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Chapter 1: Green Politics and The Value Identity Thesis

1.1. The Distinctiveness of Green Politics

1.1.3. Interpreting the Social Bases

A lthough the findings reveal substantial convergence regarding the social characteristics of green su p p o rt, they p resent a n u m ber of problem s of in terp retatio n u n d er stan d ard social-structural explanatory fram ew orks. N one of the key variables of age, ed u catio n and location w ithin the professional m iddle class had previously played large explanatory roles in political sociology, w hile the variables th at h ad d o m in ated political sociology, such as class, ethnicity and relig io u s affiliation, w ere of tan g en tial significance to the stu d y of social m ovem ent participation. M em bership of a specific class, ethnic or religious category could be easily linked to the notion of interest, as attitu d in al and voting preferences of these categories could be interpreted as expressions of the interests of that category. The variables associated w ith m ovem ent participation did not easily lend them selves to interest-based accounts.

Some com m entators on the G erm an Greens have attem pted to interpret the findings relatin g to age and ed u catio n as evidence of a form of interest-based determ ination of green support. The analyses of Jens Alber and W ilhelm Biirklin focused u p o n the su b sta n tia l levels of green su p p o rt from social categories not in paid em ploym ent. Alber described the typical Green su pporter in the early 1980s as young, highly educated and u n em p lo y ed , as the lab o u r m ark et w as not able to absorb the increased nu m b ers of g rad u a tes w hich h ad been fuelled by rap id ly expanding higher education and the baby-boom generation (Alber 1989). A ccording to Biirklin, this oversupply created a significant category of voters w ho were not adequately 'socially integrated' and this lack of social integration accounted for their anti-establishm ent political orientations (Biirklin 1987). Alber contends that green party su p p o rt should be treated

6 Interestingly, 19% of members identified themselves as self-employed, compared to 10% of the population (Rüdig, Bennie & Franklin 1991: 27). Although the study does not provide details of the scope of this category, it is likely that in includes occupations such as cottage craft production and self-sufficient farming.

as a tem p o rary phenom enon, a 'phase-specific constellation of factors (that) has resu lted in cohorts g rad u atin g from u n iv ersity w ith blocked mobility chances, becom ing a negatively privileged acquisition class' (1989: 200).

Both authors have been criticised for ignoring contradictory indications from their ow n evidence, in p articu lar their failure to deal w ith the substantial and increasing proportions of green su p p o rters w ho were in paid em ploym ent (Kitschelt 1988; P apadakis 1988). Papadakis (1988: 446) also notes, w ith reg ard to Alber, th at a higher p ro p o rtio n of G erm an Green su p p o rte rs w ere em ployed than C hristian D em ocrat and Social D em ocrat supporters. A part from these w eaknesses, Alber and Bürklin also neglected the concurrent em ergence of green constituencies beyond W est G erm an y w h ere the lab o u r m ark e t co n d itio n s w ere n o t so unfavourable for the young tertiary educated.

An alternative basis for interest derived accounts of green politics shifts the focus to the specific location of green su p p o rt w ithin the paid labour force. These interpretations contend that green politics reflects the specific interests of an occupational or class category. Initially, som e M arxian w riters c h arac terise d e n v iro n m e n ta lism in term s of m id d le class protection of class privilege in universalist guise (Enzensberger 1974). H ow ever, as Robyn Eckersley points out, such critiques ignored the crucial d istin c tio n s w ith in th e m id d le class (E ckersley 1989: 210). M ore commonly, it has been the concentration of public sector em ploym ent that has attracted variations of class interest argum ents. Rolf G erritsen, for exam ple, argues that the increased influence of environm entalism in the public policy arena facilitates redistribution of occupational pow er and the expansion of em ploym ent opportunities for m em bers of the new m iddle class (Gerritsen 1990). This argum ent resonates w ith earlier discussions of the 'N ew Class' (Bruce-Briggs 1979) or the 'professional m anagerial class' (Ehrenreich & E hrenreich 1979) in w hich the interests of public sector em ployees in p ro fessio n al service o ccu p atio n s w ere lin k ed to the m aintenance and expansion of the know ledge-based welfare state.

