Having analysed both Christianity and Judaism, it is now logical to assess the Islamic tradition to determine if a separate doctrine of holy war exists within this tradition. On the basis of the available evidence, it is possible to advance the notion that the Islamic faith is a potential source of violence. This is not to say that it espouses more violent axioms by nature than either Christianity or Judaism,200 only that Islam generates a
very different understanding of how divine law applies to the world. As the Islamic
194 Frederic Wehrey and Ariel I. Ahram, “Taming The Militias: Building National Guards in Fractured
Arab States” Carnegie Endowment (15 may 2019) 5.
195 Ibid.
196 Azeem Ibrahim and Hikmet Karcic, “The Balkan Wars Created a Generation of Christian Terrorists”
Foreign Policy (24 may 2019) https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/24/the-balkan-wars-created-a- generation-of-christian-terrorists/ accessed 09/09/2019.
197 Whilst religion is certainly part of globalisation, paradoxically as communities become marginalised,
it can also be a source of backlash. See generally M. Herrington Luke, ‘Globalization and Religion in Historical Perspective: A Paradoxical Relationship’ (2013) 4 Religions 145.
198 Mark. Juergensmeyer, ‘Religious Nationalism in a Global World’ (2019) 10 Religions 97.
199 Robert M. Kunovich, ‘An Exploration of the Salience of Christianity for National Identity in Europe’
(2006) 49 Sociological Perspectives 435; Rogers Brubaker, ‘Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective’ (2017) 40 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1191.
200 Timothy Renner ‘A Quantitative Look at Violence in Religious Texts’ (Timothy Renner, 2
December 2015) <https://timothyrenner.github.io/datascience/2015/12/02/violence-in-religious- text.html> accessed 4 December 2017.
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faith is all-encapsulating, it is therefore perhaps more difficult to distinguish any approach to war completely devoid of religious motivation within the tradition.201 On
this basis, it may be thought of as resembling a more primordial approach to violent conduct. However, it is sufficiently distinct from both its progenitors and earlier religious notions to merit more detailed discussion. For one, there is a more diverse array of perspectives visible in the Islamic faith, with many different interpretations as to what religious war is, emerging within the tradition.202 The persistence of the
Islamic notion of war well into the modern age in both the imagination of state militaries203 and terrorist groups204 also calls for an investigation. Accordingly, it is
appropriate to explore the origins of the approach to warfare contained in Islamic tradition, which diverged somewhat from the general understanding of tribal warfare found on the Arab peninsula during the seventh century.205 It is also worth mentioning
that in its early history, the Islamic faith was seen as heretical by both Christians and Jews.206 This background is an important consideration in understanding the
development of organised violence in the Islamic tradition.
The Quran, as the primary religious text, covers the early development of a doctrine of conflict in the Islamic tradition in addition to the central tenets of the Islamic faith. It is commonly divided into two periods of revelation: The Meccan and Medinan. The majority of the Quranic sources advocating the use of violence – the “sword verses” – fall later, which has consequences in terms of how they are interpreted.207 Calls for violence in the text are apparently directed against disbelievers
and idolaters.208 However, there are also verses that place restrictions on warfare.209 A
purely exoteric reading, however, does not necessarily reveal the correct reading of war in the Quran, with different forms and methods necessary for a correct
201 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan
2011) 2.
202 Ibid.
203 Gen S.K. Malik, Quranic Concept of War (Adam Publishers & Distributors 1992) 95–96.
204 For instance, in a section titled “Why We Hate You and Why We Fight You” ISIS discusses the
importance of waging war against anyone who opposes their message. See Dabiq 15 (Al Hiyat Media 2016)
205 As Armstrong notes, along with Christianity and Judaism, a great number of faiths populated the
region. Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (Random House Publishing Group 2007) 11.
206 The Islamic faith was initially framed in this manner, with writers from this period framing thios
perspective as prevalent amongst Jewish and Christian contemporaries. See Peter the Venerable, Writings Against the Saracens (Catholic University of America Press 2016) 46.
207 Yaser Ellethy, Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy: Classical and Modern Interpretations
(Taylor & Francis 2015) 118.
208 The Qur'an (Oxford World's Classics) 2:191. 209 Quran 2:190, 2:191–195.
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interpretation.210 Whilst this the exoteric meaning is not the formally correct reading,
it is of immense importance to both how the Quran is understood by Revivalist movements, and critically by external, non-Islamic observers.
