ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT PETITIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL ALLOWED JANUARY 2011 TERM

Sandholm v. Kuecker

405 Ill. App. 3d 835, 942 N.E.2d 544, 347 Ill. Dec. 341 (2d Dist. 2010) S. Ct. Docket No. 111443

Issue: Constitutionality of Citizen Participation Act

Whether a defamation action filed by a former high school basketball coach against various individuals is properly barred under The Citizen Participation Act. 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq.

Synopsis

The Citizen Participation Act is Illinois’ anti-SLAPP statute. 735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (“SLAPP” refers to Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation). In the typical SLAPP case, citizens petition their local government to stop a developer in some way. The developer then sues the citizens for intentional interference with prospective business. Eventually the developer’s lawsuit is thrown out, but in the process, the citizens are financially strained. In this case, a former high school basketball coach brought an action for defamation based on defendants’ criticism of his conduct. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss finding that the Citizen Participation Act provided them with immunity. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that the Act was unconstitutional. The defendants cross-appealed, claiming the trial court improperly limited the award of attorney fees.

Appellate Court Decision

The Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, rejecting plaintiff’s claim that the Act provided blanket immunity to defame others. The Appellate Court explained that the Act provides a qualified privilege and only protected those statements made in furtherance of the moving parties’ right of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.

Wisnasky-Bettorf v. Pierce

403 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 934 N.E.2d 623, 343 Ill. Dec. 299 (5th Dist. 2010) S. Ct. Docket No. 111253

Issue: Election Law

Whether an established political party must file a resolution pursuant to section 7-61 of the Illinois Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7-61) in order to fill a vacancy in a nomination when no candidate appeared on the primary ballot for that party and no write-in candidate was nominated.

Synopsis

Following a primary election, the petitioner, Wisnasky-Bettorf, was nominated by the Republican Party for the office of board of review member. No Republican Party candidate’s name was printed on the ballot and no candidate was nominated as a write-in for that office. An objection was made to the timeliness of the petitioner’s candidacy. The respondent requested that Wisnasky-Bettorf’s name not appear on the ballot because the resolution was not filed within three days of the primary election as required under section 7-61 of the Election Code. The St.

Clair County Electoral Board sustained the objection and removed the petitioner’s name from the ballot for the general election. The circuit court upheld that ruling, and the Appellate Court affirmed.

Appellate Court’s Decision

On appeal, the respondent argued that the 2010 amendment to section 7-61 of the Code demonstrated that the legislature intended to remove the three-day requirement. The Appellate

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Court disagreed, finding that, had the legislature intended to remove the three-day requirement it would have stated so in the amendment, but did not.

Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois

405 Ill. App. 3d 489, 937 N.E.2d 769, 344 Ill. Dec. 746 (3d Dist. 2010) S. Ct. Docket No. 111447

Issue: Sovereign Immunity

Where the State argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a case, but upon losing on its motion to dismiss, decides to file an offensive counterclaim instead of filing an interlocutory appeal, is the trial court vested with discretion over the case?

Synopsis

Township brought a quiet title action alleging ownership of parcel of property designated as a public square in plat recorded by the prior owners of the property. The State filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the State Lawsuit Immunity Act required that the lawsuit be brought in the court of claims, not the trial court. The trial court denied the motion, and the State responded by filing a counterclaim against the Township claiming that it was the owner of the land. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township and the State appealed.

Appellate Court Decision

The Appellate Court held that, even if it concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the claim against the State, the State’s counterclaim constituted an offensive action which vested the trial court with jurisdiction to determine the parties’ property rights as to the public square.

Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A.

404 Ill. App. 3d 543, 936 N.E.2d 181, 344 Ill. Dec. 39 (5th Dist. 2010) S. Ct. Docket Nos. 111286 and 111304

Issue: Statutory Interpretation – Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act Whether the trial court erred in dismissing enforcement action under the Act.

Synopsis

Plaintiff, a not-for-profit citizens group, filed a six-count complaint against ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A. and the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, seeking injunctive relief in the form of an order to cause Exxon to remove and properly dispose of slurried coal production waste allegedly leaching into the community drinking water supply. Plaintiff claimed that Exxon violated various provisions of the Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation Act and the Water Use Act of 1983. The trial court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, ruling that plaintiff could not challenge the issuance of a permit under section 8.05 of the Act.

Appellate Court Decision

The Appellate Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the plaintiff was challenging Exxon’s compliance with the permits, not the issuance of those permits. The Appellate Court noted that Exxon “wants us to ignore continued environmental violations simply because permits have been issued.” The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s enforcement actions. The court also disagreed that this is a matter that must be handled through the administrative process. The court also found that the trial court erred in dismissing the claim under the Water Use Act, finding that the Act specifically allows such enforcement actions.

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT PETITIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL ALLOWED