H ow ever, these accounts th at a ttem p t to link p a rticip a tio n in green politics w ith occupationally defined interest are som ew hat problem atic

in te rp re ta tio n s. G oul A n d ersen is critical of the new class in terest argum ent, noting the tenuous connections betw een the issues articulated by the e n v iro n m en tal m ov em en t an d the vag u ely d efin ed in terests a ttrib u te d to the new class (G oul A n d e rse n 1990a: 103). O th er com m entators have sim ilarly pointed out th at the claim s m ade by new social m ovem ent participants are not claims m ade on behalf of the new m iddle class. Any elem ent of p articu larism in green politics involves claims m ade on behalf of other categories, w hich bear little relation to identifiable new m iddle class interests (Eder 1985; Offe 1985). In fact, m any green political claim s fit very uncom fortably w ith the interest-based argum ent. As Philip Lowe and W olfgang Riidig observe.

The demands of radical political ecology for fundamental changes in industrial society do not accord with this model. The financing of the welfare state is dependent on continued economic growth - why should it be in the interests of those who work within it to demand the end of economic growth and a halt to major technological projects? (Lowe & Rüdig 1986: 522).

Robyn Eckersley extends this p o in t to su g g est th a t in term s of the definition of interest offered by the class interest hypothesis, the core participants in the green m ovem ent are well aw are th at th ro u g h their actions and dem ands they are 'quite deliberately seeking to "bite the hand that feeds them ’" (Eckersley 1989: 222).

C ontrary to the above analyses that stipulate that the new m iddle class is well placed to p u rsu e its interests, C otgrove and D uff claim th at the political m arginality of green politics reflects a peripheral location in the occupational structure.

environmentalism is an expression of the interests of those whose class position in the non-productive sector locates them at the periphery of the institutions and processes of industrial capitalist societies. Hence, their concern to win greater participation and influence and thus to strengthen the political role of their members (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 341).

This m arg in ality is reflected in the alienation from decision-m aking e x p e r ie n c e d by e m p lo y e e s in th e n o n - p r o d u c tiv e s e c to r. E n vironm entalists' in terests, according to C otgrove and Duff, lie in challenging the dom inance of the industrialist interests that occupy the

central economic and political locations. In a sim ilar vein, Claus Offe has interpreted the evidence regarding w ho does not participate in new social m ovem ents according to a sim ilar distinction. He observes th at 'the classes, strata, and g ro u p s th at are p en etrated least by the concerns, d em an d s, and form s of action of the "new" p arad ig m are exactly the "principal" classes of capitalist societies, nam ely, the in d u strial w orking class and the holders and agents of econom ic and adm inistrative pow er' (Offe 1985: 835). O n this basis, Offe suggests th at it is the absence of stru ctu ral im peratives, defined as location in the principal classes, that enables new social m ovem ent su p p o rters to ad o p t universalistic political o rien tatio n s.

These in terp retatio n s are fram ed in term s of w here new m iddle class in te re sts do not lie. Sim ilarly, political scientists such as D alton and In g le h a rt have a rg u e d th a t e n g a g e m e n t in n ew p o litics reflects corresponding disengagem ent from the constraints of class-based politics. A ccording to D alton, m em bers of the new m iddle class, and the better educated are freed from the traditional social bases of the party system and are subsequently m ore likely to be influenced by new political concerns (Dalton 1984: 107). Inglehart’s theory of postm aterialism is sim ilarly built upo n the contention that those w ho have had their im m ediate needs for econom ic security satisfied d u rin g adolescence and early adulthood are free to address political issues that arise from the p u rsu it of quality of life (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990). Because these conditions have been more prevalent for postw ar generations than those born before 1945, there is a m ark ed co n cen tratio n of new politics su p p o rt am ong the y o u n g er generation. Education, according to Inglehart, serves as a good indicator of form ative affluence, but is not significant in its ow n right.

The sim ple correlation betw een form ative affluence and new politics is not the only way of accounting for the significance of age and education. A ccording to Goul A ndersen, ’it seems more likely that it is the exposure

to the political struggles and political m obilisation during form ative years th at is the relevant intervening variable betw een generation and values' and th at this exposure is 'linked to know ledge and thus to education which m ay also as such affect consciousness of distant problem s such as ecological pro b lem s’ (Goul A ndersen 1990a: 106). Offe asserts that the

constituency of new social m ovem ents is d raw n prim arily from 'those w ho have the easiest cognitive access to the particular nature of systemic irrationalities or those w ho are the m ost likely victim s of cum ulative deprivations' (Offe 1985: 850). Eckersley's interpretation is essentially the same: 'the class least likely to be constrained from p u rsu in g rem edial action is the new class .... by virtue of its high education and relative autonom y from the p ro d u ctio n process’ (Eckersley 1989: 221). Tertiary ed u catio n , arg u es E ckersley, enables p eo p le to a d o p t u n iv ersalistic perspectives and conceive of society as a whole. The green constituency, by virtue of this capacity, engages in w hat Alvin G ouldner (1979) has term ed a 'culture of critical discourse'.7

