Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States (U.S.) military has conducted significantly more counterinsurgency (COIN) and peacekeeping operations than any other type of operation, to include the high-intensity warfare experienced during both World Wars (Boot 2014). The diminishing possibility of large-scale conventional warfare due to the threat of nuclear weapons and the Western preoccupation with stabilizing weak and developing states suggests a continued proliferation of COIN operations as the twenty-first century progresses. As recent U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight, the cost in blood and treasure required to conduct COIN
operations using the current top-down, nation-building approach is often at odds with the level of commitment possessed by intervening powers. This resource-commitment mismatch and the failure of many COIN operations to produce decisive results have sparked a debate among COIN theorists concerning the validity of the top-down, state-centered COIN model. A growing number of COIN theorists now advocate a bottom-up, community-based approach to COIN (Jones 2010 and Kilcullen 2013). This dissertation tests a theory, based in bottom-up COIN theory, for the use of community-based security forces. The use of community-based security forces is one method promoted by bottom-up COIN theorists as one way to overcome the shortcomings of current U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine. While the use of community-based security forces is touted as a component of bottom-up COIN, in numerous cases the use of these irregular forces has led to human rights abuses and other counterproductive effects. The theory proposed in this dissertation presents variables that influence the success or failure of community-based security programs.
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, encapsulated in Field Manual (FM) 3-24: The United States Army and United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014), draws its foundations from the state-centric development model prevalent in Western governments and aid organizations.
One flaw of the manual is that authors of FM 3-24 do not critically examine the experiences of previous counterinsurgency operations using variables outside their current model to determine what, if any, other variables influence the outcomes of COIN operations. U.S. COIN doctrine and state-building both propose that population security is one of the key elements of counterinsurgency or state-building and that states
experience widespread violence because of the extent of weakness of their central governments. Therefore, these views propose that the only way to achieve security and stability is for the host nation to be the “primary actor” in providing security, while donor aid builds the structures of a modern state (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, Fukuyama 2004 and Dobbins, et al. 2007). This is the essence of the top-down COIN approach; building a centralized state apparatus to assume the role of security guarantor.
The failure of the international community and the U.S. in particular to establish functioning central governments or sustainable security in numerous post-conflict societies exposes the issues with top-down COIN methods.
This research follows the trend in recent COIN literature that proposes the state-based counterinsurgency theory is incorrect or at best insufficient because of its reliance on the unproven belief that building a traditional state-based security apparatus is the only viable way to provide security (Dobbins, et al. 2007 and Fukuyama, 2004). This view interprets Max Weber’s definition of a state as “a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,” to mean that the state must be the exclusive and not just predominant holder of force in order to function (Weber 1958). This is a Western-based view of the roles and functions of a state and presents an ideal or perfect case of societal organization and does not reflect how late developing states function. As Douglass North (1981) notes, this idealized vision of state control does not acknowledge that at best most states only enjoy a comparative advantage in the use of force. Often the exercise of violence in a weak state experiencing an insurgency is a cooperative and competitive interaction between the state, insurgents, and other non-state practitioners of violence.
Detractors of state-building theory point to the numerous failures of state-building projects to gain lasting security in many conflict prone states in Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East. These critics propose that such efforts fail because they use Western state formation as the template and demand development of a central government, democratization, and modernization at a pace that overwhelms the capacity of fragile states and societies (Paris, 2004 and Ahram, 2011). While critiques of state-building theory have led international development agencies and donors to focus on a dual strategy of top-down and bottom-up development models, little rigorous and analytical focus has been paid to applying these lessons to COIN doctrine (OECD, 2007).
The failure or inconclusive results of recent state-building projects attempted by the international community in Somalia and several Sub-Saharan Africa states and of state-centric counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan questions the practicability of state formation in fragile or failed states contending with weak
institutions and non-state competitors. The alternative to establishing state monopoly of
power in countries where it never existed or where the state has traditionally been a hindrance to stability and development is to accept the devolution of violence to non-state actors and find practical ways to incorporate those non-state actors into
counterinsurgency efforts (Ahram 2011).
Authors such as Seth Jones (2010) and David Kilkullen (2013) point to the need for the application of bottom-up COIN strategies, but offer models based on single cases.
Jones (2010) defines bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy as leveraging existing grassroots resistance to insurgent movements to not only secure the population, but also to gain the support of the population. By gaining the support of the local population,
“especially mobilizing locals to fight insurgents, providing information on their locations and movements, and denying insurgent sanctuary in their areas,” the goal of bottom-up COIN strategy is to “mobilize communities simultaneously across multiple areas” (Jones 2010, ix). Jones proposes that this method can create an unstoppable momentum against an insurgent force until “a ‘cascade’ or tipping point is created and insurgent victory is impossible” (Jones 2010, ix). This suggests a need for the establishment of the
relationship between the variables influencing bottom-up COIN strategies and the outcome of the operation, as well as the relationship among the variables themselves.
