equally, without hierarchy) to negate any

preconceptions, and then finally verification of the experience (revisiting of the text to postulate meaning). This iterative reduction of our preconceptions to remove them from our description of an experience and negate their impact allows us finally to focus on the

experience itself without interference and, thus, the essence of the experience can be explored in its native descriptive form.

The notion of putting aside assumptions and preconceptions is not a consistent belief of phenomenologists, and thus the descriptive methodological approach has been further developed. This development not only allows the recognition of assumptions and

preconceptions by the researcher but also permits detailed interpretation of the experience itself. This is interpretive phenomenology.

3.4.5.2 Interpretive (or hermeneutic) phenomenology

Heidegger (1889-1976)

Martin Heidegger was a student of Husserl’s, and he believed that it was neither entirely possible nor helpful to the process of understanding how experiences are perceived if the experience is divorced from the contextual world in which it sits. Brooks (2015) summarises that this maintenance of connection between “what” and “how” is important to explore “what it means to live in and among a world which is experienced by each individual in their own way” (p. 642), and thus our relation to the world is individually contextual and

interpretative. Heidegger (1927/1962) developed this theme of “dasein”, or being-in-the- world (Finlay, 2011), reflecting the notion that the person and the world are, together, one entity. This view of investigating human experience led to the recognition of hermeneutic or interpretive phenomenology as a distinct style of phenomenology. Furthermore, Heidegger’s phenomenological position explicitly allows for the phenomenologist’s interpretation to take

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into account their own assumptions (J. A. Smith et al., 2009) as it is believed to be impossible to divorce the body and the mind when investigating human experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962).

This research explores the feedback experience from the perspective of those experiencing it and thus interpretation, not merely description, of that feedback experience is necessary. It is important that I gain insight into the experience itself taking into account its relational context with the world. I do not wish to divorce the student’s experience of feedback from its situational context because the context may give rise to nuances associated with healthcare education that sets this study apart from research that investigates other disciplines. Without being able to explore the feedback experience from its authentic context, it is not possible to consider the data through the theoretical lens of communities of practice, and this is one aim of the study. Furthermore, my own experience as a clinician and educator adds depth to the lens through which this field is investigated, and this is a depth that I want to remain within the method. For these reasons, I chose to utilise an interpretive phenomenological approach.

3.4.5.3 Development of the lifeworld approach

The focus of the lifeworld approach to investigating lived experience (P. Ashworth, 2016) draws on two distinct facets already discussed earlier and recognised as important to broader phenomenological interpretation. Firstly, the lifeworld attitude towards

phenomenology recognises the importance of drawing on both aspects of intentionality so that both the “what” and the “how” of a given lived experience are studied simultaneously. Secondly, this approach dictates that a given lived experience, whilst it may be in context, cannot be considered in isolation but posits that it is studied in the context of broader lifeworld.

A specific contribution to interpretive phenomenology was made by Ashworth in his outline of the specific “fragments” (Finlay, 2011) that he believes are essential to the study of any lifeworld experience. He describes there being eight key fragments:

1. Self or selfhood: considers the identity of the person, agency and their voice. 2. Sociality: considers relationships with others.

3. Embodiment: considers the body, emotions and gender.

4. Temporality: considers times, duration, biography, past and future. 5. Spatiality: considers space, place and geography.

6. Project: considers links to other tasks. 7. Discourse: considers language.

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8. Mood-as-atmosphere: considers feelings that are woven into an experience. (P. Ashworth, 2016)

These defined fragments of any lifeworld experience offer a “firmer footing” to the

interpretation of lived experience as a human science (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, p. 137) and serve to offer more objectivity to subjective interpretation. This development of a lifeworld approach recognises the challenges, and often impossibilities, associated with adopting a transcendental phenomenological style by applying epoché (Langdridge, 2007). Instead, it recognises the context that wider social dimensions bring to a specific lived experience and permits the researcher to explore the experience holistically and with some presupposition.