Whilst jihad is used in different contexts in the Quran, it is possible to discern dual themes within the revelation, with the initial Mecca phase being more spiritual, whereas, in later Medinan revelations, the term encapsulates violence in addition to earlier meanings.211 As Firestone notes, the context of Islam is fairly violent; not only
did the Arabian peninsula relatively have scarce resources, but it was also afflicted by intense clan-based violence.212 This formed the background for the subsequent raids
and conquests undertaken by Muhammad, which are recorded in the Quran. Modern commentators are well apprised of the context and prevailing conditions in their interpretive framework.213 As with the Jewish faith, this understanding of context
could serve in restraining the use of religious violence. An argument that emerges from this acknowledgement is that Muhammad lived in a context so alien to the modern condition that it would, therefore, be unfair to examine him from a perspective informed by modern standards of civics and warfare.214 However, critically,
mainstream Islamic understanding does not confine the actions of Muhammad to a historical condition; instead, Muhammad is taken to represent an example of human infallibility. His actions are meant to inform the behaviour of Muslims indefinitely, and therefore cannot be muted in the same manner as secular figures. It can be determined however that Muhammad took radical steps in relation to internal warfare, forbidding the traditional Ghazwahs,215 which the Arab tribes of the time were
accustomed to embark upon. Muhammad turned their activities outwards, permitting raids to be conducted against non-Muslims, and on occasion leading such raids in person. Allegiance to God, or his prophet, effectively surpassed the previously binding notion of tribal allegiance. This rapidly allowed for the traditional notion of tribal
210 The term Tafsīr is used to refer to the interpretation (exegesis) of the Quran. There are different
approaches to this process.
211 Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawy, Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Muhammad Said Al-
Ashmawy (University of Florida Press 2002) 113.
212 Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (Oxford University Press 1999) 36. 213 Ellethy (n 207) 119.
214 Patrick Sookhdeo, Global Jihad: The Future in the Face of Militant Islam (BookBaby 2014) 210. 215 Referring to tribal raids. See generally Peter A. Webb, ‘Creating Arab Origins: Muslim
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raiding to transform into what ultimately became a total declaration of war against all non-Muslims in defiance of any previously existing clan or familial bonds.216
It is, to some extent, possible to account for the variable notions of religious violence by considering the context that was constructed around these events, a step reputedly grounded in the Quran itself.217 This historiography commonly frames
recourse to violence during the prophetic era as an uncomfortable necessity, the last resort in the face of abuses by polytheists and Jews.218 The importance of context in
relation to notions of violence has conventionally been attained in the formal, scholarly approach to the faith, by a distinct class of scholars (ulema), utilising a scientific approach to the Quran,219 which to some extent has stabilised the manner in which the
prophetic era is framed in the classical construction of Jihad. Problems do, however, begin to emerge when sects of the faith instead seek to present the prophetic era in an ahistorical manner.
Despite formalism being historically imposed in the way recourse to violence in the Islamic faith is understood, there have been recurrent arguments throughout Islamic history as to the meaning of the word jihad. Whilst it does not have a singular meaning, the use of the term in reference to violence in both the Quran and Hadith translated to the use of the term in relation to military endeavours throughout the classical period.220 Jihad is associated with struggle and is used to refer to conflicts
between Muslims and Meccan polytheists.221 In subsequent legal interpretations, jihad
served as a means of uniting Muslims and mobilising them in order to solidify power.222 Jihad is frequently understood to denote war fought against infidels,223
though this is not the word’s only meaning.224 The discussion of holy war within the
Islamic context is therefore reflected in the use of the word jihad, though this is not the word’s exclusive meaning.
216 Firestone (n 189) 18.
217 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, “Qur'anic 'Jihād': A Linguistic and Contextual Analysis (2010) 12
Journal of Qur'anic Studies 147
218 Muhammad Abdel Haleem, Understanding the Qur'an: Themes and Style (I.B Tauris 2010) 64–67. 219 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam
(Cambridge University Press 1986).
220 Referring to the first three centuries of Islam. Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam
(University of Chicago Press 1991) 72.
221 Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, Islamic Rulings on Warfare (U.S. Army War College
2004) 3.
222 Rudolph Peters, The Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (Markus Wiener Publishers
2005) 5.
