ii) EC support to civil society and local government

In document Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: Mozambique 1996-2000. 2000. (Page 51-55)

The EC has done much work through international NGOs in Mozambique. However, many EC evaluations in the sector (see Annex 1.2, p.A2) show that the rehabilitation programme lacked a clear strategy, was complex and fragmented, and that this affected its results and sustainability (including weak involvement of local communities). More recently, the EC, learning from its past experiences, has introduced the Rural Development Programme (innovative but very complex) and the Call for Proposals for support to NGOs through the Food Security Unit.

The EC is also working on an overarching strategy for cooperation with NGOs in Mozambique and is to launch a consultation with civil society (it will also prepare a study on Civil Society Dialogue). This is an important step in moving from a focus on NGOs to a focus on Mozambican civil society (particularly local communities).

Past EC support mostly through international NGOs, but without a clear strategy and with weak institutional results

Between 1993 and 1999, the EC approved 325 NGO projects, for a total value of € 142 million, using funds from 10 different budget lines as well as the EDF through Article 254, 255 and the NIP.81 Many of the serious weaknesses of the rehabilitation programme (see below) may in part be attributed precisely to the multiplicity of instruments that were used in

a tremendous challenge and… it is clear that it will need an extension provided their performance is good enough” EC Food Security Unit (2000a), p.21.


In particular, through Article 254 and 255 funds, and through budget-lines for rehabilitation in Southern Africa, rehabilitation in developing countries, co-financing of NGOs, and food security.

Donors’ weak links with civil society

While a number of important civil society organisations have begun to achieve a high profile in Mozambique (e.g. the Catholic Bishops Conference during the 1999 elections, and the Liga dos Direitos Humanos), donors have a relatively poor knowledge of civil society. Some donors, however, have supported political parties and the capacity of the National Parliament.

Local NGOs have also noted, in an October 1998 USAID partner retreat,that donors do not have direct contact with local NGOs. Moreover, local NGOs are dissatisfied with their dependence on international NGOs (which do not provide sufficient training for them). The World Bank has initiated a monthly dialogue with a number of NGOs. Similarly the FSU has established Technical Seminars with a number of NGOs. LINK (an NGO grouping) is also contributing to increase the communication among NGOs and between NGOs and donors and the Government.

Donors, including the EC, have also faced difficulties in achieving genuine beneficiary participation (EC 1999g, pp.36-37). This is both because most donors have a weak understanding of Mozambican civil society but also because many local NGOs do not have a close link to local communities. This is in part because of the centralist tradition, because of the limited accountability to local communities of authorities at both provincial and district levels, and because of the dependence of many NGOs on donors or the Government.

The Government has recently been trying to coordinate the activities of NGOs more closely, linking them to sector approaches and clarifying the legal framework (see, for example, Govt. of Mozambique 1999). The Government seems to be aiming to replace NGOs in the implementation of many social sector interventions. This is very different from the past where international NGOs had substantial autonomy. At the same time, however, it is Government policy to outsource certain activities to NGOs (e.g. in PROAGRI). Relations between the Government and local NGOs (and civil society in general) are still very weak. However, it is expected that the PARPA process will contribute to increase consultations.

order to finance the programme. As much as 85% of the programme was channelled through international NGOs, with only 15% through local NGOs.82

EC programmes through international NGOs have had limited impact in supporting local communities or local NGOs (see Annex 1.2, p.A2). Given its delays and administrative complications (e.g. arising also from the use of so many different instruments), the EC is, for NGOs, “often the donor of last resort”.83 This may limit the quality of the project proposals it attracts. Moreover, the focus of EC projects has in the past been on the immediate implementation of projects and physical results, rather than a more institutional approach looking at establishing more permanent links with local communities and looking at the sustainability of projects. Evaluations have reported low impact and sustainability of interventions in the rehabilitation programme.