One of the main foundations of this dissertation, derived from an exhaustive literature review and recent U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that COIN forces often fail to establish population security because of inadequate
external security force manpower and resources. Military leaders asked to face the daunting task of defeating an insurgency are left in a quandary imposed by the competing factors of limited resources and time constraints and the requirements of speed, duration,
and resources necessary to build a strong central government and security sector necessary to defeat an insurgency. Faced with these constraints and requirements, commanders of COIN forces in most recent cases are forced violate COIN doctrine and adopt bottom-up strategies to achieve population security. One such strategy is the use of community-based security forces, which is the focus of this dissertation. These programs have produced mixed results. In Iraq community-based, security forces produced rapid gains in security in 2007 through the Sons of Iraq program, while in Afghanistan
community-based security forces in the period of 2002 to the present have produced few security gains with little initial success (Human Rights Watch 2011). Earlier
counterinsurgency operations by the U.S., France, Britain and Peru have also used local community security forces to overcome resource and information constraints as well as to provide rapid and persistent security in contested zones, with varying degrees of success.
This practice contradicts current counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, which dictates that only the state can provide security. Instead of addressing this deficiency in
counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, the use of community-based security forces has been ignored or downplayed in the 2014 revision of FM 2-34 and therefore has not been scrutinized as a necessary component of successful U.S. counterinsurgency strategies (Gentile, 2008 and Amato, 2011).
Problem Statement
Community-based security is not without its critics. Detractors highlight instances of predatory behavior by community-based security forces or their use by nefarious local powerbrokers, which hinder the effectiveness of aid and the development of state institutions (Human Rights Watch 2011). The frequency of the use of
community-based security forces and their mixed record in counterinsurgency operations, coupled with the lack of attention placed on the factors necessary for their successful implementation, demonstrates a need for further study. This problem lends itself to asking which factors and combination of factors influence the outcome of community-based security programs as a part of a larger COIN operation.
Statement of Purpose and Research Question
The impracticability of current top-down COIN doctrine and the near universal, but mixed, use of community-based security forces points to an important area of research relevant to academics and practitioners. For academics, this study refines one facet of COIN theory, further challenging the concept of the state monopoly on the use of force and providing an empirical theory for the successful use of community-based security forces. For practitioners, this study seeks to provide selection criteria for the use of community-based security forces and to set expectations for their effectiveness.
Therefore, this research seeks to address the research question, “How do the variables associated with the relevant literature on community-based policing influence the outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?”
Community-based policing theory proposed by Bruce Baker provides one source of potential variables to apply to COIN community-based security programs. The overlap between community-based security and community-based policing are evident beyond the similarity in names. Community-based security programs seek to empower local populations to establish security in ongoing internal conflicts that weaken the ability of the state to secure a population, while community-based policing promotes the
establishment of security after conflict termination when the institutions of a state cease to exist or are degraded.
Community-based policing theory has been successfully tested in post-conflict countries in Africa and adherence to the principles of the theory have been found to promote accountability of security forces to the local populace and provide security and judicial services that are congruent with local practices, while maintaining government oversight (Baker 2004). Baker (2004) proposes that the critical variables required for the success of a community-based security program are the incorporation of traditional justice systems; local sustainability and accountability; voluntary participation by local elites; and external oversight. While this theory has been proven effective in post-conflict states in Africa, it has not been tested in other regions or as a component of counterinsurgency operations.
This dissertation, guided by the relevant literature discussed in the literature review, proposes that because of the higher level of violence and material capacity associated with insurgent groups compared to other non-state actors such as gangs, the most critical variable in community-security programs is sustained external oversight and support. This is a divergence from Baker’s theory, which suggests some oversight by a responsible state is necessary, but links to discredited or predatory government forces can often act as a negative influence on the acceptance of community-based policing by the local population (Baker 2010). The greater need for material and training support required to confront a trained and well-equipped insurgent force should outweigh the benefits of autonomy in cases of community-based security programs in
counterinsurgency operations. This is due to the greater threat posed by a well-armed
insurgent group as compared to the low-level crime and disorganized civil unrest faced by the post-conflict community-based policing programs addressed in Baker’s research.
It is a reasonable assumption that community-based security forces must be armed at a nearly equal level to the insurgent forces they confront, thus community-based security forces would require a higher level of support from government forces.