223 Ibid.
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The Quran has given rise to a number of distinct approaches to warfare; different approaches are frequently criticised as being selective in terms of which verses or periods they emphasise.225 Additionally, the Hadith sources seem to support
both peaceful and warlike interpretations.226 Speaking generally, Islam began in the
context of violent expansion once the initial Islamic caliphate was consolidated. However, it became apparent that the domain of Islam would not experience seamless expansion. This necessitated the production of a doctrine that permitted stable relations with the non-Muslim world. Crafting this initial Islamic international legal system required the addition of reasoning to build upon the content of primary religious sources and cover emergent problems in the early Islamic community. Classical interpretations of Islamic warfare stress the essential division of the world into the house of war and the house of Islam.227 This distinction is stressed in the
emergent system of Islamic international or imperial law. Within the house of war, further distinctions are drawn between the people of the book and the polytheists. The ultimate aim of the Islamic state is to dominate the house of war via jihad.228 Bernard
Lewis estimates that the classical goal of jihad was to expand the domain of the Islamic state until it was accepted by the entire world. A temporary truce could be made if it benefited Muslims, though ultimately no permanent peace was possible prior to the achievement of this ultimate goal.229 The persistence of this goal would no doubt cause
a condition of bad faith between the Islamic state and any external force they should encounter.
As this chapter has already stated, however, there are multiple constructions of warfare within the classical period. Al Farabi, for instance, discusses the use of war in an offensive sense, justified on the basis of bringing Islamic virtue to the disbeliever and thereby improving their personal existence. Violence is ultimately necessary, as not everyone is susceptible to reason, and therefore force must be utilised. War is essentially rooted in this limitation, as well as the need to compel a portion of the
225 Aboul-Enein and Zuhur (n 221) 6.
226 Marie-Luisa Frick and Andreas Muller (eds), Islam and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism
from a Plurality of Perspectives: Brill`s Arab and Islamic Laws Series, vol 7 (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 75.
227Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, The Reliance of the Traveler (Islamic Texts Socity 1993) 994 [43]. 228 Johannes Bork, ‘Models of Coexistence: Approaches for Overcoming the Classical Legal Division
Between the “Land of Islam” and the “Land of War” by Contemporary Islamic Scholars’ (2017) 38 Journal of Beliefs & Values 247.
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population not susceptible to persuasion to obey the law by force.230 In at least one
contemporary analysis, however, al Farabi is seen as diverging from the prevailing view of jihad. He dismisses the existence of absolute evil231 and advances the notion
that there are therefore no fit targets for jihad, as it is unthinkable that there would be an entire enemy city in which all individuals are morally derelict enough to justify such an extreme war.232 Whatever the conclusion with relation to jihad, al Farabi
sought to use the classical influence of Plato and Aristotle to reinterpret the core texts of Islam for the benefit of his society, 233 introducing some classical influences.
Speaking generally, the prophet Muhammad could be construed as imposing restraint on warfare, discernable through his pronouncements and actions.234 Indeed,
it is possible to suggest that violence is expressly forbidden in Islam, except in the case where the situation is morally elevated in the faiths estimation; expanding the Dar-al- Islam. In this case, scholars contended it was not only good to fight, but leaders should ensure that the community did so at least once a year.235 Al Shaybani built on this
theme, suggesting in an initial articulation of international Islamic law that it is desirable, though not necessary, that disbelievers be offered a chance to convert prior to engaging in hostilities;236 this would, of course, relieve the need for conflict. The
non-Muslim individual is induced to this condition in that should he surrender, he gets the protections to which Muslims are entitled; for instance, getting to keep his property.237 Non-Muslim subjugation is also an option, though on far less favourable
terms.238 In addition to setting out terms for warfare against non-Muslims, al Shaybani
offers some insight into the formation of a doctrine permitting the use of violence against other Muslims. A coherent legal basis for war between Muslims is difficult; unlike apostasy (if someone defects from the faith, it is permitted to kill them239),
rebels accept the faith of Islam but are errant in their allegiance to the Islamic state in
230 Muhin Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy (University of Chicago
Press 2001) 139.
231 Joshua Parens, An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions: Introducing Alfarabi (State University
of New York Press 2006) 69.
232 Ibid 71–72.
233 Daniel E. Burns, ‘Alfarabi and the Creation of an Islamic Political Science’ (2016) 78 The Review
of Politics 365, 365–366.