The use of multiple instruments to work with NGOs in the past has resulted in separate support units. Given capacity constraints the NGO Unit has shifted from the implementation of the rehabilitation programme84 to a key role in the preparation of the RDP. At the moment both the NGO unit85 and a component of the FSU work with NGOs, and their documents describe a separation based on the support of consumption and non-consumption activities. A future more strategic support to civil society (and the new restructuring of the SCR) may require the EC to reconsider the relation between these units and to draw a clearer distinction between policy and implementation roles (see p.51).

Recent moves to a more strategic approach

The many evaluations of the rehabilitation programme have allowed the EC to learn from its past experience. This has already led to a more focused approach in support of civil society that includes the Rural Development Programme, a more strategic approach by the Food Security Unit to support NGOs (with Calls for Proposals) and by the careful work on developing a strategy for supporting civil society (see Annex 1.6, p.A7).

Rural Development Programme

The multiplicity of instruments used in support of the rehabilitation programme has been somewhat reduced and the NIP RDP programme ( € 30 million) concentrates a large part of the EC support to non-State actors.86 In designing the RDP, the EC has tried hard to learn from the lessons of the rehabilitation programme. In particular, a number of mechanisms have been introduced to link the NGO-implemented interventions to Government plans. Provincial directorates will be involved in project identification, and central line ministries will be involved through the Steering Committee which selects the winning proposals (on a restricted Call for Proposals). The RDP also includes a € 2 million component for strengthening district-level planning. Project design involved the participation of other donors.

There are many positive features in the design of this intervention (for an initial assessment, see Annex 1.5, p.A5), but many implementation details have not been decided. Given the complexity of this programme, success is likely to depend on the quality of implementation. It is important that the RDP is consistent with Government plans, but it is also important that

82 EC (1999g). 83 EC (2000a), p.8. 84

This involved making decisions on funding NGOs, but without clear selection criteria or operational independence from the Delegation and Headquarters (see Annex 1.2, p.A2). 85

The NGO unit has worked in the implementation of the rehabilitation programme and it is has recently worked on the design and preparation for implementation of the RDP.


The RDP consists of about 20 projects that would be implemented by NGOs selected by a restricted Call for Proposal (pre-selected by the PMU) on the decision of a Steering Committee (permanent members NAO, Delegation and Ministry of Agriculture).

it genuinely supports local communities. Some accountability of the PMU to local communities will therefore be important. The role in the RDP of provincial directorates and the PMU at district level does not fully ensure local accountability (see also capacity constraints). Transparency in the Call for Proposals is also important in this respect,87 as is the need to find modalities to allow the participation of small local NGOs (linked to local communities) and to match the absorption capacity of different sectors and regions.

The links of the RDP to central (and district) plans will depend on the progress of sector-wide approaches (which still have a high risk attached to them) and on capacity at provincial and district level (to ensure funding for recurrent expenditures), which is also an area of difficulty. The financing proposal expressed confidence that INDER would provide support for implementation at an inter-sectoral level, but the situation is now unclear with the integration of INDER into the Ministry of Agriculture.

There may be difficulties (given Government capacity constraints) in the integration of the RDP into sector-wide approaches and into the budgetary process. The work of the Steering Committee (in selecting proposals and monitoring the PMU) is critical, but it may over- stretch the capacity of both Government officials and the Delegation.88

The introduction of Calls for Proposals

The EC (through the work of the FSU and the NGO Unit) has tried to provide more strategic support to NGOs. In 1997 a first Call for Proposals was introduced for NGO project selection within the Food Security Programme (for projects beginning in late 1998).89 The Call for Proposals process increases transparency in the selection criteria and supports the spread of best practice among NGOs. Calls for proposals now require analysis of local partners and capacity-building measures. There have been considerable delays in the approval of proposals, but the process should reinforce EC support to local NGOs that have close links with local communities.90 Calls for proposals are also being introduced within the RDP and, from 2000, within the NGO Co-financing budget-line. The FSU has also increased its communication with NGOs and uses Technical Seminars supporting capacity-building.91

Towards a strategy for cooperation with NGOs but also a wider strategy on support to civil society

Evaluations have found that the EC has lacked an overarching strategy to work with NGOs. However, its wider support to civil society (community-based organisations, etc.) has had even less strategic orientation.

