7. Case study: representation of minorities in the public sector
7.3 Equitable representation of non-majority communities as an EU
7.3.2 Implementation of the policy at the central level – burdened
Lack of transparency and party appropriation of the policy
The dominant assessment of a “success story” of the representation in the police, however, is not widely shared in relation to the overall project of equitable representation. My interlocutors highlighted that these were in essence
192
separate processes managed by different institutions – while the police reform was managed through the Ministry of Interior; the overall policy was implemented by the Secretariat for the implementation of the OFA at the central level in the Government. Since its establishment the latter has been headed by an Albanian vice prime minister in charge of the policy and was allocated funds for managing the hiring process for the purposes of equitable representation. The significance of the Secretariat in the hiring process was constantly emphasized during the interviews for this thesis. An EU official in Skopje called it “the biggest employment agency in the country with approximately 300-400 employments per year. The Employment Agency can’t do what this Secretariat is doing.”193 The figures reflect this progress, as a briefing paper from a local think tank has recently highlighted that data from the Central Registry of Civil Servants depict a commendable increase in the number of ethnic Albanians in the civil service from 5.61% in 2004 to 24.18% in 2012 (Risteska, 2012).
Despite this statistical increase, the policy at the same time has been criticized for the lack of transparency in its implementation and neglecting the needs of the smaller communities. In terms of the former, the lack of reliable information on the number and nature of employments has been of primary significance. In a commentary on the effective participation of minorities in the public life, the Advisory Committee of the CoE highlighted that “comprehensive data and statistics are crucial to evaluate the impact of recruitment, promotion and other related practices on minority participation in public services. They are instrumental to devise adequate legislative and policy measures to address the shortcomings identified” (CoE, 2008). The national government in 2007 had already highlighted that “the adopted Strategy *...+ envisages the possibility for setting up a state authority in charge for processing data on the employees in the public sector. Presumably the State Statistical Office will be in charge” (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2007b p.29).
In addition, a significant number of employees hired for the purposes of the equitable representation policy have been paid from the state budget, while not working in practice. The media reported on this phenomenon extensively and in 2009, the Vice Prime Minister responsible for these recruitments recognised the problem (Trajkovska, 2009). In my interviews it was estimated that around 1,000 people have been hired to boost statistics, and are paid from the state
193
Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 2011.
budget, but are not formally working. A report of the International crisis Group in 2010 highlighted that “hiring ethnic Albanians also risks becoming a box ticking exercise in which many new employees have no clearly defined job description, office or equipment” (ICG, 2011 emphasis added). In addition, the Brussels correspondent for Macedonia has argued that the European condition for equitable representation has been turned into a farce (Jovanovska, 2009). The problem has also been recognised by the European Commission underlining that “a large number of newly recruited civil servants received salaries, even though they were not assigned any tasks or responsibilities” (EC, 2011c p.20). Recently, the Committee of Ministers in its Resolution on the FCNM implementation warned that the manner in which this policy is implemented
does not help to increase the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in the public sector [... and...] could have a negative impact on the quality and consistency of services provided by the civil service and foster resentment in society (CoE, 2012).
Furthermore, the Secretariat, as the responsible institution for this policy has been headed by Albanian political parties in power enforcing party membership as an additional criterion for these recruitments. A University professor interviewed for this research explained that Albanians who are not members of the ruling Albanian party could not get into the administration.194 Bieber has argued that the dominance of political parties in the interethnic relations marginalizes any non-party based interests, and also results in party, rather than ethnic representation, ultimately leading to inter-ethnic discrimination (Bieber, 2008b). The party-based appointments in the civil service have been a general feature of the development of the Macedonian state and of the Western Balkans in general. As a result, in 2010 the Ombudsman concluded that while discrimination is practiced on the basis of gender, national, religious and political orientation, the last one is the most prevalent and difficult (Ombudsman, 2010). In response, in its latest priorities and benchmarks to the Government, the European Commission has recommended “systemic co- ordination [which] should ensure that the Programme does not favour principle of equal representation, over the principle of merit based recruitment and that it will respond to real staffing needs identified by the respective administrative bodies” (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2011a p.5).
194
Author’s interview with University professor and former governmental minister, Skopje, 22 February 2011.
The problems accompanying the policy on the ground have been mirrored in the delays in reporting on the implementation of the Strategy as highlighted by national and EU interviewees.195 Solely conducted on the basis of statistical increase in employment at the central level, the reporting on the Strategy has not been accompanied by a thorough assessment of its impact. In any case, “the EU assesses the success in relation to minorities through numbers and mainly through employments", highlighted a senior civil servant. 196 An official directly working on this issue also mentioned that “for years there have been no sanctions against the state bodies which do not respect the equal representation principle”.197 Lastly, criticism was put on the requirement to complete targets within a short period of time. An official working on the issue stated that “they (read: the EU) put pressure on the Government and later they stepped back and required a merit based approach – it is impossible to bring about such results in just two years”.198 A representative of the Commission, on the other hand, argued that “we (i.e. the Commission) have been waiting for a report on the measures taken for years, however, have not received one, despite the high numbers of formally employed members of the communities”.199
Thus, the manner in which the policy has been implemented contradicts the objective for creating a strong and functioning bureaucracy, which has been another aspect of EU conditionality, more recently included in the context of EU accession. The 2009 report of the SIGMA/OECD explains that “this well-intended tool, developed for putting into practice the principle of equal representation of the various minorities, quite often enters into contradiction with the merit system, because it provides additional room for partisan-influenced recruitment” (SIGMA, 2009 p.2). The 2012 Progress Report underlined that “respect for the principle of merit-based recruitment together with the principle of equitable representation needs to be ensured” (EC, 2012b p.10). At the same time, the EU in its dialogue with Macedonia established a separate working committee on the
195
Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, Skopje, 23 December 2010, Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 2011.