The remaining variables are unchanged from Baker’s model. In addition to oversight, limited territorial jurisdiction should also influence the ability of non-state security forces to act as predatory agents outside their social and geographic
communities. Incorporation of traditional justice systems should influence the local acceptance of community-based security forces by tapping into conflict resolution mechanisms accepted by the population. This variable should also influence the ability of local trusted agents to negotiate and reintegrate marginal members of the insurgency under terms understood by the local actors in the conflict. The ability for local actors to sustain the manpower requirements of the program and accountability mechanisms should influence the long-term ownership of the program by local populations. Including local power brokers and violence specialists into community-security programs should influence the success of the program by co-opting existing power structures and minimizing the creation of powerful spoilers.
Hypothesis
Therefore, the alternate hypothesis proposed is that the degree of adherence to the factors described above and their interdependence determines the level of sustainable security attained through community-based security programs. The hypothesis can be illustrated by this formula:
security (s)= amount of sustained external oversight and support (os) + limits to territorial jurisdiction (t) + level of traditional justice systems incorporation (tj) + degree of local sustainability and accountability (sa) + level of voluntary participation by local elites (le) or s=os+t+tj+sa+le. The null hypothesis is that adherence to these factors does not influence the level of security experienced by communities participating in
based security programs. The variables presented, based on community-based policing theory and relevant COIN theory discussed later in this proposal,
addresses the unique issues and factors encountered in counterinsurgency operations and those issues critics raise with the use of non-state actors in the provision of security.
Research Approach
The research objective of the dissertation is to conduct a disciplined configurative case study of 11 counterinsurgency campaigns that include large-scale community based security programs and then use the congruence case study method to test the ability of the theory to explain the outcome of individual cases. In all military operations trade-offs between competing requirements must be made and each of these factors must be balanced to achieve success. Therefore, a model for the optimum balance between each of the factors of the model must be created. To accomplish this, a Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be conducted to determine which conditions are necessary or sufficient for a specific outcome and the potential combination of conditions that can produce an outcome. To further test the explanatory power of the model, an additional case study will be examined after the QCA to determine if the combinations and relative strength of each variable produced by the QCA provide adequate explanation of the case.
Assumptions
Based on the researcher’s experience and the relevant historical accounts of the use of local indigenous security forces during COIN operations, three primary
assumptions were made regarding this study. First, the used of community-based security forces can be a critical component of bottom-up COIN operations. This
assumption is based on premise held by a growing number of military and COIN analysts that the Sons of Iraq program was a key component in the reduction of violence in Iraq during the so-called US military force “Surge” in 2007. This is a necessary assumption because if other environmental conditions are the causal variables that cause specific outcomes, the validity of this study comes into question. This dissertation continually tests the validity of this assumption by accounting for other factors that influence the outcome of all the cases studied.
Second, this study assumes that the desire for security is a universal motivation and the inhabitants of a community have a stake in stability and security of that
community. Therefore, given the access to the proper resources, local actors will be motivated to provide security for themselves. This assumption is guided by Maslow’s hierarchy of needs that posits the desire for safety is one of the base human motivators. It is also based on community policing principle of local ownership that proposes that given a stake in the outcome of a program, the local population will desire a successful
outcome. This assumption is necessary because if local inhabitants caught in an active insurgency are primarily motivated by other considerations, the principles of community-based policing are not valid for COIN community-community-based security programs.
Third, accounting for local differences in environmental and cultural conditions, community-based security programs used in previous COIN operations share similar characteristics. This is based on an initial review of the cases used in this dissertation and others outside the scope of this study. This is a necessary assumption for this dissertation because the purpose of this study is to measure the degree of membership of selected attributes the cases selected for this study share. As with the others previously noted, this assumption will be tested throughout this dissertation by accounting for other factors in each of the cases that may have been causal influences on their outcomes.
Rationale and Significance
Most counterinsurgency theorists support the use of local security forces, but are either vague in the requirements for effectiveness or provide case specific
recommendations. Community-based policing in Africa and Bruce Baker’s theories on community-based policing provide an existing theoretic framework that Baker (2010) notes has not been tested outside of Africa or applied to community-based security effort during an insurgency. The model for this research intends to test the hypotheses that local ownership, incorporation of traditional justice systems, sustainability, and voluntary participation by the community and local security provider will resolve many of the concerns that arise during the implementation of a community-based security program.
This dissertation and the model presented in it will provide two additions to the existing literature. First, it will provide support for the general applicability of bottom-up COIN, which up to this point has been developed and tested using single cases. Also, a QCA of the model, which is explained in depth in the methodology chapter, will indicate the relative importance of each variable and the necessary and sufficient combination of
variables needed to produce a required outcome; this type of analysis has not been conducted before. Second, testing a modified community-based policing model will test the variables of the model outside of Africa, which has not been done before. In each of these areas this dissertation will provide a unique and necessary contribution to the existing literature.
Definitions of Key Terminology Used in This Study
Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency – The use of social networks at the local level by a national government or external force to secure the local population, isolate insurgents
Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency – The use of social networks at the local level by a national government or external force to secure the local population, isolate insurgents