The EC is beginning to address these problems with the preparation of a discussion paper on a framework for cooperation with NGOs (see Annex 1.6, p.A7).92 This is an important exercise


The use of restricted Call for Proposals may not necessarily contribute to greater transparency. 88

For example, the fact that the RDP has a large component for education (justifiable on poverty grounds) requires the EC to increase its focus on the sector-wide approach in education, therefore spreading the EC staff resources to another sector.


The funding for these NGO projects (which was pooled from 1996, 1997 and 1998 budget- line allocations) was not included in any financial proposal that went to the Food Aid Committee (EC Food Security Unit 2000c, p.6). Funding for projects selected by a subsequent Call for Proposals, launched in September 1999, was included in the 1999 Food Security Programme financial proposal.


There is a risk, however, that weaker NGOs and proposals may be selected if there is not a sufficient number of NGO bids for effective competition for the funds available, since there is a limited number of NGOs that will be in a position to make proposals for specified types of projects at a given time.


Through the FSU, the EC has also since 1998 organised Technical Seminars with private companies and associations, international and local NGOs, public sector entities, and donors. 92

which shows serious analysis and a willingness to search for innovative modalities of support. It will contribute to the development of a strategy that is informed by lessons learnt from past EC support (and by the strategies of other donors, e.g. Netherlands). Aims of the exercise include bringing all funding instruments under a single EC strategy and increasing the links with sector-wide approaches.

The discussion paper also proposes a timetable for launching a wide ranging consultation with civil society in order to begin work on the civil society component of the new EC strategy (as per the Cotonou Agreement). This is an important exercise, given the relative weakness of donor support to Mozambican civil society (including watchdog NGOs and community-based organisations). As part of this process the EC is planning to prepare a study on civil society dialogue (perhaps jointly with other key donors). These efforts could be supported by other initiatives for consultations with civil society (e.g. PARPA).

B. Donor coordination

Donor coordination is particularly important in Mozambique. Public finance is highly dependent on donor funds, while instruments for coordination are weak. Donor interventions have a high profile within donors’ aid portfolios, and pressures to implement projects are high. Mozambique has followed 13 years of BWI programmes and it is currently in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process (and HIPC). In this context, while donors collaborate in working groups and sector wide approaches, there is intense donor competition and different donor strategies (e.g. shown by the non- transparent use of salary supplements to Government officials).

In the past, EC coordination has been poor but it has recently improved. The EC is now playing a key role in the discussion on salary supplements and in coordination in the agriculture sector (PROAGRI), and it has shown a willingness to work with other donors and to co-finance other donors’ projects in some sectors (e.g. private sector and elections). Coordination in structural adjustment and the roads sectors has been weak. However, coordination could improve with the work of some donors in developing a common approach to budget support. The EC is also focusing on ways to improve coordination in the road sector.

Weak Government coordination capacity impacts on donor programmes

The Government’s weak capacity for aid coordination significantly reduces the impact of donor programmes. The Government does not have a strong budget process that can provide a guide as to where donor resources are required. The Ministry of Planning and Finance does not have comprehensive information on donor programmes and there is no Government unit that ensures that donor assistance fits the Government’s expenditure plans. Decisions on foreign aid are made by an inter-ministerial committee, which takes more account of political than of technical factors. Different donors have different Government counterparts and these do not communicate effectively with each other.1 Many donors (including the EC) work with different units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the World Bank’s counterpart is the Bank of Mozambique and the IMF’s counterpart is the Ministry of Planning and Finance. The NAO for the EC is the vice-minister of Foreign Affairs. The NAO office is a special government unit only dealing with EC programmes.

1. For example, the approval of the GIP3 conditionalities by the Government would appear to have received limited feedback from the Ministry of Planning and Finance.

Donors have a number of coordination initiatives but competition is still

In document Evaluation of EC Country Strategy: Mozambique 1996-2000. 2000. (Page 51-55)