The United States, plaintiff-appellee vs.
Pio, Tomas and Catalino Mercado, defendants-appellants
20 Phil. 127 (1913)
FACTS:
The defendants were charged of the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by preventing Claro Mercado in rendering aid to Maria Mateo by way of force and violence in order for the Santiago Mercado to maltreat Maria Mateo. After hearing the evidence adduced, the court found the defendants guilty of the crime charged. The defendants appealed that the trial court erred in overruling the objection of the accused on the Private Prosecutor’s question referring to character of the witness. Private Prosecutor asked the witness for the defense the said Santiago Mercado oft how many times he convicted and assaulted other persons. The defendant Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The court overruled that the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a witness can be impeached by the party against whom he has been called.
RULING:
A witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth honesty or integrity is bad. You cannot impeach the admissibility of a witness and you may show by an examination of the witness himself from the record of the judgment.
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ON IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS
An exception to the rule requiring the laying of foundation for the admissibility of evidence of inconsistent statements has been allowed in the case of dying declarations. Since they are admitted on the ground of necessity, proof of inconsistent or contradictory statements of the deceased may be admitted on the same ground without laying any foundation therefor.
Tommie Lou MOSLEY, appellant vs
Commonwealth of Kentucky, appellee
420 S.W.2d 679 1967
FACTS:
The accused was charge of rape against Geraldine. On the other hand, the accused raised the defense that the sexual intercourse was consensual. The accused presented Dr. Gay as his expert witness to impeach the credibility of the complainant. However the Court refused to permit the jury to consider the testimony of Dr. Gay. The accused was then convicted of rape.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court erred in refusing to take the testimony of Dr. Gay to impeach the credibility of the witness.
RULING:
YES. As supported by evidence Dr. Gay is an expert witness. In fact he was the attending physician of Geraldine. He was in charge of the treatment of Geraldine's mental disorder. He further stated that one of the manifestations of schizophrenic reaction is fantasies, which in Geraldine’s case, extend to the area of sex.
Since the Court merely relies upon the uncorroborated testimony of Geraldine, it is insufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused given that, had the testimony of Dr. Gay been admitted, the resolution of the case would have been different.
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OLIVER J. COLES, Defendant, vs
CHESTER A. HARSCH, Plaintiff,
129 Or. 11, 276 P. 248 (1929)
CASE SYNOPSIS
Appellant, a new husband, challenged the judgment of the Circuit Court, Multnomah County (Oregon), which was entered in favor of appellee, an ex-husband, in the amount of $ 17,500 in an action for malicious alienation of the ex-wife's affections by showing "improper attention" to her from 1923 through 1925 after the ex-wife divorced him, and then married the new husband.
CASE FACTS
A judgment was entered for the ex-husband in the amount of $ 17,550, and an appeal was taken.
DISCUSSION
• The court held that there was an insufficient foundation before attempting to impeach the principal witness as to an incident at Pudding River.
• However, the court stated that before one could find that a witness was untruthful, the attorney cross-examining the witness should have confronted the witness with the alleged statement accompanied by the identifying circumstances.
• The court further held that the trial court erred in permitting the ex-husband, over objection, to ask what the former wife had told him about her intention to return to Oregon.
• The ex-husband sought this information to catch the new husband in an untruth to a collateral matter.
• The trial court also erred in overruling the new husband's objection to allowing the ex-husband to read in evidence an affidavit signed by the new husband which averred the nonpresence in Oregon of his wife.
• Inquiries into the intricacies of the new husband's divorce action, after the agreement as to the new husband's matrimonial status, would import an unnecessary collateral issue.
CONCLUSION
The court reversed the trial court's judgment entered in favor of ex-husband.
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US vs. MEDICAL THERAPY SCIENCES, INC., AND STANLEY BERMAN
583 F.2d 36 (1978)
FACTS:
Stanley Berman, Defendant, and his company, Medical Therapy Sciences, was convicted of filing false Medicare claims. Defendant double billed for the same patients and charge for equipment and supplies either not needed or not delivered. Barbara Russell, a friend and employee of Defendant, testified for the government. Defendant contends that the prosecution should not have been allowed to call character witnesses for Russell. The government brought out prior convictions of Russell on direct examination arguing that they were anticipating impeachment by Defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the Government, in questioning Russell on direct as to her prior convictions, is impeaching its own witness, and if it is allowed to do so?