196
Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 07 March 2011.
197
Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European affairs, Skopje, 23 December 2010.
198 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 07 March 2011.
199
Author’s interview with civil servant from the Delegation of the European Commission in Skopje, 27 January 2011
reform of the public administration in which these issues were being discussed; however “in practice there has not been a major breakthrough in terms of reconciling the two objectives”. 200
European officials interviewed for this study agreed that “the pressure for equitable representation had been instrumentalised in the domestic context, but underlined that the manner of implementation was dependent on the national authorities”.201 OSCE employees who are highly involved in this issue were critical of the implementation of this policy, still recognising that “the institutional system which has been put in place cannot be stopped immediately”.202 National officials, on the other hand, linked the problems to the European Commission’s requirements for statistical increase in the representation. It was argued that “there is abuse of conditionality in this specific policy area”.203 The policy which before 2005 contributed to getting a positive avis has been misused and has had negative by-products such as excessive hiring based on party affiliation.204 Overall, all the stakeholders recognised the problem, however, the European Commission and the national officials mutually found the other side responsible for the perpetuation of this policy.
The differences in the understanding of the policy escalated in 2011 when the European Commission assessed in its report for the first time that the overall number of civil servants from the non-majority ethnic communities matches the demographic structure, however “the trend of recruiting employees from these communities on a quantitative basis without regard to the real needs of the institutions continued” (EC, 2011c p.10).The recognition at the EU level of the largely completed process of equitable representation in the Progress report of 2011 stirred a lot of debate at the national level, since the policy could no longer be interpreted as a requirement for EU accession. The Vice Prime Minister responsible of the policy dismissed the data from the EU and announced new employments as part of the equitable representation policy (Popovska and Trajkovska, 2011). Similarly, the activities for the fulfilment of this policy have
200
Author’s interview with civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, Skopje, 23 December 2010.
201
Author’s interview with Commission official, Brussels, 11 October 2010. 202
Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, 19 January 2011. 203 Author’s interview with senior civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, 07 March 2011.
204
Author’s interview with high level civil servant from the Secretariat for European Affairs, Skopje, 22 December 2010.
remained part of the NPAA in 2012 and the policy is interpreted in the light of the EU accession process (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2012).
Although in 2011 the Commission determined that the number of civil servants matches the demographic structure, because of the evident discontent among the Albanian ruling parties, the assessment in 2012 was toned down. In 2012, the Commission noted that “the overall proportion of civil servants from non-majority communities is satisfactory”, underlining that there is a problem in distribution among ministries and at various levels in the civil service (EC, 2012b p.17). At the same time, in July 2012, the Committee of Ministers on the implementation of the FCNM assessed that “persons belonging to the Albanian, Bosniak, Serb, Turkish, Vlach and Roma minorities are still underrepresented” (CoE, 2012 ). In this sense, the differing assessments between the EU and the CoE on the same issue further create space for various interpretations of the conditionality at the local level which has been the case with this policy.
Neglecting the smaller communities
The second major shortcoming of the implementation of this policy comes from the lack of attention to the smaller communities in Macedonia. A 2012 policy brief of a local think tank analysing this policy put forward the following numbers: the Turks and the Roma who represent 3.85% and 2.66 % of the population participate with 1.49% or 0.64% in the civil service respectively (Risteska, 2012). In the Progress Reports, the European Commission highlights that the representation of the smaller communities, particularly the Turks and Roma, in the civil service still remains low (EC, 2010b). In response to this problem and upon pressure from minority MPs in 2008, the Government established an Agency for protection of the rights of the smaller communities. The Agency was not recommended in European Commission documents and Commission officials argued that it was not an element of EU conditionality, however, after its establishment it became a regular element of the national reporting on the EU affairs (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009a). The origin of the policy and its introduction in the EU accession process are similar as the case of the law on languages examined in the previous chapter, illustrating the domestic origins of policies which later become part of EU conditionality.