234 Aboul-Enein and Zuhur (n 221) 8. 235 Peters, (n 222) 20.
236 Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Siyar al-Saghir (Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi tr, Islamic
Research Group 1998) 48.
237 Ibid 55. 238 Ibid 58–59. 239 Ibid 67.
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some way.240 Talking of the “people of rebellion”, al Shaybani sets out the situations
in which it is permissible to kill them.241 Rebels, whilst permissible to kill, get
preferential treatment to that which must be expected by non-Muslims in relation to property rights. It is naturally necessary for rebels to be killed for their divisiveness; their status as errant Muslims is, however, superior to that of a non-Muslim or apostate. In the general discourse the meaning of rebel as well as the permissibility of fighting them is a matter of much greater complexity than the rather cut and dry approach of al Shaybani, however.242 There is however no doubt that across various examples of
Muslim imperial code recognition of the essential utility of collective violence to both expand the influence of Islam, and critically as a tool for maintaining order within the Islamic community. In almost every situation, a Muslim gains preferential treatment to that which a disbeliever might expect. In brief, it is possible to suggest that, as a rule, Muslims aren’t supposed to fight, unless it is in pursuit of Jihad. Coping with the need to fight within the Muslim community, therefore, became a central challenge for early Muslims. A solution was produced, though a normative boundary existed between those that expressed allegiance to Islam on the battlefield and those who didn’t. Having gained an understanding of the essential Islamic understanding of conflict, it is possible to set out how the application of conflict by the faith is limited. To briefly apply a frame of historical reference, the notion of a global Islamic leader in the Sunni tradition is relatively meaningful until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire; a last, largely ineffectual jihad was declared in the early twentieth century.243
Yet, the loss of a polar Islamic leader has far-reaching consequences in terms of invoking jihad in the meaning of holy war. There is a reasonable basis to assert, however, that the declaration of jihad is privileged in the same way as modern conventional war is, in that only the correct authority may declare it. Today the
240 Referring to Fitnah in the sense of a rebellion or revolution. See Abdelilah Belkeziz, The State in
Contemporary Islamic Thought (I.B Tauris 2009).
241 al-Shaybani (n 236) 67.
242It is of course in some situations permissible to rebel in the context of Islamic law, notably when
governed by an unjust leader. Applying the principles of rebellion to the modern content is naturally challenging, however. See Mohamed Badar, Ahmed Al-Dawoody and Noelle Higgins, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law of Rebellion: Its Significance to the Current International Humanitarian Law Discourse’ in Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral and Ayesha Shahid (eds), International Law and Islam (Brill Nijhoff 2018) <https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004388376/BP000021.xml> accessed 09/09/19
243 Mustafa Aksakal, ‘“Holy War Made in Germany”? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad’ (2011) 18
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consensus is that it is a state.244 Historically it would have been the Caliph.245 This
serves as an eliminatory factor that would constrain the conduct of the holy war, given that the state system has proliferated globally. Second, the spiritual meaning of jihad has been emphasized in mainstream Islamic thought, over the more classical association with actual physical warfare, with an abject denial that it has ever carried violent connotations exhibited in a few fringe documents.246 Jihad, after all, has
multiple meanings; increasingly, the more liberal notion of internal jihad has been highlighted in Islamic thought.247
More aggressive and permissive understandings of jihad are present throughout different periods of Islamic history, many of which have been replicated in the current era. Ibn Taymiyyah’s majmū’ al-fatāwā is frequently cited by ISIS,248
and the scholar has been held up as one of the most prominent influences on the philosophy of Salafi jihadism.249 Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a period where the Islamic
world was faced with possible destruction at the hands of the Mongol empire; additionally, his lifetime was characterised by normalisation of relations between Muslim empires and Christians; Ibn Taymiyyah was extremely critical of those he saw as responsible for these trends.250 He sought a return of the Muslim world as a solution
to the issues of his era, to its point of origin, and this provides a key touchstone for contemporary jihadi thought. The aforementioned fatwa he created was intended to make clear that despite professing to be Muslim, the Mongols (occasionally tartars) were not Muslim, and it was therefore imperative that they were killed.251 Ibn
Taymiyyah frequently experienced difficulties ranging from scholarly disagreements,
244 This is visibly contended by modern non-state violent groups emerging from the Islamic tradition.