RULING:
YES. The Court of Appeals noted that the government is allowed to bring out the impeachment facts when it anticipates the defense will do as well. Further, it notes that it is important that the trial court maintain discretion to determine whether the witness’s veracity for truthfulness is being attached on cross-examination. The Government argues that the prosecutor was only anticipating defense impeachment, as it had the right to do, so that the jury would not gain the impression that the Government was attempting to hide information from them. The Supreme Court agrees. Rule 608 itself contains no limitation that precludes a party from offering character evidence under circumstances where it anticipates impeachment. Rather, the event that triggers the applicability of the Rule is an "attack" on the witness' veracity. Under the Federal Rules, a party may impeach his own witness. However, putting that witness' veracity in issue through eliciting impeaching facts should be distinguished from merely revealing the witness' background. Indeed, even in jurisdictions where a party may not discredit his own witness, it has been held that the fact of prior convictions may be brought out on direct examination for non0impeachment purposes. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge has the discretion to permit the use of character witnesses. His proximity to the situation allows him to make the determination of when, and by whom, an attack is made. Were the rule to be otherwise, a party would have to choose between revealing, on direct, the background of a witness and its right to use character evidence if the witness' veracity is subsequently impugned.
NEWTON, Petitioner, vs
STATE, Respondent,
127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
FACTS:
The plaintiff in error was tried upon an information charging that on or about the 22nd day of July 1921, he did “unlawfully have in his possession and under his control intoxicating liquor, to wit, about one gallon of whisky, with the wilful and unlawful intent” to sell the same.
The jury returned a verdict finding him guilty and leaving the punishment to the court. By the judgment of the court he was sentenced to be confined in the county jail for 60 days and to pay a fine of
$250.
Evidence shows that defendant lived on a farm owned by his brother, about 15 miles from Altus;
that on the date alleged, officers went to this farm with a search warrant; defendant having been arrested the day before on a charge of intoxication was in the county jail at Altus.
The deputy sheriff testified that he found a tin bucket containing about a gallon of corn whisky concealed among some sacks of wool in the barn, and there was about a half barrel of what he judged to be mash in a shed near the hog lot; that he found a tin boiler in the residence and a keg out in the yard, and the boiler appeared to have a dough on it, and he also found a hollow wire about two feet long and that similar copper wires are found in automobiles.
Against counsel for defendant’s objections the witness was permitted to testify that he had visited defendant’s place about two months before and found a still, and later again searched the place and found nothing.
Eaveret Mckingley was permitted to testify over the objections of defendant that as city marshal of Altus, he arrested the defendant on the 22nd day of July; that defendant was drunk, sitting in a buggy, and he found a bottle of whisky in the buggy. Said bottle and contents were introduced in evidence against the objection of defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the witness is admissible.
RULING:
No, we think this testimony was clearly inadmissible, because it had reference to separate and distinct offenses, clearly disconnected with the offense charged in the information on trial.
In our opinion the evidence objected to does not fall within any exception to the general rule.
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STATE V. OSWALT
62 Wn.2d 118 (1963)
FACTS:
Defendant appeals, upon a short record, from a conviction of robbery and first degree burglary.
During trial, a defense of alibi was introduced. Error is assigned to the admission of certain rebuttal testimony, defendant contending such evidence constituted impeachment on a collateral matter.
The short record before the court is the testimony of two witnesses which indicates that on July 14, 1961, two armed men entered the King County residence of Frank L. Goodell. One man stood guard over a number of people at the home. The other man took Mr. Goodell to a Tradewell store and forced him to open the safe and turn over the money therein. Defendant was identified as one of the two men.
In presenting his defense of alibi, defendant called a Mr. August Ardiss of Portland, Oregon. On direct examination Mr. Ardiss testified in substance that: he and his operated a restaurant in Portland; he was acquainted with the defendant, as a fairly regular patron of the restaurant; defendant was in the restaurant at such times on July 14, 1961, as to render it impossible, as a practical matter, for defendant to be in Seattle at the time of the offense charged; and he remembered this occasion because defendant had accompanied a restaurant employee to work, assisted in a part of her work, and escorted her home. On cross- examination, the police detective which is one of the witnesses, clearly identify that Mr. Oswalt
was there during the happening of the said crime. It is to the rebuttal testimony of the police detective that defendant assigns error. The state, in response, contends such testimony to be admissible not only because it challenges the credibility of witness Ardiss, but also establishes defendant's presence in Seattle preparatory to the offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a witness may be impeached on the ground that his testimonies were only a collateral matter in the present cause.
RULING:
No. It is a well-recognized and firmly established rule in this jurisdiction, and elsewhere, that a witness cannot be impeached upon matters collateral to the principal issues being tried. The purpose of the rule is basically two-fold: (1) avoidance of undue confusion of issues, and (2) prevention of unfair advantage over a witness unprepared to answer concerning matters unrelated or remote to the issues at hand.
In the instant case, the state's charge apparently rested upon an identification of the defendant by witnesses at the scene of the crime. The defense apparently rested upon alibi. The state seemingly considered the testimony of witness Ardiss sufficiently credible to require this attack. The defendant was convicted. It is difficult, therefore, to classify admission of the testimony in question trivial, formal, academic, or harmless, and to conclude that such did not affect the outcome of the case.
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