To illustrate this discrepancy, an EU official highlighted that: “the European Commission did not recommend the setting up of a new Agency, but that the current structures needed to change in their mode of work and take the
smaller communities into consideration”.205 At the same time, the interviewed employees of the Agency considered that “the institution was set up in response to EU recommendations”.206 Hence, at the national level the activities of the Agency have become part of the NPAA and activities undertaken for EU accession (Government of the Republic of Macedonia, 2011b). The European Commission officials explained this development as “using the Commission’s remarks for populist goals. The appearance of the Agency can be seen partly as a result of the commitment to the EU, but it was not in the spirit of the recommendation”.207
The functioning of this institution has generally been wrought with difficulties, as it “does not have a clear mandate or competences”.208 In addition, its operation was delayed extensively by the lack of funds, late appointment of the director and staff. An OSCE official working on a feasibility study of the Agency for smaller communities has concluded that “it is clear it has not been strengthened enough to become really relevant in terms of staff or budget or clear mandate, as it does not have enough funding or human resources.”209 Similarly, in the 2011 report, the Commission highlights that “due to an unclear mandate and significant reduction of the budget in 2011, the Agency is unable to accomplish most of its tasks defined by the law” (EC, 2011c p.20). The weakness of this institution is specifically evident in the implementation of the equitable representation policy, as the Agency legally has no say in the employment procedures for this purpose. An official from the Agency highlighted that “on meetings with the Secretariat210 we insisted to at least conduct monitoring in the committees for employment – we thought that they should allow this although according to the Law they do not have such an obligation”.211 This requirement was however, not fulfilled. In the 2011 Progress report an improvement was noted since “in 2010 there was a 46% increase of members of Roma and a 12% increase in the Turkish community. However, more efforts are needed in order to
205
Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 2011.
206
Author’s interview with an official of the Agency for the protection of the rights of the smaller communities, Skopje, 17 January 2011.
207
Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 2011.
208
Author’s interview with European Commission official, Skopje, 21 January 2011, Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, 19 January 2011 209 Author’s interview with OSCE representative, Skopje, 19 January 2011. 210
Meaning Secretariat for implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. 211
Author’s interview with an official of the Agency for the protection of the rights of the smaller communities, Skopje, 17 January 2011.
improve the quality of the recruitment process” (EC, 2011c p.20). Still, the numbers remain miniscule, which has led a local think tank to conclude the implementation of this principle had important long-term impact on the civil service that resulted in injustice and inequality (Risteska, 2012).
The weak progress in the employments of the smaller communities stands in sharp contrast with the progress in terms of the Albanian community. Most of my interlocutors concluded that the EU and consequently the national authorities did not express any continued interest in realising this policy for the non-Albanian community. While the European Commission mentions the underrepresentation of the smaller communities, most of the interviewees highlighted there was no increased involvement of the EU on this issue in addition to the reference in the reports. Similarly, the Agency officials argued that “the EU Delegation conducts solely monitoring of our work and we do not see more interest from them, although we hope in the future things will change”.212 Generally, at the national level, both national officials and representatives of CSOs underlined that the EU has not put increasing pressure despite the evident “appropriation of this policy by the Albanian community”.213 There was a widespread opinion that while the Commission considered the employment of this community as a priority, the other communities were neglected.
Overall, the analysis of the role EU conditionality has played in the equitable representation policy in Macedonia points to a set of divergent conclusions. The study of the EU documents and the interviews indicates that this issue was at the forefront of EU conditionality and was also supported by EU funds and assistance. At the same time, the Government responded formally with Action Plans and employment of non-majority communities (primarily Albanian). Even though with these results, the role of EU conditionality in supporting the domestic policy makers in this field could be considered as positive, on a substantive level the policy has been accompanied by numerous problems. The domestic actors and the interaction with the context resulted in mixed results of the policy and highlighted the need for re-examination of the methods of its implementation. Moreover, the strict benchmarking in relation to the equitable representation in the police brought about effective implementation in this
212 Author’s interview with an official of the Agency for the protection of the rights of the smaller communities, Skopje, 17 January 2011.
213
Author’s interviews with civil servant from the Ministry of Justice, Skopje, 18 January 2011.
specific sector. At a more general level, although there was no major domestic opposition to equitable representation, the policy was not put into practice as expected. The employment in many cases has been only on paper, violating merit principles and disregarding the needs of the smaller communities. Subsequently, it has become a subject of increasing criticism from both European and national officials and administration. In the last report, the European Commission stated that: the recruitment procedure remains vulnerable to undue political influence (EC, 2011c p.10).
This example confirms the findings in literature over the potential of the EU conditionality to facilitate policies which can lead to polarisation at the local level. In addition, it sheds light on the conflict between the objective of achieving representation in the administration and the merit principle also supported by the EU conditionality. These conflicting objectives also raise concerns over the dynamic relationship between Europeanisation by conditionality and democratic consolidation. In this direction, similarly, Przeworski (1995) highlights that in the absence of a usable bureaucracy, the state is unable to implement either economic or political reforms. As such, the functioning administration becomes a condition for democratic consolidation as well as an element of EU conditionality, which is being undermined by the local usage of the set of conditions related to the representation of minorities in the administration. As such this example confirms the potential for retrenchment through Europeanisation, as one of the outcomes of this process identified by Radaelli (2000). Lastly, the analysis highlights the need to consider the EU conditionality in light of the domestic