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A substantial body of research on attributions has examined the notion of bias as it relates to intergroup attributions and attribution errors. The literature indicates that in- group biases are ubiquitous; even when people are arbitrarily divided into generic groups based on trivial criteria they tend to favor their own in-group (Chatman & von Hippel,

31 2001). ―The evaluation of one‘s own group is determined with reference to specific other groups through social comparison in terms of value-laden attributes and characteristics‖ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). People tend to interpret the behavior of in-group

members as more favorable, while out-group behavior is attributed to negative internal dispositions and important situational factors are ignored; the reverse is the case in attributing the causes of less desirable behavior (Tygart, 2000). Mass et al. (1995) even found evidence of a linguistic intergroup bias that pervades languages. The researchers note that a good behavior is described as a general disposition for an in-group person, but the same behavior by the out-group is considered an isolated incident (Mass et al., 1995).

One mechanism that has been used to explain biased attributions across groups is ‗intergroup attribution.‘ Intergroup attribution refers to the ways that individuals, as members of salient social categories, explain the behavior or conditions of in-group and out-group members (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). As Gaertner and Dovidio (2005, p. 618) note, ―This mere classification of people into the in-group and out-groups is sufficient to initiate bias.‖ Research shows that attributions at the group level are often ethnocentric and group-serving, as individuals tend to favor members of their own group rather than members of out-groups. This bias, labeled the ultimate attribution error (or group attribution error), has been replicated in a variety of contexts over the past three decades (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1979; Allison & Messick, 1985; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974; see also Hewstone, 1990, and Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). The ultimate attribution error holds that people attribute positive in-group and negative out-group behaviors or events to dispositional causes, but attribute negative in-group and

32 positive out-group behaviors or events to situational causes. As a consequence of the ultimate attribution error, people can maintain their in-group favoritism even in the face of inconsistent evidence (Chatman & von Hippel, 2001).

Scholars have theorized about the functions of the ultimate attribution error, in terms of both in-group benefits and negative social consequences. Research has outlined two potentially distinct in-group benefits derived from this type of bias: 1) attributing in- group negative occurrences and out-group positive occurrences to external causes may function to preserve or protect group self-esteem, and 2) making internal causal

attributions for in-group positive occurrences and out-group negative occurrences may promote or enhance group-esteem (Weber, 1994; Hewstone, 1990). Pettigrew (1979) and others have also suggested that the ultimate attribution error plays an important role in the maintenance of stereotypes and prejudice (for a review, see Hewstone, 1990). As Tygart (2000, p. 262) explains, ―The European theories of prejudices and intergroup behavior have focused on the in-group principle,‖ especially with regard to group-serving biases.

According to both theory and empirical research, people make use of

stereotyping, group categorization, and other simplifying techniques in order to navigate their complex social environments (Tajfel, 1981, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A significant consequence of these cognitive processes is discrimination against perceived out-groups (Tajfel, 1970). A growing body of research reveals that under certain

conditions, group-based stereotypes may be activated quite automatically in the presence of group-relevant stimuli (Devine, 1989; Perdue et al., 1990; Kawakami, Dion, &

33 people are grouped based on naturally occurring social category memberships, such as race and ethnicity, a variety of implicit and explicit biases emerge that favor in-groups over out-groups (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Chatman & von Hippel, 2001).

The role of ultimate attribution error in exacerbating racial stereotypes and prejudice remains a paramount concern raised by the attribution literature. Across various contexts, race has been shown to be an identifying factor of out-groups that can vividly stimulate the attention of other groups (Tygart, 2000). One study of White college students found that situational or external attributions were preferred to explain the actions of a ‗harm-doer‘ when the target was described as White; conversely, White participants tended to make dispositional or internal attributions when the target was described as African American (Duncan, 1976). Similarly, another study found that White participants made more dispositional than situational attributions for a high- achieving White target and a low-achieving African American target (Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge, 1993). White participants in the study also made more situational than dispositional attributions for a low-achieving White target and a high-achieving African American target.

Although research by Duncan (1976) and Jackson et al. (1993) has examined race-related attribution effects using a sample of only White respondents, studies involving samples of diverse racial backgrounds have also found similar results. For example, Stephan (1977) examined attributions across three racial groups (Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Whites) and found that in-group members made more dispositional attributions to positive behaviors and fewer dispositional attributions

34 to negative behaviors than out-group members; the study revealed that the strongest intergroup attribution occurred among Mexican Americans and Whites. In addition, Chatman and von Hippel (2001) examined attributions among African Americans and Whites, and found that both racial groups were subject to in-group biases in their causal attributions, and these attributions at least partially accounted for biased evaluations of in-group and out-group individuals.