There are still some attem pts to re-integrate these findings into fam iliar interest-based fram eworks. A ndre Görz (1985) and A ndrew Dobson (1990), for instance, regard the green constituency as politically m arginalised and suggest on this basis that all m arginalised categories in industrial society have a stake in p ro m o tin g green change, rath e r th an being tied to protection of the old order. These are attem pts to salvage some of the logic of rev o lu tio n a ry socialist p o sitio n s, even th o u g h the carrier of the em an cip ato ry role is no longer the w o rking class b u t the 'm ass of disaffected n o n -w o rk ers' (G örz 1985: 35). Such a version of social- structural interpretation relies on the use of the term 'm arginalisation' to fudge the significant difference betw een the young, educated, articulate m iddle class w ho do participate in the green m ovem ent, and the long­ term unem ployed an d retrenched older w orkers w ho do not have the same cultural resources at their disposal and who do not participate to any great extent.8

7 Eckersley departs from Gouldner's usage in crucial respects. According to Gouldner, both the 'technical intelligentsia’ and 'humanist intellectuals' engage in the culture of critical discourse. Eckersley plays down the role of the former, claiming that they are too heavily implicated in industrialism to adopt a sufficiently critical stance (1989: 222). It is unlikely that Gouldner would endorse Eckersley's equating of the relative absence of structural constraint with the absence of structural interests.

8 According to Kriesi, the unemployed are under-represented in new social movement activity (1989: 1106).

To sum m arise, Inglehart, D alton, Offe, Eckersley and Goul A ndersen all claim that green political participation is facilitated by the relative freedom from the structural constraints of industrialism , while Cotgrove and Duff em phasise the stru ctu ral m arginality of green participants. Either way, how ever, these analyses are not considered by these authors as complete accounts of green politics. These in te rp re ta tio n s all place significant em p h asis on characteristics w hich greens, for w h a tev e r reason, are considered not to have, and the variation betw een them centres around w hether this absence signifies deficiency or freedom . N evertheless, the placem ent of so m uch analytical w eight u p o n the absence of particular characteristics makes for a som ew hat fragile basis for explanation, and this is generally recognised.

C otgrove and Duff, for instance, are m indful of the need to find other ways to supplem ent their account w hich em phasises the relative absence of structural interest. Put sim ply, how do environm entalists come to be in 'peripheral' m iddle class occupations rather than in those locations which are central to capitalist production? It w ould be im plausible to suggest that their intra-class location is a result of generational inheritance. N or is it plausible to suggest th at environm entalists choose peripheral locations out of self-interest. C otgrove and Duff suggest therefore th at 'there are strong grounds for concluding that values are a m ajor factor influencing occupational choice' (Cotgrove & Duff 1980: 343) and th at 'those who reject the ideology and values of industrial capitalism are likely to choose careers outside the m arket-place' (1980: 344). Once again, this line can be traced back to Parkin, who argued that social and cultural occupations in the non-profit sector are 'sanctuaries' protecting those w ho inhabit them from implication in the capitalist system (Parkin 1968: 187).

For Dalton and Inglehart, the link betw een the absence of interests and the presence of values is virtually definitional. Value-based politics is the sort of politics you have w hen you d o n 't have interest-based politics.9 The

9 Unless postmaterialist needs such as self-actualisation and autonomy are treated as interests, in which case no distinction can be made between values and interests. One could argue that Inglehart's use of the Maslovian framework of developmental needs dissolves the distinction. Needs can be portrayed in terms of both values and interests.

inverse relationship betw een class interests and norm ative com m itm ents is also a feature of sociological approaches (Crook, Pakulski & W aters 1992: 147). Robyn Eckersley puts a finer point on this argum ent. It is the space opened u p by this relative absence of interest in class-based politics that provides the o p p o rtu n ity for adopting a value-based politics. This is not an opportunity that all those in the position to do so (i.e. the new m iddle class) necessarily take up, as significant n u m b ers of this sociological category still ad o p t self-interested political orientations (1989: 222-3). A comm on feature of all these accounts is that new politics, postm aterialist or green value orientations are reg ard ed as the sta n d a rd expression of value-based politics.10